









J u d i t h  r e s n i k   
 
Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of 
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of 
Rights 
abstract.  Two developments frame this discussion: the demise of negotiated contracts as 
the predicate to enforcing arbitration obligations under the Federal Arbitration Act and the reori-
entation of court-based procedures to assimilate judges’ activities to those of other dispute reso-
lution providers. From 1925 until the mid-1980s, obligations to arbitrate rested on consent. 
Thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court shifted course and enforced court and class action waivers 
mandated when consumers purchased goods and employees applied for jobs. To explain the  
legitimacy of precluding court access for federal and state claims, the Court developed new  
rationales—that arbitration had procedural advantages over adjudication, and that arbitration 
was an effective enforcement mechanism to “vindicate” public rights.  
The result has been the mass production of arbitration clauses without a mass of arbitra-
tions. Although hundreds of millions of consumers and employees are obliged to use arbitration 
as their remedy, almost none do so—rendering arbitration not a vindication but an unconstitu-
tional evisceration of statutory and common law rights. The diffusion of disputes to a range of 
private, unknowable alternative adjudicators also violates the constitutional protections accorded 
to the public—endowed with the right to observe state-empowered decision makers as they im-
pose binding outcomes on disputants. Closed processes preclude the public from assessing the 
qualities of what gains the force of law and debating what law ought to require. The cumulative 
effect of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on arbitration has been to produce an unconstitu-
tional system that undermines both the legitimacy of arbitration and the functions of courts. 
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introduction:  dispute diffusion  
“To avoid the expense and delay of having a trial, judges encourage the liti-
gants to try to reach an agreement resolving their dispute.” 
  —“Understanding the Federal Courts/How Courts Work,” website 
of the U.S. Courts, 20151  
 
“We may change any terms, conditions, rates, fees, expenses, or charges re-
garding your Services at any time.” 
  —Wireless Provider “Customer Agreement,” 20152 
Courts are equated with public processes, and arbitration with private con-
sensual agreements. Yet that convention misses the degree to which public law 
has come to regulate the contours of arbitration, and the ways in which courts 
have incorporated privatizing practices. While public and private—in various 
senses of those words—have long co-mingled in courts and in arbitration, the 
balance has shifted, reconfiguring the field of dispute resolution and diminish-
ing distinctions between the work of courts and of other dispute resolution 
providers. 
One reason to care about the changing mix of the public and the private in 
both venues is that the political authority and the moral legitimacy of courts 
and arbitration have depended on distinctions between public and private 
spheres. In theory, judges are agents of the state, charged with implementing 
its law through public decision making; arbitrators are creatures of contracts, 
obliged to effectuate the intent of the parties. The distinction is presumed to be 
constitutionally respectful and welfare-maximizing, enabling the enforcement 
of public rights and protecting the autonomy of contractual relationships.  
Yet the two practices—adjudication and arbitration—are coming to be 
styled as fungible options on a “dispute resolution” (DR) spectrum. An in-
creasingly common parlance (crisscrossing the globe) replaces the phrase  
“alternative dispute resolution” (ADR) with DR, so as to put courts—now 
deemed “Judicial Dispute Resolution” (JDR) or “Judicial Conflict Resolution” 
 
1. Civil Cases, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederal 
Courts/HowCourtsWork/CivilCases.aspx [http://perma.cc/BR9L-4WGC]. 
2. The quotation comes from Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T § 1.3 (2015), http://www 
.att.com/legal/terms.wirelessCustomerAgreement-list.html [http://perma.cc/9XA6-E956] 
[hereinafter AT&T Wireless Customer Agreement] (emphasis omitted). Similar provisions 
are proffered by other wireless service providers. See, e.g., General Terms and Conditions  
of Service, SPRINT, http://shop2.sprint.com/en/legal/legal_terms_privacy_popup.shtml?id16 
=terms_and_conditions (“We may change any part of the Agreement at any time, including, 
but not limited to, rates, charges, how we calculate charges, discount, coverages, technolo-
gies used to provide services, or your terms of Service.”). 
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(JCR)3—on a continuum of mechanisms responding to conflicts. This formula-
tion aligns courts with a range of options that clouds courts’ identity as a 
unique constitutionally obliged mode of decision making.  
The reasons for and the goals of this homogenization vary, as the field of 
DR is capacious. Among its proponents are those seeking to respond to the 
high demand for adjudicatory services by augmenting “paths to justice” so as 
to enhance access,4 reformers aspiring to shape more collegial problem-solving 
processes,5 entrepreneurs looking for business,6 and potential defendants  
hoping to avoid the publicity and regulation that courts entail.7 The methods 
include expanding the forms of process, increasing the power of private pro-
viders to issue binding judgments, and broadening the repertoire of providers. 
The shared aim is to produce resolutions enforceable by law. 
“Dispute Diffusion” is the term I offer to capture these new commitments 
to the eclipse of court-based adjudication as the primary paradigm for govern-
ment-authorized dispute resolution. Implementation in the United States 
comes through a mix of policymaking through statutes, rules, regulations, and 
court-made doctrines, which press trial-level judges to become conciliators, to 
deploy other individuals as “neutrals” to mediate or to arbitrate in courts, and 
to outsource decision making to the private market. Much of the work seeks to 
quiet conflict by relying on confidential interactions among disputants and de-
cision makers. The claims filed, the methods used by decision makers, and  
the results are often outside the public’s purview. An array of provisions—
forming what I term “Alternative Civil Procedural Rules” (ACPR)—reflect the  
 
3. Such shorthands appear in a variety of materials. See, e.g., THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: 
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski eds., 2013) 
[hereinafter THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE].  
4. See, e.g., HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO 
LAW 148-66 (1999); Mauro Cappelletti, Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes Within the 
Framework of the World-Wide Access-to-Justice Movement, 56 MOD. L. REV. 282 (1993). 
5. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democrat-
ic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L. J. 2663 (1995). 
6. See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the Profes-
sion and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 950-53 (1993).  
7. For example, advertising campaigns have characterized litigation as abusive, while defenders 
of court-based processes argue that critics have exaggerated the harms of lawsuits and un-
dervalued the legitimacy of the injuries sought to be redressed. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, An 
Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 
731-33 (1998) (discussing how a lawsuit against a fast food restaurant, which had served 
scalding coffee that caused serious injuries, became a poster case for the misuse of courts); 
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social Science: Lessons 
from West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1097 (2008) (detailing anti-litigation organizations 
targeting jurisdictions for being insufficiently protective of business interests). 
  
the yale law journal 124:280 4   20 15  
2808 
 
developing deregulatory norms. While conferring adjudicatory license on a  
variety of private processes, the ACPR rarely address the needs of indigent  
users, the independence of the decision makers, and the rights of the public to 
participate.  
Some aspects of Dispute Diffusion can be attributed to private ordering,8 
but the focus in my discussion is not on international sovereign debt or trade 
arbitrations. Rather, my concerns are about mandates applied to hundreds of 
millions of consumers and employees, obliged to arbitrate not because of 
choice but because public laws have constructed requirements to use private 
decision making in lieu of adjudication. The United States Supreme Court 
opened the floodgates during the last three decades, as it reinterpreted 1925 
congressional legislation, now known as the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), to 
require courts to enforce a myriad of arbitration provisions, promulgated by 
issuers of consumer credit, manufacturers of products, and employers.  
The result has been the mass production of arbitration clauses requiring 
that claimants, alleging violations of federal and state statutory and common 
law wrongs, proceed single-file to decision makers designated by the clauses’ 
providers. To assume the result is “mass arbitration” is to misunderstand how 
the provisions function; few who are cut off from using the courts and required 
(rather than choosing) to arbitrate do so, thereby erasing as well as diffusing 
disputes. 
Procedural change is synonymous with the history of courts, as transna-
tional exchanges shape and reshape both adjudication and arbitration. The de-
velopment of new modes for responding to disputes and the proliferation of 
sites for resolution are not problems, per se. An important example is the 
growth of administrative adjudication, through which many (but not all) pow-
ers of courts are delegated to other kinds of judges who work under rules craft-
ed through public exchanges and subjected to constitutional limitations.9 In 
doctrinal terms, as long as the Court determines that the “process due” suffices, 
delegation to an alternative forum is permissible.10  
 
8. See, e.g., EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010); A. 
Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy”—Causes and (Partial) 
Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605 (2002); Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International 
Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2015).  
9. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), is the iconic statement of the obligations that follow 
such adjudicators. A recent review of the interactions among federal administrative adjudi-
cators comes from Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 805 (2015). In the federal system, Article III imposes some constraints on the permissi-
ble scope of delegation to non-Article III judges. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 
2608-09 (2013).  
10. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), provides the oft-stated test evaluating the private 
and public interests at stake and the risks of error of not providing certain forms of process. 
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But in the context of mandated arbitration, the Court has not exercised its 
obligation to analyze the alternatives and assess their quality. Rather, the Court 
has spun off decision making without imposing structured safeguards. The re-
sult is a system that ought to be seen as unconstitutional, in which state-
enforced dispute resolution is outsourced to hundreds of unregulated providers 
whose rules are hard to find, processes generally closed, and outcomes difficult 
to know.  
The burden of my discussion is to understand why and how new dispute 
resolution institutions are being constructed, to map their contours and values, 
and to analyze their constitutional and normative implications. The recent Su-
preme Court FAA case law has garnered a good deal of criticism for cutting off 
the production of law,11 for undermining the role of Article III courts,12 for  
limiting associational rights,13 and for constricting access to law by enforcing 
bans on the collective pursuit of claims.14 The reallocation of disputes through 
the FAA to non-public service providers should also be understood as a shadow 
conflict over public subsidies for litigants. Justices who object to reading the 
federal Constitution as imposing positive obligations to support civil litigants 
and who are leery of court-based class actions can avoid debates about the 
scope of such rights by obliging disputants to use single-file arbitration.15 The 
 
11. J. Maria Glover, Feature, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE 
L.J. 3052 (2015). 
12. See PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 15-53 (2012); Roger J. 
Perlstadt, Article III Judicial Power and the Federal Arbitration Act, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 201 
(2012). 
13. See Burt Neuborne, Ending Lochner Lite, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183 (2015). 
14. See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 118-133 (2011); Myriam E. Gilles, The 
End of Doctrine: Private Arbitration, Public Law and the Anti-Lawsuit Movement (Benjamin N. 
Cardozo Sch. of Law, Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies Research Paper No. 436, 
2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2488575 [http://perma.cc/REK9-6NZQ]. 
15. For example, Justice Scalia has authored two opinions requiring single-file arbitrations de-
spite evidence that absent the capacity to use collective action, claims will not be brought. 
See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), discussed infra notes 370-373, 422-437, 441-445 
and accompanying text. Justice Scalia has also questioned the extent to which the Constitu-
tion requires governments to assist individuals seeking to use the courts. See, e.g., Lewis v. 
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-350 (1996). Justice Thomas concurred in both of the arbitration 
rulings upholding class bans. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2312-13 (Thomas, J., concurring); 
AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753-56 (Thomas, J., concurring). He has also objected to 
constitutional obligations to subsidize litigants. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2521 
(2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting); M.L.B. v. S.L.J. ex rel. M.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 130 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Both Justices Scalia and Thomas also joined in imposing limits on 
class actions. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
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consequence, as one researcher of arbitration provisions for employees has con-
cluded, is a system that exacerbates inequalities.16 
The FAA case law has also troubled contract and arbitration scholars,17 be-
cause obligations to arbitrate arise not from negotiation but by signing (or 
clicking on) documents, some of which stipulate that the drafter of the provi-
sions “may change any terms” unilaterally.18 Deeming an obligation to proceed 
(almost always on an “individual basis”19) through a designated dispute resolu-
tion system to be an enforceable “contract” undervalues private law,20 rightly 
admired for facilitating cooperative agreements, reflecting the will of the par-
ticipants able to tailor obligations to their particular needs. 
My argument is that the cumulative impact of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions on arbitration also produces an unconstitutional system, providing insuf-
ficient oversight of the processes it has mandated as a substitute for adjudica-
tion and shifting control over third-party access away from courts and to the 
organizations conducting arbitrations and the commercial enterprises drafting 
arbitration clauses. Legal claims are a species of property, and open courts are 
the venues designated under constitutions to respond to claimed deprivations 
of those property rights. Limitations on rights—and new procedures for their 
 
16. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71 (2014). Colvin argues that mandated arbitration gives control 
over process to employers, lowers the bargaining capacity of employees, and limits access to 
counsel.  
17. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, TOWARD A NEW FEDERAL LAW OF ARBITRATION (2014); MAR-
GARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF 
LAW (2013); OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 185, 196-97 (2012); Stephen J. 
Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MED. 56, 71-72 (2014). 
Some studies also raise the concerns that consumers signing such provisions are generally 
unaware of the clauses, which often have poor “readability scores”; moreover, if read, most 
consumers “wrongly believe” that the clauses do not preclude them from using courts 
through class actions. See Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street and Consumer Protection Act § 1028(a), CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU § 1, at  
11; § 2, at 27-28 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study 
-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5B9-JPSZ] [hereinafter CFPB 2015 Arbitra-
tion Study]; Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang Liu, “Whimsy Little 
Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of 
Arbitration Agreements 8-11 (St. John’s Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14-
0009, Feb. 19, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2516432 [http://perma.ccs/LPM3-8KPG]. 
18. AT&T Wireless Customer Agreement, supra note 2, at § 1.3.  
19. Id. at §§ 2.1-2.2; see also CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 52 n.120. 
20. Radin terms the decision to count such obligations as contracts to be a normative “degrada-
tion” of contract that erodes the moral foundations of contracts. RADIN, supra note 17, at 19-
28; see also Michelle E. Boardman, Consent and Sensibility, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1967 (2014) (re-
viewing RADIN, supra note 17). 
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vindication—are readily permissible but cannot, constitutionally, be imposed 
arbitrarily or be insulated from tests of fairness and lawfulness.  
The Court’s own explanations of its decisions licensing arbitration reflect 
the concern that procedural innovations should protect the rights at stake. The 
Court has repeatedly described its rulings as resting on the requirement that 
arbitration provide opportunities for the “effective vindication” of statutory 
rights,21 and the Court has regularly drawn the analogy between arbitration 
mandates and forum selection clauses in which disputants designate one juris-
diction’s court system or another.22  
Thus, the Court’s reallocation of adjudicatory authority to arbitration could 
be constitutional, were several conditions met. First, the Court would have to 
police the alternatives to assess the adequacy and fairness of the procedures ex 
ante, to understand how they are used in practice, and to impose oversight on 
both process and outcomes ex post. When doing so, the Court would need to 
ensure that the alternatives provide egalitarian dispute resolution mechanisms, 
responsive to the asymmetries among disputants through fee waivers to the  
indigent, collective actions, or other means to protect opportunities for voice 
and participation. Second, the Court would have to require public access to the 
processes and outcomes, making the alternatives transparent and accountable 
so as to facilitate debates about both procedures and governing norms. 
But the Court has not done so. Rather, the Court’s expansion of the FAA—
diffusing disputes through outsourcing to deregulated and variable processes—
strips individuals of access to courts to enforce state and federal rights, strips 
the public of its rights of audience to observe state-empowered decision makers 
imposing legally binding decisions, and strips the courts of their obligation to 
respond to alleged injuries.  
 
21. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991); Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240-42 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985). The doctrine’s breadth is discussed infra 
Part IV. 
22. “An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of  
forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used 
in resolving the dispute.” Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974); see also 
Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628, 630-31. This “forum selection” analogy has been repeat-
edly invoked by the Court. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 
662, 698 (2010); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295-96 (2002); Cortez Byrd 
Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 199-201 (2000); Vimar Seguros y Rea-
seguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 289 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1989); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 
U.S. 22, 36-37 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Shearson/Am. Express, 482 U.S. at 255. 
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Evidence of these failures comes from data about the use of arbitration by 
consumers. Despite the heralding of arbitration as a speedy and effective alter-
native to courts, the mass production of arbitration clauses has not resulted in 
“mass arbitrations.”23 Instead, the number of documented consumer arbitra-
tions is startlingly small. Arbitrations involving wireless service providers pro-
vide one example, which I have chosen because the Supreme Court addressed 
the ban on class arbitrations in that context in its 2011 decision involving 
AT&T Mobility.24 According to information from the American Arbitration  
Association (AAA), designated by AT&T to administer its arbitrations and 
complying with state reporting mandates, 134 individual claims (about 27 a 
year) were filed against AT&T between 2009 and 2014.25 During that time pe-
riod, the estimated number of AT&T wireless customers rose from 85 million a 
 
23. The phrase is becoming part of debates on the FAA case law. See generally David Horton, 
Mass Arbitrations and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 459 (2014). 
24. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
25. The American Arbitration Association provides quarterly reports on consumer arbitration 
pursuant to the laws of various jurisdictions in which it operates. Consumer Arbitration  
Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2015), https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer 
/consumerarbstat [https://perma.cc/8ZBZ-FX5T] (select the document “Provider Organiza-
tion Report”). With the indefatigable, thoughtful, and innovative research assistance of a 
group of Yale Law School students whom I thanked at the outset, and with the guidance of 
Bonnie Posick’s tracking of massive amounts of materials, we reviewed five years of data by 
downloading the file documenting arbitrations from July of 2009 through June (the second 
quarter) of 2014 and by filtering claims against AT&T. Because the AAA takes data from the 
website each quarter, the materials on the web as of the spring of 2015 no longer included 
some of what had been posted for 2009, and new materials had been added to provide in-
formation through the end of 2014. The data we analyzed ran from July 2009 through June 
of 2014; we downloaded the data to retain them. These data are hereinafter referenced as 
AAA Data, July 2009-June 2014, Provider Organization Report, and are on file with the author.  
A preliminary word on methodology is in order. After downloading the five-year period 
detailed above, we then removed all claims filed by one firm after learning that it had filed 
the 1,149 claims in an effort to create de facto class actions, see infra notes 480-482 and ac-
companying text. Thus, we identified 134 individual claims. Thereafter, we sent summaries 
and drafts of our analyses to AAA’s Vice President for Statistics and In-House Research, 
Ryan Boyle, who responded generously to our many inquiries and who provided materials 
and explanations of AAA’s data and policies. That series of e-mails and telephone exchanges, 
from February through April of 2015 are hereinafter referenced as Boyle AAA 2015 Materials. 
The record in the AT&T litigation included AAA data from five years between 2003-
2007, and the numbers are parallel to those we identified for 2009-2014 in that fewer than 
two hundred consumer arbitration filings were recorded. See Brief of Civil Procedure and 
Complex Litigation Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, 20, AT&T 
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3934621 (citing Declaration of Bruce L. 
Simon in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Amended Motion To Compel 
Arbitration, ¶¶ 8-9, Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (No. 
06-944), rev’d, 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012)). See infra note 485 and accompanying discus-
sion.  
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year to 120 million people, and lawsuits filed by the federal government 
charged the company with a range of legal breaches, including systematic over-
charging for extra services and insufficient payments of refunds when custom-
ers complained.26  
More generally, the AAA, which is the largest non-profit provider of arbi-
tration services in the United States, averages under 1,500 consumer arbitra-
tions annually;27 its full docket includes 150,000 to 200,000 filings a year.28 
Thus, were arbitration providers to be in high demand, their capacity to  
respond would be limited. An estimated 290 million people have cell phones,29 
and “99.9% of subscribers” to the eight major wireless services are subject to 
arbitration clauses.30 For those with credit card debt, about 50% face arbitra-
tion,31 as do more than 30 million employees.32 Virtually all of these arbitration 
 
26. AT&T, Number of AT&T Wireless Subscribers from 2007 to 2014 (in 1,000s), STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/220692/number-of-atundt-wireless-subscribers-since 
-2007 [http://perma.cc/PU6N-FTP4]; 4Q 2014 AT&T By the Numbers, AT&T (2014), 
http://www.att.com/Common/about_us/pdf/att_btn.pdf [http://perma.cc/3CEP-YPER]. 
See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 3-4, FTC v. 
AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov 
/es/system/files/documents/cases/141008attcmpt1.pdf [http://perma.cc/FK95-6AEX]; Stip-
ulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Relief at 16, FTC v. AT&T  
Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/es/system 
/files/documents/cases/141008attstip2.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z4D3-JQTB]; infra notes 509-
511 and accompanying text. 
27. AAA Data, July 2009-June 2014, Provider Organization Report, supra note 25 (recording 7,303 
claims labeled consumer arbitrations, excluding construction, real estate, and employment 
categories); Analysis of the American Arbitration Association’s Consumer Arbitration Caseload: 
Based on Consumer Cases Awarded Between January and August 2007, AM. ARB. ASS’N, http:// 
www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004325 [https://perma.cc/LPG6-S6F9] (“Each 
year, the AAA administers approximately 1,500 consumer cases . . . .”). The AAA data from 
2015 listed 1,063 filings in 2010; 1,425 arbitrations in 2011; 2,811 arbitrations in 2012; and 
1,741 in 2013. Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25. 
28. Statement of Ethical Principles for the American Arbitration Association, An ADR  
Provider Organization, AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about/mission 
/ethicalprinciples [http://perma.cc/Z4QY-9TNX] (describing the AAA as administering 
“approximately 150,000 cases” each year) [hereinafter AAA Ethical Principles]. The AAA 
provided us more recent data, indicating that annual filings (not limited to arbitration) were 
“203,084 in 2013 and 223,751 in 2014.” Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25. 
29. The number of subscribers comes from BAR-GILL, supra note 17, at 187, 196-97.  
30. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 26, 28 tbl.1. Most include a small claims 
court option, id. at § 1, at 15, and discussed infra notes 486-492 and accompanying text. 
31. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 10; see also Arbitration Study Preliminary 
Results: Section 1028(a) Study Results to Date, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU 22 (2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/LS7Q-HTFZ] [hereinafter CFPB 2013 Preliminary Results]. The CFPB not-
ed that a class action antitrust settlement limited the use of arbitration clauses for certain is-
 
  
the yale law journal 124:280 4   20 15  
2814 
 
clauses bar class actions in courts or in arbitration, and to the extent that use of 
the court system is permitted, individuals are routed to small claims courts that 
also do not provide collective procedures.33  
By way of contrast, thousands of courts operate in the state and federal sys-
tems, where civil filings are estimated to run between 25 and 47 million cases 
annually, excluding about 50-60 million juvenile and traffic cases.34 Moreover, 
when a federally chartered agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB), looked at federal court filings between 2010 and 2012 in five consumer 
product markets, the CFPB identified 3,462 individual cases, or on average 
about 1,100 per year, in addition to 470 federal consumer class action filings.35 
 As the volume of filings suggests, the market for courts remains robust,  
including among those who have the capacity to draft their own contracts.  
Reviews of the contracts of companies with the resources to customize indicate 
that they do not regularly bind themselves to arbitrate, or that they sometimes 
seek to obtain the benefits of both arbitration and courts by bargaining for  
judicial review of arbitrators’ rulings.36 Yet the Supreme Court has also rejected 
parties’ efforts to permit judicial oversight of arbitrators’ decisions.37  
Debate is underway about whether arbitration is cheaper or quicker than 
courts and whether consumers or employees do better or worse in either ven-
ue.38 My goal is to turn attention to the underlying fact that almost no consum-
 
suers for under four years, beginning in 2010. “If those issues still included such clauses, 
some 94% of credit card loans outstanding would now be subject to arbitration.” CFPB 2015 
Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 9-11.  
32. Alexander J.S. Colvin & Mark Gough, Individual Employment Rights in the U.S.: Actors and 
Outcomes, 68 ILR REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2) (on file with author). 
33. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 1, at 10. The small claims court option is en-
couraged by the AAA. See Consumer Arbitration, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2015), https://www 
.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer [https://perma.cc/QW23-RKGA] (“Consumers are not 
prohibited from seeking relief in a small claims court for disputes or claims within the scope 
of its jurisdiction.”). 
34. See infra figs.2 & 3; notes 131-132 and accompanying text. 
35.  CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 6, at 27-28. Filings ought not to be equated 
with decisions, as in some of the cases identified, defendants sought to stay litigation and 
filed motions to require arbitration. Id. § 6, at 8. Although CFPB researchers also sought to 
identify filings in a subset of states, they found that data challenges made that plan unwork-
able. Id. § 6, at 15. In terms of the class action research, the research included six consumer 
markets and also was able to locate 92 state court class action filings.  
36. See Hall St. Assocs., v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 579-80 (2008); Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 
Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 512-13 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014); infra 
notes 564-571, 654-668 and accompanying text (discussing Strine).  
37. See Hall St., 552 U.S. at 587-88. 
38. See, e.g., Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, After the Revolution: An Empirical 
Study of Consumer Arbitration, 103 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1) (on file 
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ers or employees “do” arbitration at all. The lack of use reflects the minimal 
oversight of arbitration’s fairness and lawfulness, the failure to require a com-
prehensive system of fee waivers, the bans on collective actions requisite to 
augmenting complainants’ resources, and the limited access accorded third 
parties to the claims filed, the proceedings, and the results.  
My purpose is not to idealize courts as the sole path to or the embodiment 
of justice.39 Barriers to entry are significant, with lawyer fees ranking high on 
the list of obstacles.40 Moreover, examples of “junk justice,” in which the judi-
cial process works its own unfairness, are plentiful. Illustrative is one study of 
4,400 lawsuits filed by debt buyers in Maryland courts; unrepresented debtors 
regularly defaulted on amounts owed (averaging about $3,000)—all without tri-
als, lawyers, or much judicial oversight.41 The imposition of court-user fees  
and fines for those with limited resources imposes yet other harms, including  
endless debt cycles and the imprisonment of some for the failure to pay.42 The  
 
with author); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Con-
sumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 843-44 (2010); Christopher R. 
Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J. L. RE-
FORM 813, 813-16 (2008); Report from Alexander J.S. Colvin & Mark D. Gough to the Am. 
Ass’n for Justice, Comparing Mandatory Arbitration and Litigation: Access, Process, and 
Outcomes (Apr. 2, 2014) (on file with author) [hereinafter Colvin & Gough Report]; Do 
Class Actions Benefit Class Members? An Empirical Analysis of Class Actions, MAYER BROWN 
LLP 1-2 (Dec. 2013), http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/uploads/Documents/PDFs/2013 
/December/DoClassActionsBenefitClassMembers.pdf [http://perma.cc/DT6J-T2YE]; Con-
sumer Arbitration Before the American Arbitration Association, Preliminary Report, SEARLE CIV. 
JUST. INST. (2009), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_010205 [https: 
//perma.cc/9RAJ-HDF8]. 
In 2015, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau added its analysis, based on study-
ing 422 federal consumer financial class settlements approved between 2008 and 2012, and 
identifying the sizes of classes in about three-quarters of those cases and the amounts re-
ceived. The CFPB study concluded that consumer class action settlements during those 
years had benefitted at least 160 million consumers by providing $2.7 billion in damages or 
in-kind relief. Further, the CFPB reported that settlements averaged $540 million, and law-
yers’ fees ranged from 16-24 percent. See CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 1, at 
16-17.  
39. See GENN, supra note 4, at 148-66. 
40. “The vast majority of ordinary Americans lack any real access to the legal system for resolv-
ing their claims and the claims made against them.” Gillian K. Hadfield, Innovating To Im-
prove Access: Changing the Way Courts Regulate Legal Markets, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 
83. 
41. Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt Buyers, 26 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179 (2014). Ninety-eight percent of the defaulting debtors lacked 
counsel. Id. at 208-09. 
42. See Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha & Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to 
Reentry, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. 13-26 (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites 
/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3AR-KRU2].  
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Department of Justice’s 2015 account of the failures of the municipal court in Fer-
guson, Missouri is another example, making vivid the disjuncture between gov-
ernment-empowered judges and just systems.43 Rather than “administering jus-
tice or protecting the rights of the accused,” the local court’s goal was 
“maximizing revenue,” and it did so through “constitutionally deficient” proce-
dures that had a racially biased impact.44  
Yet the ability to uncover the intricacies of how these systems fail comes from 
legal obligations of courts, which are required to maintain records and to permit 
public observation—opening paths to correct injustices, if popular will to do so 
exists.45 Courts offer the potential for egalitarian redistribution of authority, 
and the possibility of public oversight of legal authority. Without public access, 
one cannot know whether fair treatment is accorded regardless of  
status. Without publicity, judges have no means of demonstrating their  
independence. Without oversight, one cannot ensure that judges, tasked with  
vindicating public rights, are loyal to those norms. Without independent judg-
es acting in public and treating the disputants in an equal and dignified man-
ner, outcomes lose their claim to legitimacy. And without public accountings of 
how legal norms are being applied, one cannot debate the need for revisions.  
Below, in Part I, I identify the legal and historical frameworks that make 
courts obligatorily open, constitutionally regulated entitlements. This section 
offers glimpses of a large body of law, predicated on state and federal constitu-
tions, requiring assessments of the fairness of procedures, imposing obliga-
tions to assist subsets of indigent litigants, and mandating that proceedings 
and documents be publicly accessible. In Part II, I put the Supreme Court’s 
transformation of the FAA into the context of changing attitudes towards the 
role of courts. Through doctrinal shifts and revisions of federal procedural 
rules, adjudication lost its position of superiority, and arbitration gained its  
valence as a preferred method of dispute resolution. Trials came to be posi-
tioned as problematic, outlier failures of court-based procedures that had been 
redesigned to produce settlements.  
Part III provides a genealogy of arbitration by tracing its movement from 
the private domain to public obligation. This analysis begins with nineteenth-
century, trans-Atlantic models of consensual arbitration and moves through 
waves of U.S. Supreme Court interpretations, enlarging the scope of the 1925 
 
43. Civ. Rights Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 42-62 (Mar. 
4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03 
/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/9EKY-NS43]. 
44. Id. at 42, 68-69. 
45. The breaches in Ferguson included the municipal court’s failure to comply with obligations 
to make public its rules and processes. Id. at 97-98. 
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statute and crafting explanations for the propriety of broadening the FAA’s  
deployment. In the 1980s and thereafter, when mandating arbitration for con-
sumers and employees who could not plausibly negotiate terms, the Court  
developed new rationales for the legitimacy of arbitration—lauding its infor-
mality, speed, and accessibility and attributing to it the capacity to provide “ef-
fective vindication” of statutory rights.  
Part IV details the genesis of this doctrine of effective vindication and the 
Court’s reluctance to give it meaning. The Court has neither required adminis-
trative, judicial, and public oversight nor ensured egalitarianism through polic-
ing fees and facilitating collective arbitrations. By excavating data reported be-
tween 2009 and 2014 by arbitration providers, I detail how little evidence exists 
that arbitration offers a gateway to pursuit of individual claims. To illustrate 
that such limitations are not intrinsic to arbitration, I explore other models of 
arbitration, drawn from negotiated contracts relying on judges to review arbi-
trators’ decisions; from state statutes dispatching judges as arbitrators; from 
Congress, which, since 1988, has authorized federal courts to offer “court-
annexed arbitration” but permitted it only for certain claims and generally if 
freely chosen;46 from federal regulation of securities arbitrations; and from Eu-
ropean oversight of consumer arbitrations.  
I close by returning to the constitutional law of courts and specifically to 
First Amendment rulings on rights of public access to adjudication. Under cur-
rent doctrine, when third parties challenge closing proceedings, courts use the 
tradition of open trials as the benchmark by which to measure the utilities of 
openness and the impact of closure in particular processes. But as trials become 
a rarity in, rather than the centerpiece of, court-based procedures, reliance on 
that history provides no sure footing. Constitutional law needs instead to  
develop norms that state-empowered and state-enforced dispute resolution 
cannot be legitimate in democracies without open access to enable regular  
interactions among disputants, adjudicators, and the public. Thus, by way of 
conclusion, I explore the contingency of courts as public institutions, the risks 
of losing the political capital garnered by providing services to diverse dispu-
tants, and the political will that would be required to re-center courts and their 
alternatives on egalitarian and public law norms.  
 
46. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, sec. 901, 102 Stat. 
4642, 4660 (1988) (codified as amended in 1998 at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58); infra notes 573-583 
and accompanying text. 
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i .  the public  in  courts 
Public courts seem so much like fixtures, supporting and supported by the 
ideology of a “day in court,”47 that scant attention is paid to the legal sources 
and the contingencies producing the current understanding that courts wel-
come all comers. Given my claim that Dispute Diffusion renders courts vulner-
able, a brief review is in order of the thicket of texts specifying roles for judges, 
witnesses, litigants, jurors, victims, and the public.  
State and federal constitutions regulate judicial selection and tenure in of-
fice, impose mechanisms for protecting judicial independence, and define the 
parameters of courts’ jurisdiction. Detailed instructions can also be found in 
some constitutions, such as directions to Supreme Court Justices to write or 
publish opinions, to make rulings freely available, to let others publish them, 
or to explain reasons for dissent.48  
The public gains two kinds of access rights to courts. Constitutional text, 
doctrine, and common law traditions establish the authority of individuals to 
bring claims to courts and the obligation of courts to welcome third parties to 
observe their proceedings. State constitutions regularly linked the two forms of 
access by mandating rights-to-remedies in open courts. The 1776 Delaware 
Declaration of Rights (echoing the Magna Carta as filtered through natural 
and common law traditions) provided: 
That every Freeman for every Injury done him in his Goods, Lands or 
Person, by any other Person, ought to have Remedy by the Course of 
the Law of the Land, and ought to have Justice and Right for the Injury 
 
47. See generally SUSAN S. SILBEY & PATRICIA EWICK, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES 
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); Susan S. Silbey, The Courts in American Public Culture, DAEDA-
LUS, Summer 2014, at 140.  
48. The constitutions of Arizona, California, and Michigan provide that opinions “shall be free 
for publication by any person.” ARIZ. CONST. of 1910, art. VI, § 8 (1960); CAL. CONST. of 
1849, art. VI, § 12; MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. IV, § 35. The California Constitution of 1849 
was superseded by the California Constitution of 1879, which added the provision that Su-
preme Court opinions “shall be available for publication by any person,” CAL. CONST. of 
1879, art. VI, § 16 (1966). The Michigan Constitution also directs that “[d]ecisions of the 
supreme court, including all decisions on prerogative writs, shall be in writing and shall 
contain a concise statement of the facts and reasons for each decision and reasons for each 
denial of leave to appeal. When a judge dissents in whole or in part he shall give in writing 
the reasons for his dissent.” MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. VI, § 6; see also KY. CONST. of 1792, 
art. V, § 4 (imposing the “duty of each judge of the Supreme Court, present at the  
hearing of such cause, and differing from a majority of the court, to deliver his opinion in 
writing. . . .” ). 
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done to him freely without Sale, fully without any Denial, and speedily 
without Delay, according to the Law of the Land.49  
The 1792 Constitution added that “[a]ll courts shall be open.”50 The first con-
stitutions of Maryland (1776) and Massachusetts (1780), and the second of 
New Hampshire (1784) had similar directions,51 while Pennsylvania’s 1776 ver-
sion instructed that all “courts shall be open, and justice shall be impartially 
administered without corruption or unnecessary delay.”52 Early nineteenth-
century formulations, such as the 1818 Connecticut Constitution and the 1819 
Alabama Constitution, used the locution that such rights were to be accorded 
to “every person.”53 Those terms are echoed in many state constitutions that 
describe public rights to observe proceedings and to use courts.54 
Criminal defendants garnered special protections with rights to disclosure 
of charges, representation, confrontation, speedy trials, and to jurors from the 
 
49. DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. 12. 
50. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 9; see also KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 13; VT. CONST. of 
1777, ch. II, § XXIII.  
51. See MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVII (“That every freeman, for any inju-
ry done him in his person or property, ought to have remedy, by the course of the law of the 
land, and ought to have justice and right freely without sale, fully without any denial, and 
speedily without delay, according to the law of the land.”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. 
XI (“Every subject of the Commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having re-
course to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or 
character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase 
it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the 
laws.”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. I, § 14 (“Every subject of this state is entitled to a certain 
remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries he may receive in his person, proper-
ty or character, to obtain right and justice freely, without being obliged to purchase it; com-
pletely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay, conformably to the laws.”).  
52. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 26. Pennsylvania’s current constitutional provision is similar: “All 
courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or 
reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered with-
out sale, denial or delay.” PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11. 
53. ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 14 ( “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
and right and justice administered, without sale, denial or delay”); CONN. CONST. of 1818, 
art. I, § 12 (“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his per-
son, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice 
administered without sale, denial or delay.”). The right to bring claims is linked to the right 
to represent oneself in civil as well as criminal cases. See Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 
556-58 (2d Cir. 1998). The scope of the protection of “every person” is discussed infra notes 
90-94 and accompanying text. 
54. See JENNIFER FRIESEN, 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 
CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES 6-91 to 6-92 (4th ed. 2006). 
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vicinage in which the crime took place.55 Jury trial rights in criminal and civil 
cases put members of the public into courts as decision makers, thereby further 
anchoring the practice of open proceedings.56 Victims of crimes gained consti-
tutional recognition in the latter part of the twentieth century, when more than 
thirty state constitutions added provisions recognizing a role for victims in 
court proceedings.57 
The federal Constitution does not specify remedial rights in the terms used 
frequently in state constitutions.58 The phrase “open Court” appears only in the 
little-read Treason Clause of Article III,59 and the reference to “public trials” 
comes in relationship to the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants. 
Yet the idea of federal courts as responding to claims of injury has a long  
history. In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall famously insisted on two precepts: that 
the “very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individu-
al to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury,” and that 
one “of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.”60 Repeated-
ly, and relatively unselfconsciously until the current wave of objections to  
 
55. A summary is provided in Judith Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedi-
al Rights in an Age of Egalitarianism: The Childress Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 917, 1038-58 
(2012). 
56. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
2173, 2179-84 (2014). State constitutions protected civil juries, and the Seventh Amendment 
ensured preservation of civil jury trial rights in the federal system. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
VII. 
57. See, e.g., LA. CONST. § 25 (1974) (providing victims the right to be “present and heard at all 
critical stages of preconviction and postconviction proceedings” or to decline to participate). 
A listing of states with such provisions is provided by Issues: Constitutional Amendments, 
NAT’L CENTER FOR VICTIMS CRIME (2012), http://www.victimsofcrime.org/our-programs 
/public-policy/amendments [http://perma.cc/D84C-8SAP]. 
58. During ratification, Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island suggested the addition of a 
right-to-remedy clause and proffered language reminiscent of the provisions quoted above. 
North Carolina and Virginia proposed that the amendment read: “That every freeman 
ought to find a certain remedy, by recourse to the laws for all injuries and wrongs he may 
receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely 
without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, and that all estab-
lishments, or regulations contravening these rights, are oppressive and unjust.” 2 DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1787-1870, at 
268, 379 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1998) (1894). That and other proposals were not adopted, 
nor did such terms (again under consideration after ratification) become a part of the 1791 
Bill of Rights. William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee’s Open Courts Clause: A Historical 
Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 333, 372-
75 (1997). 
59. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (limiting treason convictions to those based either on the “Tes-
timony of two Witnesses” or a “Confession in open Court”). 
60. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
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implied causes of action,61 the Supreme Court responded by ruling on the mer-
its of a variety of claims of right, often predicated on statutes that did not speci-
fy the availability of private enforcement,62 as well as on common law rights.63  
The case law expressly addressing constitutionally obliged access to federal 
courts (for claims falling within the courts’ jurisdiction) is relatively thin—
prompted by instances when Congress limited access for a set of claimants 
(such as those in detention at Guantánamo Bay),64 specified that particular ex-
ecutive decisions (such as those relating to the deportation of immigrants) 
were not subject to judicial review,65 or allocated final decision making to non-
 
61. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015); Douglas v. Indep. 
Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Gonzaga 
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
62. A list of examples comes from the appendix to the brief in Douglas v. Independent Living Cen-
ter of Southern California, detailing sixty-one cases in which preemption of state provisions 
was not based on claims filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brief for Respondents at app. 1a-11a, 
Douglas, 132 S. Ct. 1204 (Nos. 09–958, 09–1158, 10–283), 2011 WL 3319552.  
63. One famous example is Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), recognizing the ability of rail-
road stockholders to contest state rate regulation as confiscatory, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment and of the Commerce Clause. Despite arguments that the suit was 
barred by sovereign immunity, the Court shaped a functional exception, permitting the law-
suit to proceed against a state official rather than the state itself, and explained that federal 
courts, like state courts, “should, at all times, be opened” to claimants “for the purpose of 
protecting their property and their legal rights.” Id. at 165. See generally Barry Friedman, The 
Story of Ex Parte Young: Once Controversial, Now Canon, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 247-
99 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010). In Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 
the majority decision by Justice Scalia positioned suits to “enjoin unconstitutional actions by 
state and federal officers [as] . . . the creation of courts of equity,” rather than resting “upon 
an implied right of action contained in the Supremacy Clause.” Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1384. 
The dissent countered that Ex Parte Young has been characterized as “giving ‘life to the Su-
premacy Clause.’” Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1391 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting (quoting Green v. 
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985))). 
When federal courts enforced common law rights, questions have emerged about 
whether such rights were part of a general common law and could thus be interpreted and 
shaped by federal judges, or whether such rights derived from remedial structures provided 
by states. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of 
Action in Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 VA. L. REV. 609 (2015), 
Bellia and Clark interpret the history to demonstrate that “the local law of a particular sover-
eign . . . determined the causes of action that its courts could adjudicate,” id. at 638, and that 
variation existed in “the forms and modes of proceeding” in England and various of the 
American states, id. at 637. The compromise, in their view, in the First Judiciary Act was that 
causes of action “were matters of local law,” to which Section 34 required federal courts to 
apply state law, just as the federal courts had to borrow forms of proceeding from the states 
in which they sat. Id. at 639. 
64. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008). 
65. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 292-93, 325-26 (2001). 
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Article III courts (such as administrative adjudication of longshoremen’s  
injuries).66  
 When facing efforts to limit litigants from bringing cases, the Supreme 
Court has responded at times by avoiding the issue because alternative routes 
to the federal judiciary existed or by reading provisions as not imposing barri-
ers that their language suggested.67 On rare occasions, the Court has over-
turned bans on judicial review.68 A variety of constitutional bases undergird 
assumptions of court access. One source is Article III’s vesting of “the judicial 
power” in a federal court system comprised of one Supreme Court and such 
lower courts that Congress chooses to create. Individuals in detention who seek 
to file claims have the additional resource of Article I’s protections of habeas 
corpus;69 when coupled with the doctrine that state courts have no power over 
individuals held by federal officials,70 the argument for access to federal courts 
becomes robust. Further, constitutional specification of the writ of habeas  
corpus, of due process, and of petitioning rights supports access to challenge 
convictions and conditions of confinement.71 The Court has concluded that 
custodians must not only facilitate communication by delivering prisoners’  
legal mail but must also permit inmates to communicate with lawyers and ob-
tain legal materials.72  
The First Amendment right “of the people . . . to petition the Government 
for redress of grievances” also provides a basis for more general access to the 
federal courts.73 The choice of the word “government” (instead of the term 
“legislature”),74 coupled with the history of legislative responses to public and 
 
66. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 65 (1932). 
67. See, e.g., St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289; Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996); Reich v. Collins, 513 
U.S. 106 (1994); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85 (1869). 
68. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723; United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871).  
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
70. Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. 397 (1871). 
71. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723; Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Ex parte Hull, 312 
U.S. 546, 549 (1941). 
72. See Bounds, 430 U.S. 817; Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). The Lewis majority read 
Bounds narrowly to reduce its scope. In the post 9/11 Guantánamo detainee litigation, the 
Government argued unsuccessfully that access rights derived solely from habeas rights and 
that, once habeas petitions were denied, no constitutional access right remained. See Hope 
Metcalf & Judith Resnik, Gideon at Guantánamo: Democratic and Despotic Detention, 122 YALE 
L.J. 2504, 2507, 2543-45 (2013). 
73. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
74. James Madison proposed specifying access to the “legislature.” See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 
(1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
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private parties’ petitions,75 supports reading the Clause to reference access to 
courts. The law thickened over the twentieth century76 and, by 2011, Justice 
Kennedy described litigation as necessary for “informed public participation” 
which was, in turn, “a cornerstone of democratic society.”77 That decision—
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri—illustrates the related point that constraints on 
litigation are permissible, if grounded in rationality.78  
Fifth Amendment guarantees against deprivations of life, liberty, and prop-
erty without due process, as well as against confiscation without just compen-
sation, can also provide routes to court for determinations of whether the pro-
cesses provided are those “due”79 and the compensation “just.”80 The doctrine 
that legal claims themselves are a species of property81 further supports access 
to courts, state or federal. Even the Court’s interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment to divest federal courts of authority over claims brought against 
 
75. For example, in 1770, the Connecticut General Assembly acted akin to a court in responding 
to “150 causes, in law and equity, brought by petitioners.” Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A 
Short History of the Right To Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 
144-146 (1986); see also Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right To Petition Govern-
ment for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15 
(1993).  
76. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30, 452 (1963) (discussing the NAACP’s right to 
litigate as a “form of political expression”); see also Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Un-
limited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (noting the right of access to courts, protected by the underly-
ing right to petition, meant that groups could coordinate to file suits or argue to agencies 
without violating antitrust laws). 
77. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2499-2500 (2011). 
78. The ruling narrowed the grounds on which Petition Clause claims by public employees ar-
guing retaliation can be made. Id. at 2498-99. 
79. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally Charles A. Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law: The 
American Constitutional Tradition, in 18 NOMOS: DUE PROCESS 3 (J. Roland Pennock & John 
W. Chapman eds., 1977). 
80. The questions of when a taking occurs and what constitutes just compensation are for the 
courts. See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); Fla. 
Power Corp. v. FCC, 772 F.2d. 1537 (11th Cir. 1985), rev’d, 107 S. Ct. 1107 (1987). More re-
cently, the Court and scholars have addressed when judicial decisions constitute takings and 
whether analysis of their lawfulness should be based on the Takings or the Due Process 
Clause. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 
(2010); Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 305, 324-28, 356-68 (2012). 
81. See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008); Logan v. Zimmerman 
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 
(1950).  
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states could be read as an implicit endorsement of judicial power otherwise ex-
tending to civil litigants properly before the federal courts.82  
Third-party rights to observe court proceedings likewise have various fed-
eral constitutional bases. Public rights of attendance (beyond the Treason 
Clause) start with the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees criminal defend-
ants a “speedy and public trial” before a jury drawn from the vicinage.83 When 
the press and the public seek access, they rely on First Amendment speech and 
petition rights, inflected by common law English and American practices.84  
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule directly on access to civil 
trials and related proceedings, its holdings on public access to criminal trials, 
pre-trial suppression hearings,85 and voir dire86 have prompted lower court 
judges to conclude that parallel rights attach to civil trials, related proceedings, 
and most of the documents filed in court.87 The formulation for determining 
whether a particular closure is lawful is often described as a mix of “experience” 
and “logic”88: that the First Amendment right of public access attaches when 
“the place and process have historically been open to the press and general 
public” and when “access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of 
the particular process in question.”89  
 
82. For discussion of the parameters of the Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, see 
Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik, Sovereignties—Federal, State, and Tribal: The Story of Sem-
inole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES, supra note 63, at 329, 329-358. 
83. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
84. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 505-10 (1984); 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-73, 575-76 (1980) (plurality opin-
ion); Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405 (1987); infra 
notes 654-665 and accompanying text. Defendants’ Sixth Amendment public trial rights 
may also produce a right or the “freedom” of the public to “listen.” See Richmond Newspa-
pers, 448 U.S. at 576-77. 
85. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
86. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010).  
87. A list of the circuits concluding that rights to civil trials were protected is provided in Del. 
Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
1551 (2014); see also Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 786, 793 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(remanding for consideration of the scope of access to civil proceedings); N.Y. Civil Liber-
ties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 305 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that the quasi-
criminal administrative hearings held by the Transit Authority, which imposed sanctions, 
were unconstitutionally closed). Access to documents—at least those deemed “judicial” doc-
uments filed in civil cases as part of lawsuits—has likewise received protection. See United 
States v. Erie County, 763 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2014); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 
F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004). 
88. See, e.g., Strine, 733 F.3d at 515, discussed infra notes 564-571, 654-668 and accompanying 
text. 
89. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
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Two other facets of the public persona of courts—hospitality towards all 
persons regardless of color, gender, or age, and concerns for inter-litigant  
inequalities and asymmetries—are artifacts of social movements of the last two 
centuries. Although many states promised “every person” rights-to-remedies, 
that reference did not include vast swaths of the population. Married women, 
African-Americans, members of Indian tribes, and various other persons faced 
legal barriers to their direct pursuit of claims. Conflicts—in courts and on  
battlefields—turned judiciaries into venues obliged to recognize the juridical 
personhood of all persons and to accord them equal dignity.  
The question of subsidies for poor litigants emerged in the mid-twentieth 
century as part of the domestic struggle over race relations, framed by efforts to 
distinguish America from “totalitarian regimes.”90 In a series of decisions, the 
Court concluded that unfairness resulted if some criminal defendants had re-
sources to pay fees for filing, transcripts for appeal, and lawyers, while others 
did not. The 1963 ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright,91 guaranteeing the right  
to counsel for indigent felony defendants, was foreshadowed by the 1956  
decision of Griffin v. Illinois, requiring that states fund transcripts for indigent  
defendants who would otherwise be unable to appeal.92 Related precepts come 
from Douglas v. California, insisting that states providing appeals of criminal 
convictions appoint counsel for indigent defendants,93 and Miranda v. Arizona, 
mandating that impoverished detainees, held for questioning by the police, be 
given Gideon-based rights to counsel.94  
Constitutional entitlements for civil litigants emerged when a class of “wel-
fare recipients residing in . . . Connecticut” argued that state-imposed fees of 
sixty dollars for filing and service precluded them from filing for divorce.95 
Writing for the Court in 1971, Justice Harlan held that the combination of “the 
basic position of the marriage relationship in this society’s hierarchy of values 
and the . . . state monopolization” of lawful dissolution required the state, as a 
matter of due process, to provide fee waivers for those too poor to pay.96  
The potential capaciousness of that precept was made plain by concurring 
Justices, each of whom would have proceeded under different legal theories. 
 
90. See Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
579, 634-38 (2010). 
91. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
92. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
93. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
94. 384 U.S. 436, 472-74 (1966). 
95. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 372 (1971). 
96. Id. at 374. See generally Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The 
Right To Protect One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153. 
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Justice Douglas objected that a Due Process approach was too “subjective” and 
instead rested the access right on the Equal Protection Clause, which he read to 
protect against “invidious discrimination . . . based on . . . poverty.”97 (Two 
years later, the Court rejected poverty as a suspect classification for purposes of 
equal protection.98) Justice Brennan agreed that the case presented a “classic 
problem of equal protection” as well as a due process violation; in his view, the 
state’s legal monopoly meant that support was required for indigent litigants 
attempting to “vindicate any . . . right arising under federal or state law.”99  
The Court retreated in the face of high demand, limited resources, and a 
slippery slope of claimants.100 The Court carved out the family as a special 
place in which Due Process doctrine generated substantive procedural entitle-
ments, such as subsidized tests to establish paternity,101 transcripts on appeal 
for indigents losing their status as parents,102 and an exceedingly narrow right 
to counsel if facing termination of parental rights.103 In 2011, a five-person ma-
jority Court concluded that procedural fairness—but not necessarily the  
appointment of lawyers—was also required before incarcerating civil contem-
nors, sued by co-parents for failure to pay child support.104  
Struggles about access for “everyone” have also prompted inquiries into 
whether courts themselves were treating claimants fairly. In the early 1980s, the 
National Association of Women Judges (NAWJ), working in conjunction with 
 
97. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 385-86 (Douglas, J., concurring in the result). 
98. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-29 (1973). 
99. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 386-88 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). The sole dissenter, Justice Black 
(who had authored the opinion in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), requiring states to 
subsidize transcripts for appeals for criminal defendants), argued that the Court had invad-
ed state prerogatives by imposing rules for civil litigants. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 389, 393-94 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
100. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial 
Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate 
Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2133 (2000). 
101. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).  
102. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). 
103. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (“[N]either can we say that the 
Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding. 
. . . [T]he decision whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent 
parents in termination proceedings [is] to be answered in the first instance by the trial 
court, subject to appellate review.”). 
104. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). The Court concluded that courts had to ensure “a 
fundamentally fair determination,” which did not necessarily require appointment of coun-
sel. Id. at 2512. The Court specifically reserved the question of whether lawyers would have 
to be appointed when the state, rather than a private party also lacking counsel, was the op-
ponent. Id. at 2520. 
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the National Judicial Education Program (NJEP) of the NOW Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, pressed for inquiries into law’s biases. Building on a history of 
judicial efforts to improve the administration of justice by studying problems 
ranging from case management to juvenile offenders,105 the NAWJ and the NJEP 
sought to bring into focus the treatment of women in courts. 
 Chief judges in state and federal judiciaries responded by commissioning 
“task forces,” looking at “gender bias,” “racial and ethnic bias” and, occasionally, 
the intersection of the two.106 More than sixty reports resulted; topics included 
interactions in courtrooms, judicial appointments of lawyers to committees and 
staff assignments, and the structures of various legal regimes governing violence, 
sentencing, incarceration, immigration, bankruptcy, household dissolution, child 
support, economic marginality, and discrimination. Thousands of pages  
documented how experiences varied by gender and race, and these reports  
prompted new rules and practices aiming to improve the inclusiveness of 
courts.107 
The mix of public adjudication, rulemaking, litigant filings, task forces, ac-
counting for funds, and the need to obtain more resources has turned courts 
into “a huge information system—an entity that receives, processes, stores, cre-
ates, monitors, and disseminates large quantities of documents and infor-
mation.”108 In the federal system, the Attorney General of the United States 
began providing statistical tables on filings in 1871.109 That task shifted in 1939 
to the Administrative Office of the United States, which works with federal 
district and appellate courts to describe the demands placed on courts.110  
 
105. See Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952, 952 (1996); Lynn Hecht 
Schafran, Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts: The Task Force Approach, 70 JUDICATURE 
280 (1987). The NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund changed its name to Legal  
Momentum. LEGAL MOMENTUM (2014), https://www.legalmomentum.org [https://perma 
.cc/5FHA-V5P9].  
106.  Resnik, supra note 105, at 953. 
107. See id. at 980-85. Issues of inclusiveness and diversity are under discussion in the field of 
arbitration. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich & Zachary P. Ulrich, Arbitration in Evolution: 
Current Practices and Perspectives of Experienced Commercial Arbitrators 8 (Pepperdine Univ. 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2014/30, 2014), http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=2519196 [http://perma.cc/9CJA-LGY7] (finding that of the 123 arbitrators re-
sponding to a survey, about eighty-five percent were men). 
108. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 
201 (2008). 
109. See PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 91-95 (1973); David 
S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the 
Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 97 (1981).  
110. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-20 (2012). The Director of the Administrative Office files reports an-
nually. See, e.g., Judicial Business 2013, U.S. CTS. (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics 
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 With the advent of PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records), 
computer docketing puts federal court filings—except those sheltered based on 
concerns for national security and litigant safety—into a public database per-
mitting readers to view pleadings and to track the submissions and disposi-
tions in particular cases.111 Aggregate statistics are compiled by the Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts, which reports yearly on the “business” of the 
federal courts.112 More efforts are underway; the Chief Justice’s 2014 “state of 
the judiciary” announced that his Court was “developing its own electronic  
filing system” to facilitate public access.113  
Parallel data entry systems exist in all the states,114 albeit often supported by 
fewer resources and with all the variations that federalism enables.115 Illinois’s 
Court Statistics Act, for example, calls for court officials to provide “infor-
mation, statistical data, and reports bearing on the state of the dockets and 
business transacted by the courts and other matters pertinent to the efficient 
operation of the judicial system.”116 That state is the exemplar chosen here  
 
/JudicialBusiness/2013.aspx [http://perma.cc/8J9U-8AWZ]. The history of the Administra-
tive Office and its reports, and their use by the Judicial Conference of the United States, are 
examined in Judith Resnik, Trial As Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 937-38 (2000). 
111. See PACER: Public Access to Court Electronic Records, U.S. CTS., https://www.pacer.gov 
[http://perma.cc/94AA-3GCV]. Certain forms of personal information (such as social secu-
rity numbers) are protected, and current federal appellate rules limit remote electronic access 
to documents in immigration cases. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a)-(c); FED. R. APP. P. 25(a)(5). 
112. See, e.g., Judicial Business 2014, U.S. CTS. (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics 
/JudicialBusiness/2014.aspx [http://perma.cc/2Y9B-GG95]. 
113. See John G. Roberts, 2014 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, SUP. CT. U.S. 7-9 (2014), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2014year-endreport.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/HFS5-5AZ7]. 
114. Robert C. LaFountain, Richard Y. Schauffler, Shauna M. Strickland & Kathryn A. Holt, Ex-
amining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of 2010 State Court Caseloads, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE CTS. 1 (2012), http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/~/media/Microsites/Files 
/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx [http://perma.cc/NXV9-BYSX]; State Court Guide to 
Statistical Reporting, Version 2.0, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS. (2014) http://www 
.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/State%20Court%20Guide%20to%20Stati
stical%20Reporting%20v%202.ashx [http://perma.cc/ZRM8-YJAZ]; Reporting Excellence 
Awards, 2014, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS. (2014), http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other 
-Pages/Awards.aspx [http://perma.cc/5VB9-48UH].  
115. See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, Courting Ignorance: Why We Know So Little About Our Most 
Important Courts, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 129.  
116. 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/1 (West 2014). The Administrative Office of Illinois Courts 
(AOIC)—like its counterparts across the country—issues annual reports containing  
caseload statistics, disposition information, and more. See, e.g., Annual Report of the  
Illinois Courts: Statistical Summary—2013, ADMIN. OFF. ILL. CTS. (2013), http://www.state 
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because it has an unusually large public arbitration program. In 2011, more 
than 41,000 cases were sent to “mandatory, non-binding, non–court procedure 
designed to resolve civil disputes by utilizing a neutral third party.”117 That 
program, created in 1987, was required to evaluate its “effectiveness” and “re-
port the results” to the General Assembly annually118 until 2012, when its sepa-
rate data-collection obligations were repealed.119  
These glimpses into the volume of filings and the infrastructures reflect the 
investments made in courts, even as judiciaries report themselves to be under-
resourced.120 Given diverse streams of income and the mix of public and pri-
vate funds, estimating the actual dollars flowing into courts is difficult. A few 
figures from the federal system offer windows into the sums committed. In 
1971, the federal judiciary received $145 million; by 2005, that allocation repre-
sented an increase from under one-tenth of a percent of the federal budget to two-
tenths—for a total of $5.7 billion.121 During the same period, staff positions more 
than doubled to 32,000,122 providing a workforce responding to annual filings of 
about 350,000 to 400,000 civil and criminal cases and more than a million bank-
ruptcy petitions.123 And, despite budgetary constraints producing pressures to 
downsize facilities and staff, the 2015 budget for the federal judiciary was $6.7 




117. Court-Annexed Mandatory Arbitration: Annual Report of the Supreme Court of Illinois to the Illi-
nois General Assembly for State Fiscal Year 2011, ADMIN. OFF. ILL. CTS. 1 (2011), 
http://www.state.il.us/court/Administrative/ManArb/2011/ManArbRpt11.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/9FDM-BK9H] [hereinafter Illinois Court-Annexed Arbitration–2011 Report]; see 735 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1001A (West 2014).  
118. Posted reports from 2004 to 2011 can be found on the Illinois courts’ websites. See  
Court-Annexed Mandatory Arbitration Annual Reports, ILL. CTS., http://www.state.il.us/court 
/Administrative/ManArb/default.asp [http://perma.cc/L984-J7VJ]. 
119. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1008A (West 2011), repealed by Act of May 30, 2012, Pub. Act 
No. 97-1099, § 10, 2012 Ill. Laws 5652; see also Illinois Court-Annexed Arbitration–2011 Report, 
ADMIN. OFF. ILL. CTS., supra note 117, at 5; Telephone Interview by Chris Milione with staff 
of the Admin. Office of Ill. Courts (Nov. 24, 2014). The staff reconfirmed this information 
for the author on May 12, 2015 (e-mail on file with author).  
120. See Michael J. Graetz, Trusting the Courts: Redressing the State Court Funding Crisis, DAEDA-
LUS, Summer 2014, at 96. 
121. Russell R. Wheeler, Chief Justice Rehnquist as Third Branch Leader, 89 JUDICATURE, Nov.-
Dec. 2005, at 116, 120.  
122. Id.  
123. The Chief Justice provided the data in his year-end report. See Roberts, supra note 113, ap-
pendix.  
124. The sum of $6.7 billion was appropriated in discretionary funds to the judiciary for the  
Fiscal Year 2015, Judiciary’s FY 2015 Meets Needs, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 15, 2014), http://news 
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Further, under the leadership of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the federal 
judiciary obtained in the 1990s what one newspaper called the “largest public-
building construction campaign since the New Deal: a 10-year, $10 billion  
effort to build more than 50 new Federal courthouses and significantly to alter 
or add to more than 60 others.”125 The courts tripled their dedicated space and, 
between 1996 and 2006, doubled it once more.126 One way to summarize the 
monumentality of the federal court system is by a photograph of the Thomas 





.uscourts.gov/judiciarys-fy-2015-funding-meets-needs [http://perma.cc/28QQ-K6L8], an 
increase of $182 million (+2.8%) over the $6.5 billion appropriated for 2014. Fiscal Year  




125. Randy Gragg, Monuments to a Crime-Fearing Age, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 28, 1995, at 36. 
The Chief Justice chaired the judiciary when it expanded its building footprint, while his 
leadership of the Court helped to produce substantial constriction of the remedial authority 
of the federal courts. See Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary Literally and Legally: 
The Monuments of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 IND. L.J. 823 (2012); see also 
Jason Mazzone & Carl Emery Woock, Federalism as Docket Control (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-18, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2573107 [http:// 
perma.cc/Y26V-WEVN]. 
126. The Future of the Federal Courthouse Construction Program: Results of a Government Accounta-
bility Office Study on the Judiciary’s Rental Obligations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Eco-
nomic Dev., Public Bldgs. and Emergency Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 
109th Cong. 269 (2006) (statement of David L. Winstead, Comm’r, Pub. Bldgs. Serv., Gen. 
Servs. Admin.).  
127. See Thomas F. Eagleton United States Courthouse, St. Louis, Missouri, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN. 
18 (2001) [hereinafter GSA Eagleton Courthouse booklet]; Thomas F. Eagleton U.S. Courthouse, 
U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN. (2015), http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/101471 [http://perma.cc 
/8XHH-QJ62]. Thanks to Magistrate Judge Noce for providing me with the image and infor-
mation about the courthouse. 
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Figure 1.  
thomas f. eagleton federal courthouse, st. louis, missouri, 2000 
 
 
Architects: Hellmuth, Obata + Kassabaum, Inc. Photographer: The Honorable Da-
vid D. Noce, U.S. Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. Photograph 
courtesy of and reproduced with the permission of the photographer. 
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Standing 557 feet, this building became the “largest Federal courthouse in the 
United States,”128 at a cost of almost $200 million dollars to construct the more 
than one million square-foot structure.129  
While courthouses have become iconic representations of government, 
twenty-first-century graphics require data.130 Figure 2—comparing the volume 
of filings in federal and state courts in 2010—provides another set of propor-
tions. This figure details the 360,000 civil and criminal federal trial court  
filings, joined by more than a million bankruptcy claimants. Those numbers 
are small when contrasted with the volume of state court annual filings, which 
number more than 47 million, when juvenile and traffic filings are excluded,131 
and some 100 million when, as in Figure 3, they are included.132 
  
 
128. GSA Eagleton Courthouse Booklet, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 127, at 12. This build-
ing is not the largest courthouse in the country. For example, the 2001 structure built for the 
Brooklyn Supreme and Family Courts houses more than eighty courtrooms in more than 1.1 
million square feet. With thirty-two stories, it is 473 feet high. See Brooklyn Supreme and 
Family Courthouse, New York, USA, DESIGN BUILD NETWORK (2015), http://www 
.designbuild-network.com/projects/brooklyn-supreme [http://perma.cc/GK54-CXH6]. 
129. See Gragg, supra note 125, at 36; Eagleton Federal Courthouse, CITY ST. LOUIS, http:// 
web.archive.org/web/20070818174938/http://stlcin.missouri.org/devprojects/projinfo.cfm 
?DevProjectID=47 [http://perma.cc/4FC9-DD5V] (putting the building’s height at 567 feet).  
130. See William H. Simon, Courthouse Iconography and Chayesian Judicial Practice, 24 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 419 (2012). 
131. The sources for Figure 2 (Comparing the Volume of Filings: State and Federal  
Trial Courts, 2010) come from, on the federal side, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics:  
March 31, 2010, U.S. CTS., tbls.C-1, D-1 & F (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics 
/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics2010.aspx [http://perma 
.cc/X7DU-XPKD]. Thus, the 2010 data ran from 2009 through 2010. Data on state filings 
come from the Court Statistics Project, State Court Caseload Statistics: 2010, NAT’L CTR.  
FOR STATE CTS. (2013), http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/StateCourtCaseload 
Statistics.aspx [http://perma.cc/Q35C-7K59]. The number of state filings is an estimate, as 
states do not uniformly report data on all categories. 
132. Data for Figure 3 (Disaggregating State Trial Court Filings) were collected by Ruth Anne 
French-Hodson, Yale Law School, Class of 2012, and Jason Glick, Yale Law School, Class of 
2012, with assistance from David Rottman of the National Center for State Courts. The data 
were revisited in 2015 by Jason Bertoldi, Yale Law School, Class of 2015. This information is 
derived from annual reports of caseload statistics published by the National Center for State 
Courts. See State Court Caseload Statistics: An Analysis of 2008 State Court Caseloads, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE CTS. 45 tbl.1, 64-68 tbl.5 (2010); Examining the Work of State Courts: An  
Analysis of 2008 State Court Caseloads, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS. 38, 51, 56  
(2010), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online 
.ashx [http://perma.cc/DUU6-5QQY]; State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual Report 1992, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., 28, 43 fig. 1.60, 100 tbl.8 (1994); State Court Caseload Statistics: 
Annual Report 1976, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS. 60 tbl.16 (1980). These statistics are esti-
mates, as not all states report data in the same manner and in all categories.  
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Figure 2.  
comparing the volume of filings: state and federal trial courts, 2010 
Figure 3.  
disaggregating state trial court filings, 1976-2008 
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The filings are one measure of judiciaries’ success. Courts are seen as hospi-
table to a variety of claimants, proceeding under a system not of their users’ 
personal design but fashioned by bodies of rule-makers committed to proce-
dural neutrality and subjected to public scrutiny. Courts are the rare venue as-
piring to treat all comers equally and to respond to litigants’ needs—with new 
forms to guide the millions of self-represented litigants, specialized clerks,  
information booths and kiosks, and targeted fee waivers for certain kinds of  
litigants.133 The doors are open to outsiders, authorized to watch the democrat-
ic practices of government officials (judges, lawyers, and staff), as they are 
obliged to interact with each other and the disputants in a respectful manner.  
And of course, these formal obligations are unevenly achieved in practice 
and at times dishonored. Painful contemporary examples come from some  
local courts that create streams of revenue by imposing fees and fines on  
indigent defendants.134 In 2015, additional evidence of such practices surfaced 
in the wake of the police shooting of Michael Brown, an African-American 
man—prompting an investigation by the U.S. Justice Department into the po-
lice and municipal court in Ferguson, Missouri. The Justice Department’s  
report detailed the court’s absence of written rules (without “any information 
about [the court’s] operations on its website”135), its failure to provide notice, 
the misinformation given, the imposition of needless court appearances, unjust 
license suspensions, unduly high fines, harsh penalties for missed appearances, 
retaliation, and biased waivers—all of which disproportionately harmed Afri-
can Americans.136  
Such problems are neither unique to Ferguson nor limited to the criminal 
justice and civil sanction system. The systemic questions of how to be fair  
in practice are ever-present. The many task forces commissioned by dozens of  
 
133. In 2011, New York reported 2.3 million people in civil litigation without lawyers; in 2009, 
California counted 4.3 million litigants without lawyers. See Jonathan Lippman, Equal Justice 
at Risk: Confronting the Crisis in Civil Legal Services, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 248 
(2012); Jonathan Lippman, State Courts: Enabling Access, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 30. 
California data are provided in the report related to a statute creating a pilot program–
named after Sargent Shriver—for civil legal assistance. See A.B. No. 590, 2009 Cal. Stat. 
2498, 2499.  
134. One report on criminal justice debt looked at California, Texas, Florida, New York, Georgia, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Arizona, North Carolina, Louisiana, Virginia, Ala-
bama, and Missouri. The study found repeated incidents in which the failure to pay a “user 
fee” or a “fine” resulted in the imposition of additional fees, the incarceration of some–
(resulting in a new form of “debtors’ prison”) as a result, and the dysfunction of the fee-fine 
system in terms of the costs to individuals and families and to the judiciaries imposing the 
charges. See Bannon, Nagrecha & Diller, supra note 42, at 1-5. 
135. Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, supra note 43, at 45. 
136. Id. at 42-60; 68-69. 
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judiciaries in the 1980s and 1990s were one response, as courts sought to ex-
plore how racial, ethnic, and gender biases affected their practices.137 State-
commissioned Access-to-Justice task forces in more recent decades are anoth-
er.138  
Those interventions and attempts are not, however, possible in closed sys-
tems. Public practices and recordkeeping are predicates to making plain how 
much needs to be fixed and to providing platforms for demands to do so. In 
2015, the Justice Department’s findings of violation of federal civil rights 
laws139 prompted the resignations of several of Ferguson’s officials and the de-
cision of the Missouri Supreme Court to appoint an appellate judge to take 
charge of the municipality’s court system.140 Publicity was at the core of the 
Justice Department’s remedies—calling for increased “transparency regarding 
court operations to allow the public to assess whether the court is operating in 
a fair manner.”141 
In sum, nothing is casual about the public’s relationship with courts. 
Courts are funded by the public fisc and staffed by government employees 
working in buildings owned or rented by the government and subject to a 
thicket of government-crafted regulation. Courts are also public in the sense 
that the members of the public are entitled to file cases, to watch proceedings 
involving others in courts, and to know the identity of judges and staff, their 
salaries (set by law), their budgets, and the rationales for their rulings. Contro-
versies about those investments and the quality of processes and outcomes reg-
ularly result. 
Governments are also the beneficiaries of these exchanges. These multiple 
meanings of the “public” in courts are in service of the authority of courts. 
From criminal penalties to the reallocation of rights in commerce and in 
households, law’s remedies entail coercion. Despite the conventional view that 
the federal Constitution has no positive entitlements, the judiciary is a counter-
example, as a public service largely supported by public funds. The private  
 
137. More than sixty reports were published by court systems as of the mid-1990s. See Resnik, 
supra note 105. 
138. These access to justice efforts are summarized at Resource Center for Access to Justice  
Initiatives, AM. BAR ASS’N (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent 
_defendants/initiatives/resource_center_for_access_to_justice/state_atj_commissions.html 
[http://perma.cc/95J9-HBV3] [hereinafter Access to Justice Initiatives]. 
139. Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, supra note 43, at 69-78. 
140. Order Transferring The Honorable Roy L. Richter, Eastern District, Missouri Court of Ap-
peals, to the 21st Judicial Circuit (St. Louis County) (Mo. Mar. 9, 2015) (en banc) (citing the 
court’s authority under the Missouri Constitution to order temporary transfers “as the ad-
ministration of justice requires”).  
141. Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, supra note 43, at 97. 
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sector relies on courts to protect economic growth and interpersonal obliga-
tions. Yet the dominant user is the government itself,142 enforcing its norms 
through criminal prosecutions and civil litigation and guarding its contracts 
and proprietary interests. Moreover, governments benefit from their judges, 
who gain their legitimacy and protect their independence through the disci-
pline of obligations to make known their procedures and to do much of their 
work before the public.  
i i .  the creation and erasure of rights  
This structure is under siege through Dispute Diffusion, propelled by  
revised mandates to judges about how to handle cases and by the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s new approach to arbitration clauses. Looking only at court-
based procedural reform or only at the doctrine of the FAA is to miss the inter-
action between the two as they have been reconceptualized during the past four 
decades. Both processes are being reconfigured as variations on the dispute 
resolution theme, and that shift reflects new normative commitments—to dif-
fusion, deregulation, and to the privatization of dispute resolutions that gain 
the force of law.  
Start with arbitration. In 2002, Justice Thomas commented on the degree 
to which the Court had “expanded the reach and scope”143 of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act.144 Designed in 1925 by merchants and lawyers,145 the Act authorized 
federal courts to enforce contract clauses that committed the signatories to for-
go decision making in courts and to be bound, instead by the decisions of arbi-
trators they choose. What that statute (reenacted “without any material 
 
142. For example, in 2013, the U.S. was a party as a plaintiff in 7,694 civil cases and a defendant 
in 40,545 civil cases, resulting in the U.S. being a party in 16.95% of the 284,604 civil cases 
filed in federal court. See U.S. District Courts – Judicial Business 2013, U.S. CTS. tbl.4, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/us-district-courts.aspx [http:// 
perma.cc/2EN4-VH8L]. 
143. EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 314 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also infra 
notes 297-320 and accompanying text. Other Justices have offered similar analyses. In 1987, 
and again in 1991, Justice Stevens charged that the Court had “effectively rewritten the stat-
ute” by applying the FAA to statutory claims and to employees. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 43 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting his discussion in Perry 
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). In 1995, Justice O’Connor de-
scribed the Court’s decisions as “building . . . , case by case, an edifice of its own creation.” 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
144. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 
U.S.C. §§ 2-14 (2013)).  
145. See Amalia D. Kessler, Feature, Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive 
Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 2940 (2015). 
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change” and named the FAA in 1947146) provided were remedies—staying or 
dismissing pending lawsuits in favor of arbitration and enforcing awards when 
appropriate.  
The scope of that remedy was once understood to be limited. During much 
of the FAA’s first six decades, congressional power to enact the statute was 
linked to its authority under Article III to regulate the lower federal courts.147 
Because the Arbitration Act was “purely procedural in nature,” it conferred “no 
new substantive right” and thus did not apply in state courts. The Act provided 
one site for the development of arbitration; other federal laws on labor-
management agreements shaped another. The statutory endorsement of labor 
arbitration reflected unions’ capacity to garner majoritarian approval of 
measures enhancing workers’ authority. Thus, commercial and labor arbitra-
tions were celebrated for their responsiveness to specially situated participants, 
many of whom were enmeshed in long-term commercial relationships.  
The distinctions between the contractual rights created by agreement and 
public rights mandated by statute, between federal and state courts, and be-
tween judges and arbitrators were robust some fifty years after the FAA’s en-
actment. As a consequence, a unanimous Court ruled in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Company in 1974 that a labor-management agreement requiring arbitra-
tion of disputes did not preclude individual employees from pursuing statutory 
civil rights claims in court.148 A decade later, in 1984, a unanimous Court like-
wise concluded that because arbitration “could not provide an adequate substi-
tute” for adjudication, an unsuccessful arbitration under a collective bargaining 
 
146. See H. REP. NO. 255, at 1 (1947) (discussing the enactment of title 9 of the U.S. Code into 
positive law). 
147. This point was stressed to the Supreme Court by both the Chamber of Commerce and the 
AAA. See, e.g., Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the State of N.Y. & Am. Arb. Ass’n, 
Inc., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 
263 (1932) (No. 172), 1931 WL 32404, at *14-15 [hereinafter AAA Marine Transit Brief]. 
Several Justices have likewise focused on Article III as the source of congressional power 
to enact the FAA. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 418 
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is clear that Congress in passing the Act relied primarily 
on its power to create general federal rules to govern federal courts.”); see also Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 22, 25, 35 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (calling the Court’s 
application of the FAA a “newly discovered federal right” in conflict with the “unambigu-
ous” legislative history, which made plain that Congress had relied on its power “to control 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts”). Thus, arbitration obligations would be enforced in 
cases filed under Article III courts’ jurisdiction over admiralty, diversity, federal question 
and the like. 
148. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-60 (1974).  
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agreement did not prevent an employee from filing a subsequent civil rights 
case.149 
Undergirding these decisions were views about the integrity of adjudica-
tion, the functions of federal statutory rights, and the rationales for arbitration. 
Judges were loyal to the public (embodied by their commitment to “the law of 
the land”150) and arbitrators to the contract (in the context of labor, “the law of 
the shop”151). Thus, Justices read statutes protecting consumers and employees 
to limit the FAA’s scope.152 As Chief Justice Burger explained in 1981, 
“[l]eaving resolution of discrimination claims to persons unfamiliar with the 
congressional policies . . . could have undermined enforcement of fundamental 
rights Congress intended to protect.”153  
Further, until the mid-1980s, the FAA case law described litigation as en-
tailing what arbitration lacked. Courts endowed disputants with a disciplined 
procedural structure, predicated on evidentiary standards, discovery, fact-
finding, law application, and appellate review.154 These attributes redistributed 
power to protect those without the clout to negotiate dispute resolution  
clauses (or much else) in contracts. Litigation’s procedural neutrality was hence  
another reason not to enforce arbitration provisions when one side had  
“unequal bargaining power”155 or “excessive” and “overwhelming economic 
power”156 in a way that suggested “no genuine bargaining over the terms.”157  
Those were the views jettisoned thereafter, as new majorities on the Court 
concluded that the FAA could require individuals, signing form job applica-
 
149. McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289, 292 (1984). 
150. See, e.g., Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57.  
151. Id. at 53; McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290.  
152. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953).  
153. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 747 (1981) (Burger, C.J, dissenting). 
154. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-
36. 
155. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that members of Congress “expressed opposition to a law which would enforce 
even a valid arbitration provision contained in a contract between parties of unequal bar-
gaining power.”). The Court later rejected the dissenters’ arguments that such inequality 
ought to constrain enforcement of arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the “potential disparity 
in bargaining power” between “large employers” and their employees ought to be one rea-
son to exempt all “contracts of employment from mandatory arbitration”). 
156. Even when requiring arbitration, the Court noted that “overwhelming” or “excessive eco-
nomic power” would be grounds for pause. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 627 (1985).  
157. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. at 666 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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tions or purchasing consumer products, to pursue statutory claims exclusively 
in arbitration. Further, the Court abandoned its reliance on Article III and in-
sisted instead that the FAA was the product of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers.158 Rather than a procedural right applicable only in federal courts, the 
FAA became a federal substantive right, preempting state laws found by the 
Court to undermine its own broadening of the “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration.”159  
As a consequence, during the last three decades, the Court has ruled that 
the FAA can be used to bar access to courts when individuals claim breaches of 
federal securities laws;160 when employees allege discrimination on the basis of 
age;161 when employees file sex discrimination suits under state law;162 when 
consumers assert rights under state consumer protection laws;163 when mer-
chants allege violations of the antitrust laws;164 and when family members 
claim that negligent management of nursing homes resulted in the wrongful 
deaths of their relatives.165 The bases for such obligations to arbitrate are not 
bargained-for, and, in many contexts, consumers and employees cannot shop 
to avoid arbitration mandates. Deeming these obligations “contract” ignores 
what the opening epigraph from the wireless service provider exemplifies:  
 
158. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
159. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (citations omitted); see 
also Shearson, 482 U.S. at 226; Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. at 625. 
160. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Ex-
press, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220. 
161. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
162. Adams, 532 U.S. at 105. 
163. AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
164. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 
U.S. 614.  
165. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam). On remand, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court sent the consolidated cases to the trial court for discovery 
and to “develop the evidence” on whether, aside from the reversed state “public policy” 
grounds, waivers of court access for those entering nursing homes were unenforceable un-
der “state common law principles.” Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 230 
(W. Va. 2012). Congress had specifically considered the requirement to arbitrate claims 
against nursing homes but has not enacted legislation on the practice. See Fairness in Nurs-
ing Home Arbitration Act of 2012, H.R. 6351, 112th Cong. (2012); Fairness in Nursing Home 
Arbitration Act of 2009, H.R. 1237, 111th Cong. (2009); Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitra-
tion Act, S. 512, 111th Cong. (2009); Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Is it Fair and Voluntary?: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Alison E. Hirschel, Nat’l Consumer Voice for Quality 
Long-Term Care). 
  
the yale law journal 124:280 4   20 15  
2840 
 
producers of rights-waivers can unilaterally “change any terms, conditions, 
rates, fees, expenses or charges regarding your Services at any time . . . .”166  
This novel approach to arbitration required new theories of its legitimacy. 
As consent and volition receded as the bases for enforcing rights-waivers, Jus-
tices developed different rationales—that arbitration was a better process than 
adjudication and did just as well as an enforcement mechanism for public 
rights. In many decisions, Justices complained that litigation was “costly and 
time consuming,”167 or praised arbitration’s capacity to produce “streamlined 
proceedings”168 providing prospective litigants with opportunities adequate to 
“effectively vindicate” their federal rights.169 Yet while regularly articulating 
that standard, the Court has not—to date—declined to enforce an arbitration 
mandate for its failure to provide adequate remedies.170  
But to focus only on the Supreme Court readings of the FAA is to ignore 
the social and political movements revising attitudes towards litigation in  
the federal courts and beyond. Beginning in the 1970s, the flexibility and  
informality of various forms of ADR (not only arbitration) came to be praised 
as virtues—juxtaposed against the formal and public obligations of adjudica-
tion which were, in turn, gaining the negative valence of imposing undue costs 
on both disputants and the courts. Congress enacted statutes and agencies 
promulgated regulations commending arbitration, mediation, and other ADR 
methods for use by administrative agencies and in the federal courts.171  
 
166. AT&T Wireless Customer Agreement, supra note 2, § 1.3; see generally Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin 
Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8-17 (2010) (discussing and documenting the 
“unilateral modification reality”). 
167. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
168. AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.  
169. See Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. at 614, and discussion infra Part IV. 
170. See infra notes 397-409 and accompanying text. Lower courts have, as discussed infra notes 
392-395 and accompanying text, upon occasion found arbitration provisions unenforceable 
and used a variety of explanations, some tied to effective vindication or burdensomeness or 
unconscionability. 
171. See infra notes 198-207 and accompanying text. The debate in the lower courts about wheth-
er an agency’s decision not to seek conciliation is judicially reviewable was resolved by the 
Supreme Court in 2015. In EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015), a unanimous 
Court authorized a narrow scope of review. At issue was whether statutory mandates that 
the EEOC “endeavor to eliminate” unlawful employment practices “by informal methods of 
conference, conciliation, and persuasion,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012), and that the 
EEOC may sue only if “unable to secure . . . a conciliation agreement acceptable to the 
commission,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(f)(1), could be the basis for defendants asserting the 
EEOC’s decision not to settle as an affirmative defense. The Court held that “[a] sworn affi-
davit from the EEOC stating that it has performed” its statutory conciliation obligations 
“but that its efforts have failed will usually suffice.” Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1656. 
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Moreover, to look only at the United States is to miss the transnational 
crosscurrents of Dispute Diffusion.172 The modern history of arbitration is 
marked by the establishment in 1899 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration173 
and by the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, which came into force in 1959174 and which the United States 
joined in 1970.175 The Convention, an international counterpart to the FAA, re-
quires contracting states to recognize awards made pursuant to private agree-
ments to arbitrate.176  
A measure of the transnational arbitration market comes from the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association, which was founded in 1926 to nurture the FAA. 
This nonprofit corporation calls itself “the world’s leading provider of conflict 
management and dispute resolution services”177 and describes its roster of 
thousands of “trained and qualified”178 neutrals who, as noted, deal with more 
than 150,000 cases yearly, mostly from contracts—public and private—naming 
 
172. See Judith Resnik, Globalization(s), Privatization(s), Constitutionalization, and Statization: 
Icons and Experiences of Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 162 (2013); Neil 
Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative 
Orders, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 373 (2008). 
173. Permanent Court of Arbitration: About Us, PERMANENT CT. ARB. (2009), http://www.pca-cpa 
.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1027 [http://perma.cc/9X6D-HNQR]. 
174. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. XII, 
opened for signature June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force June 7, 1959). As of 
the beginning of 2015 the “New York Convention” had 154 State Parties. See Status: Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html [http: 
//perma.cc/PWH5-E5YN].  
175. 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. 6997. 
176. Under the Convention, state parties can decline enforcement of awards on public policy 
grounds and may also condition enforcement on certain forms of reciprocity. For discussion 
of the scope of these exceptions, see Pierre Mayer & Audley Sheppard, Final ILA Report on 
Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 19 ARB. INT’L 249 
(2003); and Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 213 (1996). The interaction between entrepreneurship and sovereignty is mapped by 
several commentators. See, e.g., Yves M. Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Constructing a Transatlan-
tic Marketplace of Disputes on the Symbolic Foundations of International Justice, in CONTRACTING 
BEYOND BOUNDARIES: PRIVATE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (Gregoire Mallard & Jerome Sgard eds.) (forthcoming), http: 
//ssrn.com/abstract=2549866 [http://perma.cc/5W6W-DFU3]. 
177. American Arbitration Association Elects New Directors, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2014), https://www 
.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF;jsessionid=MYLjT7WG9hqmWcRnkdpyvQ2x3JGmG2yTQ8fwSGn
zgC4L66htj90V!-5119463?doc=ADRSTAGE2020833 [https://perma.cc/6L5C-SRNW].  
178. Mass Claims ADR Programs and Federal ADR Programs, AM. ARB. ASS’N 1, http:// 
www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004209 [https://perma.cc/H949-ADUR]. 
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the AAA to administer arbitration.179 By 2013, the AAA had seventy cooperative 
agreements in forty-eight countries and its own international division, the  
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR).180 These developments 
are part of larger patterns of globalization and privatization, celebrated by some 
as expanding the rule of law181 and criticized by others as a neo-liberal privati-
zation of power.182  
 Just as cross-continental exchanges shaped arbitration in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, contemporary interactions across networks of 
judges, lawyers, and repeat player litigants are transforming court-based pro-
cedures as well. During the last four decades, in several countries, programs to 
 
179. The figure of 150,000 cases administered annually by the AAA comes from various sources. 
See Statement of Ethical Principles, supra note 28; MARTIN F. GUSY, JAMES M. HOSKING & 
FRANZ T. SCHWARZ, A GUIDE TO THE ICDR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES 13 (2011) 
(reporting that the AAA “provides dispute resolution services in more than 150,000 cases 
annually . . . including arbitrations (of any sort), mediations, and other ADR processes”); 
see also Sebastian Perry, Inside the ICDR: An Interview with Luis Martinez, AM. ARB. ASS’N 4 
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_022207 [http://perma 
.cc/D66U-UFNZ] (describing that the AAA “handles over 150,000 cases a year”). More re-
cent information from the AAA indicated that, in 2013 and 2014, it received more than 
200,000 filings. See Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25. 
Several federal agencies and many state programs, such as those for uninsured drivers 
and no-fault automobile insurance claims, rely on the AAA. See Brief for the Am. Arbitration 
Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 2, Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) 
(No. 99-1235), 2000 WL 744161 [hereinafter AAA Green Tree Brief]; Brief for the Am. Arbi-
tration Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 15 n.9, Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 1967 WL 113919 [hereinafter AAA Prima Paint Brief]; see also in-
fra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (describing regulations naming the AAA as the re-
quired arbitration provider).  
The AAA is also the largest provider of arbitration services for employment. Alexander 
J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited: What Kind of Employment Arbitra-
tion System Has Developed?, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 59, 62 (2014). The for-profit pro-
vider JAMS, founded in 1979 by a former state-court judge, calls itself the “largest private al-
ternative dispute resolution (ADR) provider in the world,” dealing with about 12,000 cases a 
year and employing nearly 300 full-time neutrals in “mediating and arbitrating complex, 
multi-party business/commercial cases.” JAMS Fact Sheet, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com 
/files/Uploads/Documents/Corporate-Fact-Sheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/PQ76-VFBW]. 
180. See Brief for the Am. Arbitration Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, BG 
Grp. PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) (No. 12-138), 2013 WL 4781545, at *2 
[hereinafter AAA BG Group Brief]. As of 2015, the ICDR, which was established in 1996, 
provided “services in more than 80 countries.” See About the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) and the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), AM. ARB. ASS’N (20145), 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about [https://perma.cc/XMQ4-BGWT]. 
181. See, e.g., SABINO CASSESE, THE GLOBAL POLITY: GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND 
THE RULE OF LAW (2012). 
182. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL AS-
SEMBLAGES (2006). 
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revisit the practices of civil litigation have aimed to refocus the work of trial-
level judges, encouraging them to become case managers pressing for resolu-
tions without adjudication. In the 1990s, England and Wales embraced pre-
filing protocols to promote settlements through adoption of the “Woolf Re-
forms.”183 Australia and Canada have similar initiatives “remaking” or “privat-
izing” their courts.184  
Returning to the United States, recall that Chief Justice Burger insisted in 
1981 that, because courts had a distinctive role to play in enforcing race dis-
crimination law, arbitration was inappropriate for such claims. In contrast, he 
argued that Fair Labor Standards Act claims could be sent to arbitration, and 
he criticized his colleagues for being “oblivious to desperately needed changes 
to keep the federal courts from being inundated with disputes of a kind that 
can be handled more swiftly and more cheaply by other methods.”185 As the 
Chief Justice explained, all branches of the federal government were studying 
how “to remove . . . routine and relatively modest-sized claims . . . from the 
courts.”186 The Chief Justice was referencing—and championing—the “policy 
of favoring extrajudicial methods of resolving disputes.”187 The goal was to 
avoid having the “federal courts flooded by litigation increasing in volume, in 
length, and in a variety of novel forms.”188  
Increasing caseloads were problems to be solved, and interest in protecting 
the courts from too many or the wrong kind of cases prompted judicial action 
on and off the bench. In 1995, a special committee of the U.S. Judicial Confer-
ence (the federal judiciary’s policymaking arm) provided a “long range plan” 
that forecast a “nightmarish” scenario of overwhelming demand for courts.189 
 
183. See RT. HON. LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR 
ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF ENGLAND AND WALES (1996). Criticism of this approach 
comes from HAZEL GENN, WHAT IS CIVIL JUSTICE FOR? (2011). 
184. See generally TREVOR C.W. FARROW, CIVIL JUSTICE, PRIVATIZATION, AND DEMOCRACY (2014); 
SARAH MURRAY, THE REMAKING OF THE COURTS: LESS-ADVERSARIAL PRACTICES AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RULE OF THE JUDICIARY IN AUSTRALIA (2014); THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE, 
supra note 4. 
185. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 753 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
At issue there was a Fair Labor Standards Act claim, which, the Chief Justice argued, 
stemmed from an “entirely different historical and legal context,” making arbitration appro-
priate. Id. at 750. 
186. Id. at 746.  
187. Id. at 748; see also Warren Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982).  
188. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
189. See Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, JUD. CONF. U.S. 18 (Dec. 1995), http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/FederalCourtsLongRangePlan.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/WEY3-9UQ9] [hereinafter 1995 Long Range Plan]. Some aspects of this 
report have been superseded by the Strategic Plan for the Federal Judiciary, JUD. CONF. U.S. 
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Extrapolating from the second half of the twentieth century, the report  
projected that, by 2010, 610,800 cases (more than double the number in 1995) 
would be filed.190 To buffer against this possibility, the Judicial Conference 
urged Congress to send cases from federal courts to state courts and to admin-
istrative agencies, to avoid creating new federal rights whenever possible and, if 
cases proceeded in federal courts, to rely more on ADR.191 
The judiciary’s enthusiasm for stemming court filings resonated with lead-
ing members of industry, other members of government, and the legal  
academy. Through a series of statutes and rule reforms, mediation and arbitra-
tion—methods characterized in the 1980s by both Chief Justice Burger and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as extrajudicial procedures192—turned in the 
1990s into everyday practices inside courts.193 By 1993, judges gained the power 
to insist that litigants attend settlement conferences or use “neutrals” in efforts 
to end cases without adjudication.194  
Thus, inside the federal courts, procedural revisions pushed significant as-
pects of court-based dispute resolution out of sight. The Federal Rules were 
amended to provide that discovery materials were no longer routinely filed in 
courts unless appended to motions; pre-discovery confidentiality agreements 
became routine,195 and settlements conditioned on non-disclosure of terms  
 
(Sept. 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/StrategicPlan 
2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/5NBF-SG9C]. 
190. 1995 Long Range Plan, supra note 189, at 15. 
191. Id. at 23-39 (Recommendations 1-15); 70-71 (Recommendations 38-39). 
192. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c) (1983) (amended 1993); Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 748 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting).  
193. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (2012)); Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 
Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (2012)).  
194. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(1)-(2), (f) (requiring the attendance or availability of parties at pre-
trial conferences; authorizing the court to take action on matters including “settling the case 
and using special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or 
local rule”; and authorizing sanctions for those failing to participate in good faith); see also 
Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Celebration and Requiem for the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1802-1806 (2014). See generally Resnik, supra 
note 110. 
195. See generally Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and Discovery Sharing, 
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2014). This article surveys cases on the sharing of information 
obtained in discovery, the use of “return-or-destroy” provisions required as a predicate ei-
ther to discovery or to settlement, and a relaxed standard for granting protective orders of 
disclosures made. Benham calls for rules building in the sharing of discovery as part of the 
goal of increasing the efficiency of litigation. He argues that his proposals fit the paradigm 
of Federal Rule amendments addressing proportionality as a test of the permissible scope of 
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became commonplace.196 By 2014, proponents (including those on the Court) 
interested in constraining the perceived burdens imposed by federal litigation 
had put into place new restrictions on pleading and discovery, as well as new 
limits on the availability of implied causes of action, class actions, damages, 
and attorneys’ fees.197  
The Court is not the only public promoter or potential regulator of ADR. 
Since the 1970s, Congress has offered arbitration as a forum in which to pursue 
remedies under various federal statutes. For example, in 1978, Congress 
amended the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947 
(FIFRA) to require sharing research costs by those seeking applications author-
izing their use of chemicals covered by the act; if disputes arise, resolution is 
exclusively by arbitration.198 The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 identifies arbitra-
tion as the forum for resolving disputes between organizations, members, and 
a national governing body.199 Two years later, in 1980, Congress amended the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act to mandate arbitration for disputes 
between employers and multi-employer plan sponsors when employers with-
draw from a plan.200 In 1988, Congress altered its 1976 Federal Land Policy and 
 
discovery. Congress has proposed, but not enacted, obligations to make more materials 
available. See, e.g., Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014, S. 2364, 113th Cong. (2014). 
196. Symposium, Secrecy in Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301-590 (2006). 
197. See generally Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Ap-
proach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014). 
198. Act of Sept. 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 
136a (2012)) (“If . . . the original data submitter and the applicant have neither agreed on the 
amount and terms of compensation nor on a procedure for reaching an agreement on the 
amount and terms of compensation, either person may initiate binding arbitration proceed-
ings by requesting the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to appoint an arbitrator 
from the roster of arbitrators maintained by such Service.”). This provision was upheld 
against challenges that it violated Article III by bypassing life-tenured judges. See Thomas v. 
Union Carbide Agric. Prods Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). 
The procedures for FIFRA arbitrations are codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1440.1 (2014); those 
regulations authorize the AAA to run the proceedings. The rules detail the location of the ar-
bitration, discovery and evidentiary procedures, and arbitrator compensation. 29 C.F.R. § 
1440.1 (2014); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1440, App. (2014). The rules provide that “[a]ny person having 
a direct interest in the arbitration is entitled to attend hearings,” but that “[i]t shall be dis-
cretionary with the arbitrator to determine the propriety of the attendance of any other per-
son.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1440, App. Sec. 18(c) (2014). The AAA reported to us that it adminis-
tered twenty-one FIFRA arbitrations in 2010 and between five and eight arbitrations per 
year from 2011-2013. See Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25. 
199. Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-606, § 205(c)(1), 92 Stat. 3045 (codified as 
amended at 36 U.S.C. § 220529 (2012)) (“The right to review by any party aggrieved by a 
determination . . . shall be to any regional office of the American Arbitration Association.”). 
200. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–364, § 4221(a)(1), 
94 Stat. 1208 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012)) (“Any dispute between an 
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Management Act to establish arbitration as the default for disputes over land 
appraisals.201  
More generally, in 1996, Congress enacted the Administrative Dispute 
Resolution Act (ADRA), exhorting federal agencies to diffuse disputes by  
using providers other than judges and methods other than adjudication.202 
Both before the ADRA and after, administrative regulations commended the 
use of arbitration in a wide array of contexts, such as housing,203 national 
parks,204 patents,205 disaster relief,206 and telecommunications.207 In addition, 
 
employer and the plan sponsor of a multiemployer plan concerning a determination . . . 
shall be resolved through arbitration.”). 
201. Federal Land Exchange Facilitation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–409, § 3(a), 102 Stat. 1086, 
1087 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1716(d)(2) (2012)) (“If . . . the Secretary concerned 
and the other party or parties involved cannot agree to accept the findings of an appraisal or 
appraisals, the appraisal or appraisals shall be submitted to an arbitrator appointed by the 
Secretary from a list of arbitrators submitted to him by the American Arbitration Associa-
tion for arbitration to be conducted in accordance with the real estate valuation arbitration 
rules of the American Arbitration Association.”); see also 43 C.F.R. § 2201.4 (2014); 36 
C.F.R. § 254.10 (2014) (detailing the arbitration procedure). 
202. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990) (codified 
at 5 U.S.C. § 571 et seq. (2012)).  
203. In 1990, the Department of Housing and Urban Development enacted regulations demand-
ing that specified insurance plans “provide for binding arbitration proceedings arranged 
through a nationally recognized dispute settlement organization.” 55 Fed. Reg. 41021 (Oct. 5, 
1990) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 203.204(g) (2014)).  
204. In 2001, acting pursuant to the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, the Na-
tional Park Service authorized concessioners to use arbitration in conflicts about the value of 
leasehold surrender interests, if contracts are terminated. See 66 Fed. Reg. 35082 (July 3, 
2001). The method for selecting arbitrators is detailed in 36 C.F.R. § 51.51 (2014).  
205. In 2004, the Patent and Trademark Office permitted binding arbitration “to determine any 
issue in a contested case” before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. 69 Fed. Reg. 50003, 
50016 (Aug. 12, 2004); 37 C.F.R. § 41.126(a) (2014). Both parties must agree in writing and 
specify which issues are to be arbitrated. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.126(b), (e) (2014). In 2012, in re-
sponse to the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, the Patent and Trademark Office expanded 
the availability of binding arbitration to patent derivation proceedings. See 37 C.F.R.  
§ 42.410 (2014).  
206. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides for arbitrations in certain 
contexts under the aegis of FEMA’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Office. 44 C.F.R.  
§ 295.42 (2012). In 2009, under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 
44767, 44767 (Aug. 31, 2009), FEMA made final and binding arbitration available to resolve 
disputed Public Assistance applications related to hurricanes Katrina and Rita in projects 
worth more than $500,000. 44 C.F.R. § 206.209 (2014).  
207. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) makes arbitration available related to 
home run wiring ownership in multiple dwelling unit buildings. 47 C.F.R. § 76.804(a)(2) 
(2014), (b)(2); 62 Fed. Reg. 61016, 61017-20 (Nov. 14, 1997). In 1996, the FCC issued regu-
lations related to Personal Communication Services licensees; “parties are encouraged to use 
expedited ADR procedures, such as binding arbitration, mediation, or other ADR tech-
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as discussed below, Congress has also shaped a special arbitration process in 
the federal courts. 
On one account, the proliferation of sites of dispute resolution is an ode to 
adjudication, for which demand outstrips supply. The problem to be solved is 
insufficient capacity, as judges cannot respond to all in need of their attention. 
The goal is to equip those seeking redress with more “access to justice” (the 
term common in the United States for dozens of state-based task forces208) or 
with “paths to justice” (the phrase used in many other countries).209 In prac-
tice, such alternatives need not be either court-exclusive or court-preclusive: 
non-court options can be pursued in addition to or on the way to filing in 
court. 
 Examples of such regulated innovations come from both sides of the At-
lantic. In the United States, Congress created a system of “court-annexed arbi-
tration,” to which parties generally may give consent and for which trials de 
novo are permissible.210 Many state systems have parallels.211 In Europe, the 
preamble to a 2013 Directive on consumer alternative dispute resolution 
(CADR)212 explained that “the right to an effective remedy and the right to a 
 
niques” for disputes. 47 C.F.R. § 24.251 (2014); 47 C.F.R. § 27.1188 (2014); see also 47 C.F.R. 
§ 90.677(d) (2014) (permitting arbitration in the context of band reconfiguration separating 
cellular and non-cellular systems); 71 Fed. Reg. 52751 (Sept. 7, 2006) (same); 47 C.F.R.  
§ 301.200 (2014) (“To the extent that the parties cannot resolve such dispute . . . they are 
strongly encouraged to use expedited alternative dispute resolution procedures, such as me-
diation or non-binding arbitration.”); 78 Fed. Reg. 5310, 5314 (Jan. 25, 2013) (“[T]he final 
rule provides that any formal dispute resolution request must include a summary of the par-
ties’ prior efforts and attempts to resolve the dispute through negotiation, mediation, or 
non-binding arbitration.”).  
208. These access to justice efforts are summarized at Access to Justice Initiatives, supra note 138.  
209. See, e.g., GENN, supra note 4. 
210. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2012), discussed infra notes 573-597 and accompanying text. 
211. Illinois is the example discussed here. See infra note 591 and accompanying text.  
212. See Directive 2013/11, of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution for Consumer Disputes, 2013 O.J. (L 165/63) [hereinafter CADR 2013 Directive]. 
As of 2008, researchers reported that systems in place for consumer ADR in Europe re-
sponded to about half a million claims annually, and many of the processes were free of 
charge. See CHRISTOPHER HODGES, IRIS BENÖHR & NAOMI CRUETZFELDT-BANDA, CONSUM-
ER ADR IN EUROPE 368, 380 (2012). 
In addition, regulations address online dispute resolution (ODR) and aim to create an 
EU-wide online platform for disputes arise out of online transactions and to link this plat-
form to national ADR systems. See Regulation 524/2013, of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on Online Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes, 2013 O.J. (L 165/1) 
[hereinafter European ODR Regulation]. In February of 2015, the United  
Kingdom’s Civil Justice Council issued a report recommending the adoption of Her Majes-
ty’s Online Court (“HMOC”) for online dispute resolution. Online Dispute Resolution for  
Low Value Civil Claims, CIV. JUST. COUNCIL 3 (Feb. 2015), http://www.judiciary.gov.uk 
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fair trial are fundamental rights . . . . Therefore, ADR procedures shall not be 
designed to replace court procedures and shall not deprive consumers or  
traders of their rights to seek redress before the courts.”213 When coupled with 
new mechanisms for collective relief,214 the European Directives aim to rectify 
what could be termed a market failure in adjudicatory structures by expanding 
the number of forums in and the modes of process through which consumers 
can pursue redress for alleged legal harms.215 These mechanisms can function 
not only to resolve disputes but also as gateways to further pursuit in court.  
 An alternative account is that litigation is itself the problem to be solved—
not only because it is costly and adversarial but also because its public, regula-
tory effects do harm to entrepreneurship, impose costs on consumers and  
 
/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Online-Dispute-Resolution-Final-Web-Version1.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/WT4P-HGML]. The Council anticipated that HMOC would not “fully replace 
any existing court,” but would have “full jurisdiction over some types of disputes,” and 
would be used to administer some processes within complex disputes. Id. at 21. 
213. CADR 2013 Directive, supra note 212, at para. 45. 
214. Commission Recommendation (EU) No. 2013/396 of 11 June 2013, on Common Principles 
for Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States, 
2013 O.J. (L 201/60) [hereinafter Commission Recommendation on Collective Redress]; 
UK Consumer Rights Bill and Private Enforcement of Competition Law, OLSWANG (Dec. 5, 
2014), http://www.olswang.com/articles/2014/12/the-uk-consumer-rights-bill-and-private 
-enforcement-of-competition-law [http://perma.cc/QLN3-ELHN] [hereinafter UK Con-
sumer Rights Private Enforcement]; see also Susanne Augenhofer, Some Questions on Enforce-
ment and Individual Redress—The Example of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, EUROPÄISCHE UND 
INTERNATIONALE DIMENSION DES RECHTS [EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF 
LAW]: FESTSCHIRFT FOR DAPHNE ARIANE SIMOTTA 39 (Thomas Garber, Reinhold Geimer & 
Rolf A. Schütze eds., 2012). Discussion from a U.S. perspective is offered by S.I. Strong, 
Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S. Class Action Have a New Analogue?, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 899 (2012). 
215. The concerns prompting the CADR Directive included the view that “most consumers don’t 
take action” to pursue their claims. See EU Debates Out-of-Court Scheme for Consumer Dis-
putes, EURACTIV.COM (Apr. 15, 2013), http//www.euractive.com/food/policymakersmull 
-court-consumer-dispute-system-news-503274 [http://perma.cc/BUP7-P9VS] (quoting the 
EU Consumer Affairs Commissioner’s concern). The Commission Recommendation on 
Collective Redress explains its goal as enabling more private enforcement of rights, to sup-
plement public and individual methods. Commission Recommendation on Collective Re-
dress, supra note 214, at para. 6. 
In November of 2014, another Directive sought to expand enforcement of violations of 
EU competition law by authorizing both direct and indirect purchasers from an infringer to 
purse “full compensation” and the tolling of limitation periods when a “consensual dispute 
resolution process” is pursued. See Directive 2014/104, of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages Under National Law for In-
fringements of the Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union, 2014 O.J. (L 349/1). A UK Consumer Rights bill to create opt-out collective actions 
for damages aims to facilitate private enforcement of that body of law. See UK Consumer 
Rights Private Enforcement, supra note 214.  
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employees, and fetter government officials’ decision making.216 These views 
have gained prominence in the United States, as what was once described as 
the “old judicial hostility” to arbitration217 has been replaced by hesitancy 
about, if not hostility towards, adjudication. The gestalt is captured by the oth-
er opening epigraph, coming from a 2015 page of the federal judiciary’s web-
site, helping visitors to understand how the “Federal Courts work.”218 There, 
the judiciary set off one text box to advise disputants “to avoid the expense and 
delay of having a trial” whenever possible.219 
In addition to encouraging parties to exit the court system, judges superin-
tend court-based settlement efforts.220 As their procedures incorporate ADR, 
the practices of judges come to resemble those of neutrals and arbitrators. To-
gether, that cohort and their work constitute a field (in the sociological sense 
proposed by Pierre Bourdieu),221 in which reflexive exchanges normalize the 
avoidance of the public regulation entailed in adjudication in favor of diffusing 
disputes to diverse private sites. Control over access by third parties becomes  
a matter of largesse, rather than right.222 At the high end of international  
arbitrations, the overlapping sets of lawyers and arbitrators are developing a  
 
216. As Benjamin Kaplan, the Reporter for the 1960s revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, commented in 1989 at a symposium dedicated to the fiftieth Anniversary of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules “have worked to considerable (if not universal) sat-
isfaction to support revolutions of the substantive law. The much-criticized discovery 
function and class action remain together the scourge of corporate and governmental male-
factors.” Benjamin Kaplan, A Toast, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1879, 1881 (1989). 
217. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989). 
218. Civil Cases, supra note 1. 
219. Id. 
220. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1983); FED. R. CIV. P. 16; supra notes 192-194 and accompanying text.  
221. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 
814, 816 (1987).  
222. A parallel, coming from the quasi-criminal context, was the limited access accorded to pro-
ceedings conducted by the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), which had come to 
function as a low-level, criminal court. When individuals failed to pay fares, jumped turn-
stiles, or were otherwise misbehaving in the subway system of New York, the NYCTA is-
sued notices of violations, totaling in one year about 125,000. See N.Y. Civil Liberties Union 
v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 290-91 (2d Cir. 2011). Of that number, some 
20,000 citations were contested at in-person hearings in which Transit Authority officers 
(lawyers appointed by the Authority’s President and paid per-diem) presided. To attend, a 
prospective observer had, under Transit Authority rules, to obtain permission from re-
spondent-defendants; each respondent had to agree, twice. Id. at 292. The Second Circuit, 
relying on the “experience and logic” test, see supra notes 88-89, concluded that the rule vio-
lated the First Amendment’s protection of third-party access rights. While bracketing the 
reach of its ruling to other administrative proceedings, the Second Circuit held that the 
NYCTA’s “‘quasi-judicial’ administrative hearing” was so like a “criminal trial” that open-
ness was obligatory. Id. at 298-303. 
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community of norms. And for the small-dollar claims of consumers and  
employees, the repeat player purveyors of arbitration clauses overlap with ADR 
providers to designate certain organizations as authoritative decision makers. 
As adjudication becomes repositioned as the product of “unnecessary litiga-
tion,” the rationales for public funding of courts weaken. Decisions to cut pub-
lic investments in courts or to close courthouses become more difficult to con-
test.223  
Earlier, I offered the phrase Dispute Diffusion to capture this developing 
normative orientation, aligning and conflating adjudication with its alterna-
tives. Implementation comes through a host of statutes and regulations consti-
tuting what I termed Alternative Civil Procedure Rules (ACPR). Unlike the 
tidiness of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (numbered from 1 to  
84) and their counterparts in each state (all of which are produced and  
disseminated by the governments of the issuing jurisdictions), locating ACPR 
requires much more effort. One needs to piece together sub-constitutional  
doctrine, statutes, and government-promulgated rules authorizing outsourc-
ing, link such provisions to often hard-to-find manuals and protocols of hun-
dreds of ADR providers, and learn whether specific arbitration clauses prof-
fered when purchasing goods and services or applying for jobs impose 
modifications.224 
The reason to group this array of sources together is to show their common 
function. Unsurprisingly, the many mini-codes of procedure incorporate some 
 
223. See Hazel Genn, What is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 397 (2012). Genn detailed how the UK, once a leader in providing legal aid and 
administrative tribunal redress, adopted a policy aiming for civil litigants to internalize the 
costs of litigation (aside from courthouse infrastructure expenses) under a fee-for-service 
model. In the United States, the Judicial Conference has authorized the closing of several 
federal courthouses, and its Facilities and Space Committee announced in 2013 that it had 
reduced the square footage of the courts by three percent. 31 Court Facilities To Be Downsized 
in First Year of Cost-Cutting Project, THIRD BRANCH NEWS (Oct. 15, 2013), http:// 
news.uscourts.gov/31-court-facilities-be-downsized-first-year-cost-cutting-project [http:// 
perma.cc/RN4G-95BN]. 
224. In 2011, the Federal Judicial Center published an overview to provide an “initial report” on 
ADR practices in the federal district courts. Thanks are due to Donna Stienstra for a series 
of e-mails, clarifying the rules and resources on alternative dispute resolution in the federal 
courts. See Donna Stienstra, ADR in the Federal District Courts: An Initial Report, FED.  
JUDICIAL CTR. (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/adr2011.pdf/$file 
/adr2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/W7F3-XPA9]. In addition, an entity called the Resolution 
Systems Institute (RSI), supported in part by the private ADR provider JAMS (derived 
from the acronym for its former name—Judicial, Arbitration, and Mediation Services), has 
created a database to provide a “state-by-state guide” with search tools to court-based ADR; 
the guide also includes references to explore federal local rules. Court ADR Across the  
U.S., RESOLUTION SYS. INST. (2015), http://courtadr.org/court-adr-across-the-us/search.php 
[http://perma.cc/MA84-ZYYM]. 
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of the methods and values of the Federal Rules. And just as the substantive  
effects of the 1938 Federal Rules have come to be widely acknowledged,225 so 
too must the substantive norms imported into the ACPR be brought into view.  
At their inception, the 1938 Federal Rules aimed to ease barriers to the fed-
eral courts by shaping trans-substantive, uniform, national provisions that ex-
panded opportunities for obligatory information exchange among the parties 
and that vested discretion in trial judges, who were empowered to render  
public decisions based on the claim’s merits.226 In the mid-1960s, rule revisions 
facilitated the filing of class actions—thereby enabling the entry of schoolchil-
dren, prisoners, consumers, employees, and many others into court.227 The way 
was paved by dozens of new federal statutory rights, the creation in 1974 of the 
Legal Services Corporation, and fee-shifting provisions for civil rights and em-
ployment discrimination plaintiffs.228  
The influx of diverse claimants helped to clarify the political and social con-
sequences of adjudication—the inevitable “substance” of rules of “practice and 
procedure”—that made plain the stakes of different procedural opportuni-
ties.229 After heated debates about the processes for drafting rules, federal legis-
lation in 1988 imposed new requirements: proposed changes had to go 
through a period of public notice and comment prior to their approval or mod-
ification by layers of committees, reviewing the rules before sending them to 
the Supreme Court. Further, the time for congressional override after promul-
gation by the Court was expanded, to run for 180 days.230 Rule-making hear-
ings became contested exchanges in which self-identified groups affiliated with 
“plaintiffs” or “defendants” sought to influence decisions on pleadings, discov-
ery, aggregation, and trials.  
 
225. See generally ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979). 
226. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1131-63 
(1982); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the 
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286 (2013); Ju-
dith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 494-98, 
502-15 (1986); David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rule-
making, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1972-77 (1989). 
227. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Public Law 
Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980). 
228. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012); Legal 
Services Corporations Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2012). 
229. The Rules Enabling Act instructs that the rules of “practice and procedure” promulgated 
pursuant to its processes shall not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2071(a), 2072(b) (2012). 
230. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073-2074. An overview of the debate and the changes is provided in Owen 
M. Fiss & Judith Resnik, Making and Reading Rules, in ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNA-
TIVES: AN INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE 1162-94 (2003). 
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The Alternative Civil Procedure Rules now emerging come in part from the 
public sector; new federal rules incorporating ADR go through the processes 
outlined above, just as rules for state-based arbitration or other forms of ADR 
go through those jurisdictions’ requirements. Further, state regulations affect 
some of the rules; for example, California requires arbitration providers to 
waive fees for indigent claimants using arbitration within that state.231  
 But alternative rules are also produced by private providers, free to specify 
procedures without public input. The variability in ACPR renders it norma-
tively deregulatory. To the extent that some providers—such as the AAA—
solicit input from outsiders and are concerned about limiting expenses of par-
ties, they do so by choice. Thus, the AAA’s decisions to convene a task force to 
produce its 1998 “Consumer Due Process Protocol” imposing fee schedules 
with caps, to create ethical standards,232 and to revise its rules and fee schedules 
are matters of “internal policy.”233 Likewise, the AAA’s standards of “Ethical 
Principles,” such as “commitments to diversity” and “information disclosure 
and dissemination,” are choices,234 and many other ADR providers do not fol-
low these AAA efforts at self-regulation. Further, the manufacturers and ser-
vices that impose arbitration clauses make a host of choices; according to one 
review of 188 U.S.-based “social media providers,” about forty percent man-
dated arbitration, and many did not meet the “due process fairness tests” of the 
 
231. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3 (West 2015). 
232. The AAA convened a National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee in 1997,  
and the result was a protocol first issued in 1998. See Consumer Due Process Protocol:  
Statement of Principles of the National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee, AM. ARB.  
ASS’N (2007), http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014 [https://perma.cc 
/T2AQ-NYNE] [hereinafter AAA Consumer Due Process Protocol]. A first protocol grew out 
of a 1995 task force focused on labor and employment law. See Margaret M. Harding, The 
Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 369, 369, 373-74, 390-401 
(2003). JAMS is another provider stating it imposes fairness standards. See JAMS Policy on 
Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses Minimum Standards of Fairness, JAMS  
2 (2009), http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Jams-Rules/Jams_Consumer 
_Min-Std-2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/5W8F-X9JN]. 
233. The background of the AAA Advisory Committee on Consumer Disputes, explained supra 
note 232, is also discussed in an amicus brief submitted by the AAA, see AAA Green Tree 
Brief, supra note 179, at 3. The AAA commented that it had decided, “as a matter of internal 
policy,” that consumer disputes with an amount in controversy under $10,000 would be 
processed under the rules of this Protocol “regardless of the rules, terms and conditions re-
flected in a pre-dispute clause.” Id. at 4. See infra notes 509-514 and accompanying text, dis-
cussing changes in 2013 and 2014 to the AAA rules and fees.  
234. AAA Ethical Principles, supra note 28. 
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AAA.235 Indeed, identifying terms in arbitration clauses, ADR providers, and 
learning about their rules and caseloads are research projects in themselves.236  
In addition to variability, ACPR do not insulate decision makers’ inde-
pendence from parties; rather, ACPR shape an insider system with its own  
political economy, reliant on a web of confidential interactions inhibiting con-
nections to the body politic. One could—if energetic—search the fifty state 
websites to make a list of the name of every person appointed or elected to be a 
judge in state and federal courts. Further, one could review thousands of pages 
of data on court filings and outcomes and look at individual dockets, many of 
which are now on electronic filing systems.237 And one could walk into the 
thousands of courthouses around the country to read files and to watch judges, 
when they are on the bench. 
But no central registries account for the hundreds of ADR decision makers, 
the claims filed before them, their rules, fees, or outcomes. The AAA, for  
example, does not have a list of all the institutions identifying it as the adminis-
trator of their arbitrations,238 and the AAA does not offer a public directory of 
 
235. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Fundamentally Unfair: An Empirical Analysis of So-
cial Media Arbitration Clauses, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 341 (2014). 
236. For example, JAMS, “a leading for-profit provider in the U.S., does not publish data on its 
arbitration caseload.” Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commer-
cial Arbitration: Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals 6 (Pepperdine U. Sch. of Law Legal  
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2014/29), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2519084 
[http://perma.cc/X6TX-H683]. Stipanowich has noted the proliferation of “soft guidelines” 
through initiatives from providers including the International Bar Association and the In-
ternational Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution. Id. at 10-11. Other researchers 
have offered specific accounts. See, e.g., Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitra-
tion, the Law Market, and the Law of Lawyering, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 87 (2014). The task 
is daunting; in 2010, more than 750 ADR systems were available across EU. See HODGES, 
BENÖHR & CRUETZFELDT-BANDA, supra note 212, at 389.  
237. The information gathered is, nonetheless, far from complete. See Yeazell, supra note 115. 
Moreover, procedural reforms, discussed here and by others, are making access to court-
based information more difficult. See generally CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE 
U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Joseph W. Doherty, Robert T. Reville, & Laura Zakaras eds., 
2012). Further, when arbitration providers are required to give data, their records may have 
more information than what is filed in courts, as the CFPB noted when analyzing the out-
comes of class actions. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 6, at 3. 
238. Having a complete account would be difficult in that the AAA may not be aware that it is 
named in particular contracts as an arbitration administrator; apparently the AAA does not 
keep an internal list of all the government regulations or major manufacturers and employ-
ers that name it to be the administrator of arbitrations. Boyle AAA 2015 Materials 2015, supra 
note 25. Other analyses have identified some of the institutions and businesses empowering 
the AAA. For example, the CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 34-35, conclud-
ed that the AAA was listed in 83 percent of the credit card arbitration clauses reviewed and in 
86 percent of the mobile wireless arbitration clauses reviewed.  
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its own arbitrators.239 Instead, confidentiality is one of the AAA’s Ethical Prin-
ciples, committing the organization to keeping information about proceedings 
private.240 Watching the work is also not an option. The major providers  
advertise confidentiality as a signature of their processes; the hearings are gen-
erally closed, and the rules permit arbitrators to bar third parties from attend-
ing hearings.241 While many arbitration clauses are “silent on confidentiali-
ty,”242 some oblige participants to keep information and outcomes private.243 
 
239.  See Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25. Public access to information about AAA 
arbitrators is available when seeking to select arbitrators. See Arbitrator and Mediator 
Selection, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2015), https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/arbitratorsmediators 
/arbitratormediatorselection [https://perma.cc/6EBT-3JVJ]; Introducing AAA Arbitrator 
Select, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2015), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF%3Fdoc%3DADRSTG 
_016003 [https://perma.cc/WFS8-6YBK] (click on “Arbitrator Select” link to download the 
pdf, Introducing AAA Arbitrator Select). A party choosing the “list only” service fills out a 
two-page form in which the party can indicate the dollar amounts of the claim and 
counterclaim if any; the nature of the dispute; the “reason for choosing AAA arbitrator 
select”; and the “desired qualifications for arbitrator(s).” Introducing AAA Arbitrator Select, 
AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra, at 4-5. The AAA then provides lists of sets of arbitrators and their fees 
(ranging from $750, $1,500, or $2,000). Id. at 3. Searching and selection comes with a 
service charge of $500 for each arbitrator appointed. Id. In addition, state laws seeking in-
formation on arbitration providers offer another route to information. Those entities in 
compliance provide spreadsheets on which the names of arbitrators can be found. See, e.g., 
AAA Data, July 2009-June 2014, Provider Organization Report, supra note 25.  
240. AAA Ethical Principles, supra note 28.  
241. See, e.g., Consumer Due Process Protocol, supra note 232, Principle 12(2); JAMS Comprehensive 
Arbitration Rules & Procedures, JAMS (July 1, 2014), http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-
comprehensive-arbitration/#Rule%2026 [http://perma.cc/45KY-C2PZ] (limiting public ac-
cess to proceedings before the Judicial Arbitration and Management Services); Rules of Con-
ditionally Binding Arbitration, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, http://www.bbb.org/council/programs-
services/dispute-handling-and-resolution/dispute-resolution-rules-and-brochures/rules-of-
conditionally-binding-arbitration#ConfidentialityofRecords [http://perma.cc/S386-Z69L] 
(“It is our policy that records of the dispute resolution process are private and confiden-
tial.”). But see Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 996-1002 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding un-
enforceable ADR provisions, including those requiring confidentiality, where they created 
one-sided advantages).  
Arbitrators working under the AAA also adhere to its code of ethics, which states that 
the “arbitrator should keep confidential all matters relating to the arbitration proceedings 
and decision.” The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, AM. ARB. ASS’N 7 
(Mar. 1, 2004), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_003867 
[https://perma.cc/24B4-LVNX]. 
242. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 51-52. In six product markets, the study 
reported that in checking accounts, about twenty-eight percent of the market had confiden-
tiality clauses while none existed in wireless providers’ clauses. Id. tbl.10, 52-53. 
243. Challenges to the legality of such clauses is discussed infra notes 453-454 and accompanying 
text. The AAA takes “no position on whether parties should or should not agree to keep the 
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Aggregate data and individual filings are also not made publicly accessible, 
except as required under federal or state law. For example, the AAA complies 
with state mandates requiring posting of data, but takes down that information 
when the obligation to post (generally for five-year periods) expires.244 Some 
redacted employment awards are also made available.245 Researchers seeking to 
capture trends need to obtain special access to ADR providers’ files or archive 
data before those materials disappear from the Internet.  
Complainants and their lawyers have parallel challenges. One consumer 
cannot know from arbitration dockets whether another won or lost based on 
identical allegations of overcharges or product defects, just as one employee 
cannot generally know if another succeeded on discrimination or on other 
claims of rights. Individual decisions come into the public purview through 
limited routes, such as when awards are contested; the rulings of arbitrators 
are generally enforceable in, albeit not directly reviewable by, courts.246 As  
the AAA explained to the United States Supreme Court, which agreed with the  
argument against the appellate review called for in an arbitration clause, “fi-
nality”—translated as limited court oversight—is intended to produce econo-
my.247 Thus, the Court chose to close off judicial reconsideration even when the 
parties had sought court review of the lawfulness of the outcome of arbitra-
tion.248  
i i i .  locating the private and the public  in  arbitration  
Contract, not coercion, was the centerpiece of arbitration in much of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The obligations to participate and to  
 
proceeding and award confidential between themselves.” AAA Ethical Principles, supra note 
28. 
244. Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25; infra notes 464-466 and accompanying text. Lex-
isNexis, as well as Westlaw, also offers some capacity for searching arbitral awards. See, e.g., 
Lexis Advance (typing “AAA Employment Arbitration Awards and AAA Labor Arbitration 
Awards” to access those collections). See also Consumer Arbitration Rules, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
Rule 4-43(c) (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM 
/ADRSTAGE2021425& [https://perma.cc/3LZB-UGDP] [hereinafter AAA 2014 Consumer 
Arbitration Rules] (“The AAA may choose to publish an award rendered under these Rules; 
however, the names of the parties and witnesses will be removed from awards that are pub-
lished, unless a party agrees in writing to have its name included in the award.”). 
245. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 4, at 22. 
246. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582-84 (2008). The limited grounds for re-
view under the FAA are discussed infra Part IV.E. 
247. See Brief for the Am. Arbitration Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 3, Hall 
St., 552 U.S. 576 (No. 06-989), 2007 WL 2707884 [hereinafter AAA Hall Street Brief].  
248. See Hall St., 552 U.S. at 580-81; see also infra notes 545-556 (discussing Hall Street).  
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comply flowed from shared decisions to eschew the public arena. Negotiating 
parties could design their own idiosyncratic procedures, select their decision 
makers, and stipulate remedies to suit their preferences. Arbitrators in turn de-
rived their power from and owed their loyalties to the parties’ intent, rather 
than governing law. The “ability to tailor processes to fit particular circum-
stances and needs”249 invited autonomous self-fashioning. Arbitration was seen 
to promote economic growth250 and, as Michael Helfand discusses in this vol-
ume, the welfare and well-being of sub-communities.251 
Arbitrations were also private in two other senses of that word. First, dur-
ing the nineteenth century, parties who decided to arbitrate could not turn to 
the public system to enforce that obligation.252 Rather, as a matter of “public” 
(the word chosen) policy, courts jealously guarded their monopoly on enforc-
ing obligations253 and declined to enforce agreements to arbitrate.254 Second, 
the parties controlled the places in which arbitrations took place and could 
choose private venues, to which strangers had no right of entry.255 
 
249. Stipanowich, supra note 236, at 9. 
250. One history of contract links its development in the West to the rise of humanism and indi-
vidualism. See URIEL PROCACCIA, RUSSIAN CULTURE, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE MARKET 
ECONOMY 32-49, 61-80 (2007). 
251. Michael A. Helfand, Feature, Arbitration’s Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration Para-
digm, 124 YALE L.J. 2994 (2015).  
252. Recent research on English and colonial practice requires reassessing the view of the role 
played by the judiciary in enforcing arbitration agreements in earlier centuries. Under a 
1698 statute, the British Parliament created a mechanism for parties to obtain referrals to 
arbitration and for the court to enforce awards through contempt powers. This approach 
was adopted in more than twenty American jurisdictions, including both before and after 
colonies became states. James Oldham & Su Jin Kim, Arbitration in America: The Early Histo-
ry, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 241, 246-51 (2013).  
253. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924); see also Amalia Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation: 
The Nineteenth Century Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively Ameri-
can Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 423 (2009). 
254. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, IN-
TERNATIONALIZATION 15-22 (1992). 
255. Knowing the frequency with which arbitrations were open to third parties is difficult. His-
torians have identified examples of eighteenth and nineteenth century arbitrations that were 
conducted like trials, albeit without juries, and many such proceedings included spectators. 
See AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800-1877 (forthcoming) (on file with author); Bruce H. 
Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 468 (1984). Moreover, a rich history of English arbitrations from pre-
Roman Britannia through the Elizabethan Age documents the mélange of public and private 
that endowed third-party arbitrators with authority to resolve disputes and that included 
public access to many of the proceedings. See DEREK ROEBUCK, EARLY ENGLISH ARBITRA-
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These facets of the private in arbitration have kept arbitration off-screen. 
While the public function of courts has produced many iconic images denoting 
the authority of the state, visual representations of accords to arbitrate are hard 
to come by. An exception is an engraving (Figure 4) by Bernard Picart.256 As 
the French text explains at the bottom, two kings are depicted “swearing an  
alliance” confirmed by their handshake. The Renaissance Virtues of Justice and 
Peace embrace in the background; the eye of Providence looks down from 
above, and War, Ambition, Discord, Fraud, and Impiety are enchained below.  
 
TION (2008); DEREK ROEBUCK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ARBITRATION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
UNDER ELIZBETH I (2015). My thanks to John Langbein for suggesting this resource. 
By the time of the enactment of the federal legislation on arbitration in 1925, arbitra-
tions were styled as closed processes, and since its founding in 1926, the AAA has described 
privacy as a central feature of arbitrations. See FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: 
ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948). Thus, in contemporary discussions, 
arbitration is often celebrated for offering the confidentiality that courts do not. See, e.g., 
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 525 (3d Cir. 2013) (Roth, J., dissent-
ing); infra notes 564-571, 654-668 and accompanying text. 
256. Thanks to Michael Widener and Arthur Eyffinger for information on Picart and related im-
agery. Picart, who lived from 1673 to 1733, was known for his depictions of religious cere-
monies and customs of diverse peoples. See Ilja M. Veldman, Familiar Customs and Exotic 
Rituals: Picart’s Illustrations for Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses de tous les peuples, 33 
SIMIOLUS: NETH. Q. HIST. ART 94 (2008).  
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Figure 4.  
traitez de paix, bernard picart, 1826 
 
Frontispiece, Jean Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens. 
Courtesy of Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School. 
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Figure 5.  
original logo of the permanent court of arbitration  
 
© Courtesy of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
 
The Picart depiction was the frontispiece to a 1726 compilation of political 
treaties and commercial alliances (Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens 
by Jean Dumont).257 Its special resonance for arbitration comes from its use as 
the template for the first logo (see Figure 5) of the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion (PCA),258 whose founding conferences provided “invaluable lessons” for 
those designing arbitrations in the United States.259 The PCA has been housed 
since 1913 in the Peace Palace, which itself is an icon of volition because it has 
sheltered a series of international dispute resolution organizations to which no 
 
257. See JEAN DUMONT, BARON DE CARLSCROON, CORPS UNIVERSEL DIPLOMATIQUE DU DROIT DES 
GENS: CONTENANT UN RECUEIL DES TRAITES D’ALLIANCE, DE PAIX, DE TREVE, DE NEUTRALITE, 
DE COMMERCE, D’ECHANGE (1726). 
258. All rights to the former logo of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, shown in Figure 5, are 
held by the PCA; the image is reproduced with permission of the PCA and the assistance of 
its staff. In 2007, the logo was updated. The design remained but with fewer lines and with-
out the “eye of providence” as a backdrop. See JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRE-
SENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN STATES AND DEMOCRATIC 
COURTROOMS 284 fig.184 (2011). 
259. KELLOR, supra note 255, at 9. 
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one can be “bidden.”260 Both the PCA and the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), also housed at the Peace Palace and opening its courtroom in 1946 as the 
successor institution to the Permanent Court of International Justice, depend on 
parties’ consent to their jurisdiction and lack direct coercive mechanisms to en-
force their decisions.261 Voluntarism thus sits at the center of arbitration. 
A. The Paradigm of Merchants, Contracts, and Consent  
The merchants and lawyers who forged the public law of arbitration in the 
United States sought federal legislation to enforce consensual agreements. A 
committee of the American Bar Association (ABA) drafted language for what 
became the 1925 United States Arbitration Act (USAA).262 Joined by more than 
120 organizations under the leadership of the Chamber of Commerce, the ABA 
pressed for enactment.263  
 
260. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 258, at 255 (quoting Edward W. Bok, Introduction to ANTONIO 
SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE, THE WORLD COURT, at xii (Elizabeth F. Read, trans., 1998) 
(1925)).  
261. The PCA publicly reported fifty-four “cases conducted” under its auspices during its first one 
hundred years. Annual Reports: 108th Annual Report—2008: Annex 2, PERMANENT CT. ARB.  
43-48 (2008), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1069 [http://perma.cc/ZZA6 
-7SJZ]. The ICJ has received some 160 cases over the decades of its operation. See List of All  
Cases, INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2 [http://perma.cc 
/P4UD-HBAT]. Analyses of the history of the international tribunals houses at the Peace Palace, 
as well as of the filings and decisions, can be found in RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 258, at 247-
64.  
Under PCA rules, public information is generally provided only if parties consent; legal 
obligations may also require some disclosures. See Rules of Procedure: PCA Arbitration Rules 
2012, PERM. CT. ARB. 18 (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1188 
[http://perma.cc/8D5U-DEQL]. That practice may change as the UNCITRAL Rules and  
Convention on Transparency begin to have broader influence. See UNCITRAL Rules on  
Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, UNCITRAL (Jan. 2014), http://www 
.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency 
-E.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZK2A-UXNU] [hereinafter UNCITRAL Transparency Rules]. The 
U.N. General Assembly recommended the use of these rules in all investment disputes. See 
G.A. Res. 68/109, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/109 (Dec. 16, 2013). Enforcement of rulings 
may come through national judiciaries. See Deyan Draguiev, State Responsibility for Non-
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 8 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 577 (2014).  
262. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925). The act was repealed 
in 1947, when it was reenacted with minor editorial revisions and codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-
14 (2012). Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (1947). Details 
of those lobbying, drafting, and promoting the legislation can be found in IMRE SZALAI, 
OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA (2013).  
263. Focused efforts by New York State’s Chamber of Commerce and its Bar Association’s 
Committee on the Prevention of Unnecessary Litigation helped to move reforms in that 
state to the national stage. Id. at 56-70. See also AAA Prima Paint Brief, supra note 179, at *10 
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The 1925 statute mandated that a “written provision in any maritime trans-
action or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” was “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable,” subject to “such grounds as exist at law or in  
equity for the revocation of any contract.”264 The statute expressly exempted 
“contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of 
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”265 Those workers were 
among the few employees whom Congress could clearly regulate under its 
Commerce Clause authority, as understood in the 1920s.266 Furthermore, at 
the time, the federal courts did not have their own civil procedural rules. While 
the federal judiciary then had the power, under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 
to shape general federal common law,267 federal judges conformed most of 
their procedures to the rules of the states in which they sat.  
The question of the constitutionality of the Arbitration Act reached the Su-
preme Court in 1932; the Court upheld the statute on the grounds that Con-
gress had the authority to create such a remedy pursuant to its power under 
Article III to regulate admiralty jurisdiction.268 Two years later, Congress en-
acted the Rules Enabling Act, authorizing the federal courts to create national 
procedural rules, which were promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1938.  
 
n.5 & app’x (describing the “partial list of 122 organizations which sponsored the Federal 
Arbitration Law,” and including those organizations in an appendix); AAA Marine Transit 
Brief, supra note 147, at *5 (“Since the adoption of the first of the modern statutes in New 
York, in 1920, the use of arbitration has enjoyed a tremendous growth, and it has been 
adopted as a system for the settlement of disputes by a great number of trade associations 
and chambers of commerce, many of which have been assisted and advised in the installa-
tion of such systems by your petitioners. The construction and application of the United 
States Act is of special importance, both for the effect which it may have upon the construc-
tion and application of state acts with similar principles and provisions, and because it is the 
statute to which reference will usually be made when the arbitrations involve controversies 
between citizens of different states.”). 
264. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 2, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C.  
§ 2 (2012)).  
265. Id. § 1. Despite protests by some judges (invoking the federal Jones Act and other protec-
tions specifically for seamen), lower courts have relied on the Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the expansion of FAA law to apply 
mandated arbitration clauses to foreign nationals who are seamen. See, e.g., Lindo v. NCL 
(Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011); Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 
F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2008). 
266. This point, in the context of that era’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, is discussed in the 
dissents in Circuit City, Inc. v. St. Clair Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). See id. at 124-25 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting); id. at 133-34 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
267. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
268. See Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932).  
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As Amalia Kessler details in this volume, once in place, the U.S. Arbitration 
Act (reenacted and renamed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1947) was 
promoted and nurtured by the American Arbitration Association, itself incor-
porated in 1926 to support this system of “self-regulation.”269 The mandate of 
the FAA made the promise to arbitrate a matter of public law, but many other 
aspects of arbitration remained in the private realm. The system was privately 
financed by contracting parties270 and, because arbitrators were not to provide 
“information or publicity” about what transpired (unless parties directed oth-
erwise),271 participants controlled access to knowledge about arbitration’s use 
and could screen it from public view.  
Yet Congress also authorized parties to come to federal courts to enforce or 
vacate arbitration awards.272 When conflicts about either obligations to arbi-
trate or the outcomes are filed in court, the public gains access to information. 
As a consequence, litigated conflicts over the scope of the FAA are a treasure 
trove of insights (albeit not a random sample) into the changing terms and 
conditions under which arbitrations take place.  
 Until the 1980s, the Supreme Court put consent at the fore and read the 
statute as neither preclusive of other federal regulatory goals nor operative 
when parties had significantly different bargaining powers. The oft-cited  
exemplar is the unanimous 1953 decision of Wilko v. Swan, which involved a 
customer’s allegations that a brokerage firm violated 1933 federal securities 
laws by making misrepresentations about the valuation of a stock.273 The ques-
tion was whether terms in an agreement calling for the settlement of controver-
sies by arbitration were enforceable.274  
 Justice Reed, writing for the Court, did not rule out the FAA’s application 
to statutes,275 but his opinion raised two problems: the asymmetry in parties’ 
bargaining capacity and the limits of the arbitration process. Even if some buy-
ers and sellers “deal[t] at arm’s length on equal terms,” Justice Reed wrote, the 
federal securities laws were “drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under 
 
269. See Kessler, supra note 145, at 2986 (quoting KELLOR, supra note 255, at 27). In 1947, Con-
gress repealed the United States Arbitration Act and enacted a revised version, entitled the 
Federal Arbitration Act. See Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 
(1947). 
270. KELLOR, supra note 255, at 40-41. 
271. Id. at 242. 
272. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1) (2012).  
273. 346 U.S. 427, 428-29 (1953).  
274. Id. at 429-31. 
275. Id. at 433-34. 
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which buyers labor.”276 Moreover, the process of arbitration departed signifi-
cantly from the rights provided in courts.277 Arbitrators’ awards “may be made 
without explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their 
proceedings”—leaving one unable to examine “arbitrators’ conception of the 
legal meaning of such statutory requirements as ‘burden of proof,’ ‘reasonable 
care’ or ‘material fact.’”278 In contrast, public decision making by judges, sub-
ject to appellate review, ensured compliance with congressional regulations 
protecting purchasers of stock.279 Thus, if one party objected, the arbitration 
clause was not to be enforced.280 
B. From Waffles to Cheerios: Employees, Consumers, and Obligations  
To Arbitrate 
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court revisited its prior readings of the FAA. 
Rejecting the Wilko Court’s concern that arbitration was a “method of  
weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be  
complainants,”281 the Court reread congressional statutes to require that per-
sons having signed an “agreement to arbitrate” be required to do so.282 In a se-
ries of decisions, the Court concluded that enforcement was required unless 
objectors could meet their burden of demonstrating that a “contrary congres-
sional command” altered the obligation to arbitrate,283 that an “inherent  
conflict” existed between the relevant statutory right and arbitration,284 or that 
 
276. Id. at 435. 
277. Id. at 433-38. 
278. Id. at 436. 
279. Justice Jackson concurred, and Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Minton, dissented. 
They argued that no evidence had been presented that “the arbitral system as practiced in 
the City of New York” would not afford the rights to which the purchaser was entitled, as 
contrasted with the “tortuous course of litigation, especially in the City of New York.” Id. at 
439-40 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
280. Id. at 438 (majority opinion). 
281. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).  
282. Id. at 479; see also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987) 
(holding that § 10(b)(5) claims under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and claims under 
RICO were arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 640 (1985) (enforcing obligations to arbitrate antitrust claims); Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223-24 (1985) (enforcing obligations to arbitrate claims brought 
under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and related state law claims). 
283. See Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27 (“The burden is on the party op-
posing arbitration, however, to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial 
remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”). 
284. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S 20, 26 (1991). 
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the alternative dispute program was inadequate to “vindicate” statutory 
rights.285 
Further, in 1984, in a key decision opening new arenas for the relocation of 
claims from courts to arbitration, the Supreme Court held—over several objec-
tions—that the FAA applied to state courts. The decision in Southland Corp. v. 
Keating286 was written by Chief Justice Burger, who was, as noted, an ardent 
proponent of ADR but who was also known for supporting state autonomy 
from federal constitutional mandates.287 Breaking ranks with fellow federalists 
Justices O’Connor and Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger held that the FAA 
preempted California’s Franchise Investment Law, which called for “judicial 
consideration of claims” brought under its aegis.288 Justice Stevens (who dis-
sented in all the cases expanding the FAA’s reach from contract to statutory 
rights289) disagreed about the displacement of state authority.290 Justices 
O’Connor and Rehnquist argued that the FAA was based on Congress’s Article 
III powers, that the FAA’s text mentioned federal district courts specifically, 
and that it created a federal procedural remedy that had no application to state 
courts.291 “Today’s decision is unfaithful to congressional intent, unnecessary, 
and . . . inexplicable.”292  
 
285. Id. at 28 (“[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statuto-
ry cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial 
and deterrent function.” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637)). 
286. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
287. For example, Chief Justice Burger pressed the National Center for State Courts to create 
programs to help state attorneys general improve their arguments before the United States 
Supreme Court. See Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting 
the Powers and the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1601-04 
(2006). 
288. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
289. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 640 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
290. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 18, 21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
291. Id. at 22-36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (calling the Court’s application, id. at 35, of the FAA a 
“newly discovered federal right”). This dissent also noted that Sections 3 and 4, implement-
ing the FAA, expressly and only referenced the “United States district court[s].” Id. at 29. 
The FAA continues to be construed not to provide an independent source of federal jurisdic-
tion but as governing cases otherwise properly before the federal courts. The test of when 
federal jurisdiction exists in cases seeking to enforce arbitration agreements under the FAA 
is not, however, straightforward. See, e.g., Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009). 
A decade thereafter, Justice Scalia agreed, stating he stood “ready to join four other Jus-
tices in overruling” Southland. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, also dissented to ar-
gue that Southland ought to be overturned. Id. at 288, 291 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The 
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The expansion of the FAA to consumers and to state courts was followed 
by the Court’s rulings on employment contracts—confirming the “demise of 
the non-arbitrability doctrine.”293 In 1991, over the objections of a financial 
services manager bringing a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act,294 the Court explained that “[m]ere inequality in bargaining  
power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are nev-
er enforceable in the employment context.”295 In 2001, the Court dealt squarely 
with the question of the FAA’s application to employees. Circuit City Stores, Inc. 
v. Adams held that, aside from seamen and railroad workers (expressly exempt-
ed by the statute), employees could—through job application forms or other 
documents—waive rights to bring state and federal anti-discrimination as well 
as common law claims in courts.296 
The impact of the changing interpretation of the FAA can be seen in Figure 
6, the “Application for Employment” that Waffle House (“America’s Place to 
Work, America’s Place to Eat”) required prospective employees to sign. The 
document comes from the record in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., decided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in 2002.297 From the hand-marked portion of the docu-
ment, we learn that the applicant, Eric Scott Baker, told the company that he 
could start work in two weeks, that he had a high school diploma, and that he 
drove a 1985 Buick Skyhawk.  
  
 
FAA treats arbitration simply as one means of resolving disputes that lie within the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts.”).  
292. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by Rehnquist, J.). 
293. Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 
1103, 1113 (2011). As Drahozal and Rutledge map, the Court’s expansion of the FAA over-
lapped with expanded enforcement of forum selection clauses. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Gaming the System: Pro-
tecting Consumers from Unconscionable Contractual Forum Selection and Arbitration Clauses, 66 
HASTINGS L.J. 719 (2015). 
294. Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20. 
295. Id. at 33. 
296. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). On remand, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, under California law, the 
contract was not enforceable because it was a contract of adhesion. Circuit City Stores, Inc. 
v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002). 
297. Joint Appendix, EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (No. 99-1823), 2001 WL 
34093975, at *59, *61. 
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Figure 6. 298 
waffle house employment application  
 
 
298. Id.  
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The printed terms imposed by Waffle House offered no equivalent person-
alization. Rather, the form instructed all applicants that Waffle House could 
“deduct from any monies due [them], an amount to cover any shortages which 
may occur” and that they had to “indemnify” the company “against any legal 
liability” for withholding wages.299Moreover, if “money, food, or equipment” 
to which he had access was alleged to be lost, applicants had “to submit to a 
polygraph” or other testing.300As to the resolution of disputes: 
The parties agree that any dispute or claim concerning Applicant’s em-
ployment with Waffle House, Inc., or any subsidiary or Franchisee of 
Waffle House, Inc., or the terms, conditions or benefits of such em-
ployment, including whether such dispute or claim is arbitrable, will be 
settled by binding arbitration. The arbitration proceedings shall be 
conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association in effect at the time a demand for arbitration is 
made. A decision and award of the arbitrator made under the said rules 
shall be exclusive, final and binding on both parties, their heirs, execu-
tors, administrators, successors and assigns. The costs and expenses of 
the arbitration shall be borne evenly by the parties.301 
Eric Baker signed the form on June 23, 1994 at a Waffle House in Colum-
bia, South Carolina; he was offered and declined a job there. Some weeks later, 
and without filling out another application, Baker was hired at another Waffle 
House, miles away. Within a few weeks, Baker had a seizure (lasting “approx-
imately thirty seconds”) at work.302 On September 5, 1994, Waffle House ter-
minated Baker’s employment.303 Baker complained to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that Waffle House had violated his rights 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). After investigating, 
the EEOC filed an enforcement action against Waffle House in federal district 
court. Waffle House moved to dismiss and to compel the EEOC to go to arbi-
tration.304 
One issue, raised in defense, was the form’s effect on the EEOC. An ante-
cedent question was the form’s relevance to Baker. In 1998, the district court 
judge held that, because Baker filed the form at one location but was hired at 
 
299. Id. at *61. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at *59. 
302. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:96-2739-O, 1998 WL 35168489, at *1 (D.S.C. 
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another, “it does not appear that Baker’s acceptance of employment . . . was 
made pursuant to the written application.”305 Likewise, a member of the 
Fourth Circuit concluded that under “fundamental principles of contract law,” 
Mr. Baker had not entered into a written employment agreement.306 But a ma-
jority of the Fourth Circuit determined that the “generic, corporation-wide 
employment application . . . followed Baker to whichever facility of Waffle 
House hired him.”307 While the EEOC was not a signatory, the “binding arbi-
tration agreement between Baker and Waffle House” precluded the EEOC 
from seeking remedies for Mr. Baker, though not from requesting injunctive 
relief against Waffle House for discriminating on the basis of disability.308 
In 2002, the Supreme Court disagreed. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Stevens concluded that the form did not limit the filing by the EEOC, which 
was authorized by Congress to “vindicate the public interest” as well as to seek 
victim-specific remedies.309 The “proarbitration policy goals of the FAA do not 
require the agency to relinquish its statutory authority if it has not agreed to do 
so.”310 In dissent, Justice Thomas (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
 
305. Id. at *2. 
306. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 817 (4th Cir. 2002) (King, J., dissenting). 
“Common sense tells us that a person who physically goes to the Wal-Mart in Lewisburg, 
West Virginia, is applying for a job at that Wal-Mart, not one in Richmond, Virginia, or 
Charlotte, North Carolina.” Id. at 818. 
307. Id. at 809 (majority opinion). 
308. Id. at 809-13. 
309. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 290, 296-98 (2002). Given that Baker and Waffle 
House had not arbitrated, the issue of whether any mitigation would have been in order was 
not reached. Id. at 296-98. The view that employment forms ought not preclude public en-
forcement was championed by twenty-eight states (with Missouri in the lead) filing an ami-
cus brief in support of the EEOC, seeking reversal of the appellate court’s rule and raising 
concerns about its application to attorney general enforcement of consumer protection stat-
utes. See Brief of the States of Missouri, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Rhode Is-
land, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia and the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands in Support of Petitioner, Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (No. 99-1823), 2001 
WL 34131148. In the ruling’s wake, state enforcement agencies have rebuffed efforts to find 
themselves precluded. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 843 
N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 2014); Joulé, Inc. v. Simmons, 944 N.E.2d 143 (Mass. 2011); People v. 
Coventry First LLC, 915 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 2009). 
310. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294. The Court had suggested this approach in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991), in which Justice White discussed the point 
that requiring a registered securities representative to arbitrate his ADEA claim did not pre-
clude the EEOC from enforcing the act.  
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tice Scalia) read the form to preclude the EEOC from pursuing relief that the 
employee “has agreed not to do for himself.”311  
The Waffle House documents illustrate the distance between “fundamental 
principles of contract law” and the application Eric Baker signed. The oddity of 
characterizing such “pieces of paper” as contracts was explained in the 1970s by 
Arthur Leff, who wrote that contracts required “not only a deal but dealing.”312 
Negotiations—even with form provisions—reduced “the possibility of mono-
lithic one-sidedness.”313 Leff appreciated that contract theorists had, in the 
1940s, shaped concepts such as duress, fraud, and unconscionability as part  
of the development of the doctrine of “contracts of adhesion;” Leff thought  
these arguments innovative but the wrong approach (“totally irrelevant”314)  
to materials that were not themselves contracts.315 Rather, as “products  
of non-bargaining,” such documents were “unilaterally manufactured  
commodities.”316 As a “thing,” the law ought to regulate its quality, as it did 
other products.  
But instead of limiting arbitration to negotiated contracts, the Court has li-
censed expansive use of that product, now described by opponents as “forced 
arbitration,”317 while others offer terms such as “employer-promulgated plan”318 
 
311. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 298 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
312. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 132, 138 (1970).  
313. Id. at 138, 140. Scholars of arbitration likewise stress its basis in informed consent, coupled 
with its “procedural integrity”—and identify these two components as proper subjects of ju-
dicial monitoring. See William W. Park, Explaining Arbitration Law, in SELECTED TOPICS  
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CENTENNIAL LIBER AMICORUM (forthcoming 2015), 
http://www.williamwpark.com/documents/WWPExplainingArb29July.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/M46W-5NGP]. 
314. Leff, supra note 312, at 148. 
315. Id. at 142-43. 
316. Id. at 147. For instance, in 1962, the Supreme Court of California held that a “mass-made 
contract” (a life insurance policy sold in an airport vending machine) could not be 
“equate[d] [with a] bargaining table, where each clause is the subject of debate . . . .” Steven 
v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 377 P.2d 284, 293, 298 (Cal. 1962). I should add that my concern is not 
about boilerplate per se, which can enable egalitarian treatment across a set of contracting 
parties and lower the costs of contracting. See Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, Conceptualizing 
Contractual Interpretation, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2013). My focus instead is on mandates in 
non-negotiated documents to forgo the pursuit of public rights. 
317. Alliance for Justice, Lost in the Fine Print, YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=tgC3N802Sjk [https://perma.cc/KG9D-3QVY].  
318. The AAA provides distinct rules governing arbitration where the “dispute arises from  
an employer-promulgated plan.” Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures,  
AM. ARB. ASS’N 10 (Nov. 2009), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM 
/ADRSTG_004362 [https://perma.cc/27RR-HRM2] [hereinafter AAA Employment Arbitra-
tion Rules]; see also Colvin & Gough, supra note 32, at 13. In 2014, the AAA changed its 2009 
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or “pre-dispute arbitration.”319 Under the Court’s approach, the range of  
statutes coming under the FAA’s aegis has continued to expand. In 2012, the 
Court applied the FAA to litigants claiming violations of the Credit Repair Or-
ganization Act,320 and in 2013, to a family restaurant, Italian Colors, which ar-
gued that the American Express Company had violated the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.321 Signatures lost some of their relevance in 2009, when the Court required 
employees who had not signed a collective bargaining agreement to use arbi-
tration instead of pursuing their age discrimination claims in court.322 
 
Employment Rules by revising its fee schedule. See AAA Employment Arbitration Rules, supra, 
at 35-40.  
319. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 1, at 3.  
320. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
321. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); see also Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).  
322. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 269-72 (2009). The impact of this approach is 
on display in a 2012 opinion by a trial court judge who held that, by purchasing a car that in-
cluded a ninety-day trial use of a Sirius XM Radio, and a month later receiving in the mail a 
“Welcome Kit” from Sirius that mandated arbitration upon accessing the service, a consum-
er was prohibited from bringing a class action alleging violations of the Telephone Consum-
er Protection Act. Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., Civil No. 12cv418 AJB, 2012 WL 
1965337 (S.D. Cal. 2012). The Ninth Circuit reversed, pointing out that the customer had 
purchased nothing from the provider and that no evidence of consent existed. See Knutson 
v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 771 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2014).  
A few statutory questions remain. Litigation has focused, for example, on the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The FLSA, enacted in 
1938, authorizes “one or more employees” to bring wage-and-hour claims “for and in behalf 
of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
Co-employees must opt-in. See id. Given the statute’s provision for a collective action dec-
ades before the 1966 class action rule, a few lower courts have held that litigation outcomes 
under the FLSA, including through settlements, cannot be sealed. See, e.g., Nutting v. Uni-
lever Mfg., Inc., 2014 WL 2959481, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. June 13, 2014); Stalnaker v. Novar 
Corp., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1264 (M.D. Ala. 2003). See generally Elizabeth Wilkins, Silent 
Workers, Disappearing Rights: Confidential Settlements and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 34 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 109 (2013). 
Judges might likewise have decided that arbitration requirements—especially if preclud-
ing class arbitrations and resulting in confidential outcomes—would conflict with the FLSA. 
Instead, several circuits have sent individual FLSA claimants to arbitration. See Walthour v. 
Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2886 
(2014); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol 
Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 362 F.3d 294 
(5th Cir. 2004); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2002). In these cases, 
employees were sent to different providers—1) the American Arbitration Association, see 
Giordano v. Pep Boys—Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-1281, 2001 WL 484360, at 
*2 (E.D. Pa. March 29, 2001); Brief for Appellees at 5, Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Re-
pair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-11309); Brief for Appellee at 11-16, Suther-
land v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-304) (specifying the AAA or 
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Judicial and legislative encouragement of arbitration has not been lost on 
the business community or on ADR providers. One measure of growth is pro-
duction, and the numbers of clauses mandating arbitration are soaring across 
many sectors. A 1991 survey found fewer than four percent of firms requiring 
arbitration in employment; by 2007, another study found that more than forty-
five percent of the firms did so.323 In 2008, the estimate was that “a quarter or 
more of all non-union employees in the US”—thirty million employees—were 
covered.324  
 Many more consumers are obliged to use arbitration. The market for cell 
phones grew between 1990 and 2009 to include an estimated 291 million users in 
the United States and to produce revenues for the four major providers (AT&T, 
Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile) totaling $180 billion.325 Virtually all providers of 
wireless services insist on mandatory arbitration, along with the option (discussed 
in more detail below) of using small claims court for individual actions.326  
Financial services are another sector producing arbitration clauses. According 
to a 2015 study by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which was 
chartered in 2010 by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act and authorized to regulate arbitration in that segment of the mar-
ket,327 approximately fifty percent of credit card loans are subject to arbitration,328 
 
JAMS at the employee’s choice); Brief for Appellants at 8-9, Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 
303 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-2304); 2) JAMS, see Brief for Appellee at 11-16, Suther-
land, 726 F.3d 290 (No. 12-304) (specifying the AAA or JAMS at the employee’s choice); 3) 
the National Arbitration Forum, see Brief for Appellants at 7, 28-34, Carter, 362 F.3d at 298 
(No. 03-10484). 
In contrast, the National Labor Relations Board had concluded that the NLRA prohibits 
waivers of class arbitrations and, in the fall of 2014, declined to follow a Fifth Circuit ruling 
that held otherwise. See D.R. Horton, Inc., v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013); Murphy 
Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. slip op. 27 (Oct. 28, 2014); D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. slip 
op. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012).  
323. Mark D. Gough, The High Costs of an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Employment 
Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and Civil Litigation, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
91, 95-96 (2014). The 1991 data came from a review of about 100 contracts; the 2007 data 
came from a review of 757 U.S.-based companies. 
324. Colvin & Gough, supra note 32, at 2. 
325. BAR-GILL, supra note 17, at 185, 196-97 (relying on an estimate from the FCC). 
326. The CFPB review concluded that 87.5% of the major wireless providers (servicing over 
99.9% of subscribers to these providers) have arbitration obligations, and 85% (servicing 
over 99.7% of arbitration-subject subscribers) also permit use of small claims court. See 
CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 26, 33-34. 
327. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481-5603 
(2012). 
328. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 1, at 9; § 2, at 10 fig.1, 31. See also CFPB 2013 
Preliminary Results, supra note 31, at 21, 31.  
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and nearly all that were studied “expressly did not allow arbitration to proceed 
on a class basis.”329 Mandated arbitration is also common in web-based sales. As 
of the fall of 2014, Amazon imposed mandatory arbitration (with the small claims 
court alternative),330 and Dropbox offered a 30-day window to opt out of arbitra-
tion.331 And, as the case law at the Supreme Court reflects, some nursing homes 
require mandatory arbitration, including for claims of negligence resulting in 
wrongful death.332  
The appetite to do more was evident in the spring of 2014, when General 
Mills—the manufacturer of the popular Cheerios cereal—put a notice on its 
website that through “interacting” by “joining our online community,” “enter-
ing a sweepstakes,” downloading coupons, or purchasing products “online or 
[in] physical stores,” customers agreed that “any dispute . . . based in contract, 
tort, statute, fraud, misrepresentation, or any other legal theory,” was to be re-
solved “by informal negotiations or through binding arbitration.”333 A barrage 
 
329. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 44-45; see also CFPB 2013 Preliminary Re-
sults, supra note 31, at 62 n.146; id. at 13, 37. The 2015 study concluded that no issuers of 
credit cards had dropped arbitration clauses over the period studied, while a few added such 
provisions. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 11-12. The report also noted 
that in that segment of the market, the increase in such clauses was not as “dramatic” as 
some had predicted after the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion, 563 U.S. 321 (2011). CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 12. 
330. Conditions of Use, AMAZON.COM (2012), http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display 
.html/ref=footer_cou?ie=UTF8&nodeId=508088 [http://perma.cc/6SL2-V99Z]. 
331. Terms of Service, DROPBOX (2015), https://www.dropbox.com/privacy#terms [https://perma 
.cc/D6TJ-EFP7]. 
332. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
333. See Sarah Cole, General Mills’ Arbitration Clause, INDISPUTABLY (Apr. 17, 2014), http:// 
www.indisputably.org/?p=5564 [http://perma.cc/9YFH-LQQS] (quoting General Mills’ 
legal terms as of April 17, 2014); Stephanie Strom, When ‘Liking’ a Brand Online  
Voids the Right To Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17 
/business/when-liking-a-brand-online-voids-the-right-to-sue.html [http://perma.cc/9494 
-AQAA]. According to the reports, General Mills instituted this approach after a federal 
district judge denied General Mills’ motion to dismiss proposed class actions. The class ac-
tions alleged that the company had violated California’s consumer laws by marketing 
“Nature Valley” bars as all-natural despite the use of genetically-modified ingredients. See 
Order on Motion to Dismiss, Rojas v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 12-cv-05099-WHO (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 26, 2014); Class Action Complaint, Janney v. General Mills, 12-cv-03919-PJH (N.D. 
Cal. July 26, 2012), 2012 WL 3309433. Thereafter, the parties settled, and the cases were 
dismissed with prejudice. See Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissals with Prejudice, Janney v. 
Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 12-cv-05099-WHO (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2014), 2014 WL 6771223;  
Settlement Agreement, Janney, No. 12-cv-05099-WHO (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/general-mills-settlement-agreement.pdf [http://perma.cc/EKP2 
-NR47]. General Mills agreed to stop using the phrase “100% Natural” in advertising and 
labeling products containing certain artificial ingredients and to pay an undisclosed 
monetary settlement to the plaintiffs. Id.  
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of negative publicity prompted some retraction; General Mills reminded its 
customers that they had the “opportunity to opt out” by e-mail.334 Thereafter, 
General Mills retreated further, and by the end of 2014, its website made no 
mention of arbitration.335  
iv .  metrics  of effective vindication,  adequacy,  and 
unconscionability  
A. Gateways to Judging Arbitration’s Legitimacy 
Once the Supreme Court authorized arbitration for federal statutory and 
common law rights in the absence of bargaining, the Court needed an alterna-
tive account of the legitimacy of its actions. As discussed below, the Court first 
mentioned the idea of “effective vindication” in 1985 in the context of an anti-
trust claim arising out of a trilateral contract among transnational commercial 
parties. When expanding its imposition of arbitration to the mass production 
of arbitration clauses and applying its rule to consumers and employees, the 
Court reiterated that the legitimacy of doing so rested on arbitration’s adequa-
cy as a choice of forum in which to vindicate statutory rights. 
Before detailing the development and application of this approach, a  
word is in order about lines of doctrine which, in theory, differentiate between  
federal statutory rights and state statutory or common law rights and which 
distribute authority to review arbitration clauses between judges and arbitra-
tors. In the context of federal statutes, the Court reads the FAA as putting arbi-
tration clauses on an “equal footing” with any other contract provision336 and 
then asks whether another federal statute specifically precludes the use of arbi-
tration or, if not expressly precluded, whether an “inherent conflict” exists be-
tween arbitration and that statute. In these analyses, the Court often speaks 
 
334. Kirstie Foster, Explaining Our Website Privacy Policy and Legal Terms, TASTE GEN. MILLS 
(Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.blog.generalmills.com/2014/04/explaining-our-website-privacy 
-policy-and-legal-terms [http://perma.cc/3B27-RHPU] (“Downloading coupons, entering 
sweepstakes or subscribing to publications is entirely up to you. . . . And no. Nothing about 
this would impact current or pending lawsuits.”).  
335. See Kirstie Foster, We’ve Listened—And We’re Changing Our Legal Terms Back, TASTE GEN. 
MILLS (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.blog.generalmills.com/2014/04/weve-listened-and-were 
-changing-our-legal-terms-back-to-what-they-were [http://perma.cc/KZ76-RBUD]; Legal 
Terms, GEN. MILLS, http://www.generalmills.com/en/Company/legal-terms [http://perma 
.cc/P5H8-RYPL]; Stephanie Strom, General Mills Reverses Itself on Consumers’ Right To Sue, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/business/general-mills 
-reverses-itself-on-consumers-right-to-sue.html [http://perma.cc/SR6P-5VF3]. 
336. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). 
  
diffusing disputes and the erasure of rights  
2875 
 
about arbitration as effectively vindicating the specific statutory right pur-
sued.337 In contrast, when arbitration clauses relate to rights based on state law, 
the legal question is whether the mode of pursuing those rights must be arbi-
tration as a matter of federal law.338 Although this federal preemption issue 
might not invite inquiries other than whether the state law conflicts with the 
federal mandate, the Court sometimes also discusses the “adequacy” or “acces-
sibility” of arbitration in preemption cases. 
Thus the doctrinal lines are not crisp. The Court has linked “effective vin-
dication” to discussions of arbitration’s “adequacy”339 and to the potential that 
arbitration imposes “prohibitively expensive” costs.340 Indeed, the Court relied 
on its state preemption case (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, licensing a ban 
on class arbitrations) to inform its ruling in a federal statutory rights case 
(American Express v. Italian Colors)—despite objections by the dissent, seeking 
to buffer federal statutory claims from the ruling in the AT&T litigation.341  
Lower court decisions reflect the overlap in analyses. Some judges apply the 
test of “effective vindication” only to federal—and not state—statutory 
rights,342 while others use the terms “effective vindication” and “adequacy” or 
“accessibility” in their decisions addressing contested arbitration clauses apply-
ing to court-based pursuit of federal and/or state rights.343 Other phrases come 
into play, such as whether the obligation to arbitrate renders “illusory” federal 
or state statutes and common claims and whether using arbitration is unduly 
 
337. E.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-28 (1991); Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27, 240-42 (1987).  
338. This distinction is explained in Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
339. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). 
340. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000). 
341. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting); infra notes 406-410 and accom-
panying text. 
342. This argument in part stems from Justice Kagan’s dissent in Italian Colors, in which she 
sought to insulate the federal antitrust claims from the approach the Court had taken in the 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion decision. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct., at 2320. Lower 
courts have followed suit. See, e.g., Ferguson, 733 F.3d at 936; Lombardi v. DirecTV, Inc., 546 
F. App’x 715 (9th Cir. 2013); Torres v. CleanNet, U.S.A., Inc., No. 14-2818, 2015 WL 500163, 
at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2015). Some pre-Italian Colors rulings also took this position. See, 
e.g., Orman v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7086, 2012 WL 4039850, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 
2012). 
343. See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 37, 51 (1st Cir. 2006); Booker v. Robert 
Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Damato v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 
13-CV-994 ARR RML, 2013 WL 3968765, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2013). Some courts view 
the Italian Colors decision as precluding this approach. See, e.g., Torres, 2015 WL 500163, at 
*7 n.6.  
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“burdensome.”344 The state-law doctrine of unconscionability also appears in 
the mix, at times linked to an analysis of effective vindication.345  
The other facet of the case law requiring an introductory explanation is 
what is known as the “gateway” question: whether claims of ineffective or un-
conscionable provisions are to be decided by courts before parties can be sent 
to arbitration or decided by arbitrators as part of their interpretation of con-
tracts and of arbitration procedures.346 This arena was once understood to fall 
within state courts’ domain but is now firmly under federal control. The cur-
rent approach, shaped in 2010 by the Supreme Court, gives broad authority to 
arbitrators and “substantially” reduces the “role of courts in applying uncon-
scionability doctrine to assess the enforceability of arbitration clauses.”347  
A painful illustration comes from a 2013 Second Circuit decision brought 
by a New Yorker, Bernardita Duran, challenging a provision requiring her to 
go to Arizona to contest the obligation to arbitrate.348 Duran argued that it was 
unconscionable to require her to travel to Maricopa County, Arizona to press 
claims that a firm had violated federal statutes and New York’s consumer laws 
by, she alleged, taking “$3,190.64 in fees” from her and causing her “overall 
debt to increase by over $4,500 in eight months.”349  
 
344. See, e.g., Hall v. Treasure Bay V.I. Corp., 371 F. App’x 311, 313 (3d Cir. 2010); Awuah v. Cov-
erall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2009). 
345. See, e.g., Hall, 371 F. App’x at 313. 
346. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002). 
347. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 41;  See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc., v. Jack-
son, 561 U.S. 63 (2010). As the CFPB put it, this ruling delegated to arbitrators “at least 
some of the issues that a court otherwise could decide.” CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra 
note 17, § 2, at 41; see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006). 
The CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study provided several examples of provisions delegating au-
thority to arbitrators. See CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study supra note 17, § 2, at 43-44. The au-
thority of arbitrators, if given by contract, has also been underscored in Oxford Health Plans 
LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013), which held that arbitrators can interpret a contract to 
permit class arbitrations as a “form” of a civil action. In BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argen-
tina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014), despite questions of interpretation of an international invest-
ment treaty that might be read to divest the arbitrators of jurisdiction, the Court likewise 
held that arbitrators, and not judges, can interpret contracts to assess their jurisdiction to 
arbitrate. 
348. Duran v. J. Hass Grp., LLC, 531 F. App’x 146 (2d Cir. 2013). Other examples of the challeng-
es of “gateway” questions include UBS Financial Services v. West Virginia University Hospi-
tals, Inc., 660 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 2011); Van Buren v. Pro Se Planning, Inc., 2014 WL 6485653 
(E.D. La. 2014); and Damato v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 2013 WL 3968765 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).  
349. See Complaint ¶ 6, Duran v. J. Hass Grp., LLC, No. 10-cv-4538 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2010), 
2010 WL 4236649. Duran also alleged that the lawyer who initially ran the firm was put on 
probation by Arizona’s state bar. Id. ¶ 96. The district court had stayed the motion to com-
pel arbitration until the Supreme Court held that Credit Repair Organizations Act claims 
could be subject to arbitration, see CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012), 
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The Second Circuit’s summary order explained that, had Duran argued 
that the arbitration agreement was itself “unconscionable due to the forum se-
lection clause,” a judge would have had to decide that issue. But, because  
Duran’s claim was only that the designation of Arizona (the “forum selection 
clause”) was unconscionable, the issue was one for the arbitrator.350 What the 
court called the “logical flaw” in the result was, it believed, dictated by the  
Supreme Court’s precedent.351 Nonetheless, the court recognized the impact: 
that by 
requiring arbitration over the validity of the forum selection clause to 
proceed pursuant to the terms of that forum selection clause, we may 
well be enforcing an invalid—and indeed unconscionable—contract. 
Even if the arbitrator ultimately decides that the merits of the dispute 
should not be arbitrated in Arizona, a round of arbitration will already 
have occurred in Arizona . . . .352  
According to the 2015 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau study, Ms. 
Duran’s travel challenges were not typical of the provisions it researched. Most 
credit card arbitration clauses (ninety-three percent) and all mobile wireless 
clauses addressed the place of arbitration; the vast majority located arbitrations 
convenient to the consumer. Yet Ms. Duran was also not the only consumer 
subjected to travel obligations. About eight percent of credit card clauses and 
about fourteen percent of wireless clauses did not require locating arbitrations 
proximate to the consumer.353 Moreover, an analysis of obligatory arbitration 
provisions proffered by social media companies found that more than two  
dozen required that arbitrations be held in the “social media’s home jurisdic-
tion,” rather than that of the consumer.354 
In short, the public law of private arbitration is anything but simple, and 
three points emerge from the density of the doctrine. First, anyone interested 
 
and thereafter held that because the “contract contains nothing to suggest that the parties 
intended the courts to decide venue,” dismissal of the action was proper, see Duran, No. 10-
cv-4538, 2012 WL 3233818, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 8, 2012). 
350. Duran, 531 F. App’x at 147. 
351. Id. at 147 n.1.  
352. Id. (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000)). 
353. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 53-55. These clauses instead required the 
arbitration be at some specific location, without regard to the consumer’s residence. Id. The 
AAA’s Consumer Due Process Protocol also calls for doing so. See Consumer Due Process Pro-
tocol, supra note 232, at Principle 7 (“In the case of face-to-face proceedings, the proceedings 
should be conducted at a location which is reasonably convenient to both parties with due 
consideration of their ability to travel and other pertinent circumstances.”). 
354.  Rustad & Koenig, supra note 235, at 392-93. 
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in challenging obligations to arbitrate needs lawyers skilled in navigating a 
large body of doctrinal complexities, and hence, the Court’s jurisprudence has 
imposed a substantial financial burden on individuals seeking to use courts in-
stead of arbitration. Second, however muddy the legal approaches, federal 
judges are in control of decisions about when arbitration can be substituted for 
litigation and about which procedural features are “fundamental” to arbitra-
tion.355 The focus of the case law is not on market theories about whether  
consumers would be willing to sell their process rights in exchange for lower  
prices.356 Nor do federal judges read the text of the FAA—referencing defenses 
to arbitrability based on contract law357—to mandate deference to state contract 
law.  
Third, this body of federal law lacks directions on how courts do—and 
ought to—measure effective vindication, adequacy, accessibility, and burden-
someness. From whose vantage point—claimants, respondents, third parties,  
decision makers—is the evaluation made? Is the question comparative, with 
courts as the baseline? Is the analysis predicated on implicit assumptions about 
what constitutes optimal levels of enforcement of the law? Such questions are part 
of debates about the roles of private and public enforcement in producing compli-
ance and about how to maximize the utility of interventions in light of the costs of 
compliance and of the pursuit of violators. And, of course, views on the desirabil-
ity of individual and collective pursuit of rights—in public—ought to be informed 
by knowledge about the frequency of legal violations and the degree to which 
voluntary compliance remedies the breaches that occur.  
 
355. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011), discussed infra notes 370-
373, 422-437, 441-445 and accompanying text; see also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 170 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d, 190 (Ct. App. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Mar. 23, 3015) (No. 14-
462), discussed infra note 555. 
356. The question of what is termed a “price effect” in boilerplate provisions of various kinds is 
explored by Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. 
REV. 883, 895-97 (2014) (reviewing RADIN, supra note 17). Whether prices are affected by 
arbitration waivers is an empirical question. The 2015 CFPB study did not find any “statisti-
cally significant evidence of an increase in prices among those companies that dropped their 
arbitration clauses and thus increased their exposure to class action litigation risk.” CFPB 
2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 1, at 18. Nor did the CFPB identify reductions in the 
provision of credit. Id.  
 A different question is whether law ought to permit shopping for rights; Radin argued 
that law ought not license one party to “take” another’s rights, as a kind of “private eminent 
domain.” RADIN, supra note 17, at 15.  
357. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce.”); id. § 2 (stating that an arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract”). 
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Getting the requisite information is difficult. Data on court-based filings  
do not provide a full picture of the injuries that have occurred,358 because indi-
viduals often lack the capacity to “name, blame, and claim.”359 Even if one is 
aware of legal injuries, the costs of pursuit may well make “lumping it” appropri-
ate, absent collective action.360 Court filings are also an imperfect measure because 
of over-claiming as well as under-claiming.361 Other variables include whether  
informal remedies provide relief, whether options exist to use different venues 
(small claims court, arbitration, class actions), whether the various venues have 
the capacity to deal with the number of claimants seeking their services, and the 
role played by the government, pursuing relief on its own or on others’ behalf.  
The quality of the procedures offered is also relevant in terms of user-
friendliness and of the availability of assistance. For example, some courts have 
clerks specially trained in helping self-represented litigants, and courts routinely 
adjust or waive fees for litigants with limited or no resources. Further, when 
claimants can join together in collective actions, costs can be spread. The kind and 
nature of process also matter in an assessment of whether a system’s procedural 
entailments are “proportionate” to the claims at stake—a concern increasingly 
present in federal civil rulemaking362 and a standard-bearer in Europe.363  
How might these assessments be made in practice? One might expect that if 
arbitration were a “better” process than adjudication and levels of legal claims 
were constant, the availability of arbitration would produce a rise in filings. 
Satisfaction rates via user surveys could also be illuminating; a proxy could be 
whether negotiating parties bargain to stay out of court altogether or seek judi-
cial review. Analyzing outcomes and comparing providers, as the Government 
 
358. For example, one analysis from the 1980s concluded that of one hundred injuries where the 
stakes exceed $1,000, about ten result in pursuit of court remedies. David M. Trubek, Aus-
tin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordi-
nary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 86 (1983).  
359. See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transfor-
mation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980). 
360. For example, a survey of more than 1,000 credit card holders reported that most believing 
they were wronged would cancel cards, approximately 10% would report a problem to a 
government agency, and 1.4% thought they would contact a lawyer or bring suits. See CFPB 
2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 3, at 16-18.  
361. PAUL C. WEILER, HOWARD HIATT, JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, WILLIAM G. JOHNSON, TROYEN 
BRENNAN, AND LUCIAN LEAPE, A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE 
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993).  
362. Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality in Discov-
ery, DUKE L. CENTER FOR JUD. STUD. (2014), http://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers 
/judicialstudies/v_gelbach_kobayashi_duke_idps_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/N3NU-PH25]. 
363. See Vicki C. Jackson, Feature, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 
3094 (2015).  
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Accountability Office (GAO) has done for financial services arbitrations364 and 
as a variety of researchers seek to do for employees and consumers,365 could of-
fer additional insights, especially if independent measures of the validity of 
claims are available. 
In addition to empirical information, however incomplete, value judgments 
are required. For example, when describing arbitration as “cheaper,” “more in-
formal,” and “speedier” than adjudication, is the implicit claim that arbitration 
permits more claimants to bring complaints, that it imposes fewer burdens on 
potential respondents, or both? What metric should be used to assess the im-
pact of adjudication’s expressive values? Returning to the question of the van-
tage point for such assessments, is the cost-benefit assessment internal to the 
disputants or ought third-party access to information about the proceedings be 
factored into the equation? Choosing goals depends in part on underlying nar-
ratives about the degree to which compliance with legal rules exists, the  
importance of compliance, the role of public exchange, and whether private  
efforts to enforce rights make a difference.  
An example of efforts to increase private enforcement comes from the  
European Union, committed to protecting the right to an “effective judicial 
remedy.”366 A recent Directive on Consumer ADR consciously aims to expand 
the number of private claims pursued through alternative dispute resolution 
without precluding the use of courts thereafter.367 In contrast to what might be 
termed this claim-expressive approach, the United States Supreme Court’s use 
 
364. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-74, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: 
HOW INVESTORS FARE 35-40 (1992) [hereinafter GAO, 1992, HOW INVESTORS FARE]. 
365. See, e.g., Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 38; Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 38; 
Drahozal, supra note 38; Colvin & Gough Report, supra note 38; Do Class Actions Benefit 
Class Members? An Empirical Analysis of Class Actions, MAYER BROWN LLP 1-2 (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/uploads/Documents/PDFs/2013/December/DoClassActi
onsBenefitClassMembers.pdf [http://perma.cc/DT6J-T2YE]. 
366. Originally framed in terms of protection of fundamental human rights, the right to an effec-
tive remedy gained confirmation in Article 47 of the European Charter. See Rights to Effective 
Remedies, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 1211-28 (Steve 
Peers, Tamara Hervery, Jeff Kenner & Angela Ward eds., 2014).  
367. CADR 2013 Directive, supra note 212. Interest in developing consumer ADR came from con-
cerns that judicial redress was “not always practical or cost-efficient for consumers or busi-
nesses.” See Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment Accompanying the Directive on 
Consumer ADR and the Regulation on Consumer ODR, EUR. COMM’N 13 (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201204/20120425ATT43950/2012
0425ATT43950EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/FF6L-W4RR]. Further, some industries viewed 
CADR as a means of defusing problems. HODGES, BENÖHR, & CRUETZFELDT-BANDA, supra 
note 212, at 396-97. Another factor was the sector of government involved; these consumer 
directives fell within the portfolios of ministers of business and finance rather than of jus-
tice.  
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of the FAA to preclude court filings and to permit bans on collective actions is 
seen as “claim suppressive.”368 That shift, discouraging private enforcement, 
could be predicated on the view that compliance with legal rules is better 
achieved through other means369 and thus that court-based procedures are in-
efficient or unnecessary, or on the view that too many pursue unwarranted 
claims.  
Evaluating the tradeoffs in many arenas can be difficult, but some of the 
utilities and harms of collective action are obvious. As Justice Breyer in the 
AT&T case commented, given a “maximum gain to a customer for the hassle of 
arbitrating a $30.22 dispute is still just $30.22,”370 individuals at risk of paying 
$125 in administrative fees were unlikely to pursue their claims (“only a lunatic 
or a fanatic sues for $30”).371 A concern from the prospective defendants’ van-
tage point was voiced by Justice Scalia, writing for the AT&T majority and as-
serting that class arbitrations created “in terrorem” effects, pressing companies 
into inappropriate settlements.372 Thus, all members of the Court agreed that 
collectivity mattered; they disagreed about what weight to accord competing 
arguments about whether class actions usefully police misbehavior and provide 
individual benefits, disserve customers because companies increase the costs of 
products, or result in trivial remedies for individuals and unduly large fees for 
their attorneys. 
The institutional question is which bodies—courts, legislatures, agencies, 
individuals and their lawyers—are to make such assessments about the 
tradeoffs between litigation and arbitration and the utilities of collective action. 
One can read the many federal statutes giving rise to private causes of action as 
congressional judgments attributing some value to private enforcement of the 
law, just as state constitutions, legislation, and common law endow individuals 
with rights to pursue injuries. Yet the Supreme Court has not given much 
weight to this court-based rights framework. As the majority in the AT&T liti-
 
368. See Myriam Gilles, Individualized Injunctions and No-Modification Terms: Challenging “Anti-
Reform” Provisions in Arbitration Clauses, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469 (2015). 
369. Regulatory options, for example, provide other routes. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 14-
39, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2533661 [http://perma.cc/JAP4-9YA6]. 
370. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1760 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855, 856 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
371. Id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Judge Posner’s comment in Carnegie v. Household 
Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
372. Id. at 1752. The lack of review stemmed from the Court’s holding in Hall Street, discussed 
infra notes 545-556 and accompanying text. A review of the empirical information available 
on the trade-offs between class and individual actions is provided by Joanna C. Schwartz, 
The Cost of Suing Business, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2589208 [http://perma.cc/Z9QN-BNZM]. 
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gation explained, it was relying on “our cases”373 to read the FAA (which pre-
dated class actions and which makes no mention of arbitration’s form in terms 
of the numbers of parties or other features) to require enforcement of arbitra-
tion obligations that include collective action bans. Further, rather than  
remand to require fact-finding, the Court has repeatedly stipulated the adequa-
cy of arbitrations and rejected judicial monitoring of the outcomes.  
Congress has thus far responded in a piecemeal fashion, episodically  
insulating a few businesses (such as car dealerships and chicken farms374)  
from mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. Further, Congress has relied on the  
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to oversee securities arbitrations 
and the GAO to report on their use; chartered the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau to consider regulation of mandatory arbitration of disputes about 
consumer financial products and services;375 and specified the structure and 
reach of court-annexed arbitration in federal courts. But Congress has yet to 
impose general requirements addressing the kind of consent required to waive 
 
373. AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749.  
374. See Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, S. REP. No. 107-266, at 1-2 
(2002) (describing dealers as “virtual economic captives of automobile manufacturers” who 
proffer contracts on a “take it or leave it” basis) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006)); Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 11005, 122 Stat. 1651, 
1653 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 197c (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).  
Military personnel also have some protection. The 2007 Talent-Nelson Amendment ex-
empts “covered” members of the armed forces and their dependents from mandatory arbi-
tration in consumer credit disputes, which the Department of Defense has defined to include 
payday loans, vehicle title loans, and tax refund anticipation loans. See Talent-Nelson 
Amendment to the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
109-364, § 670(f)(4), 120 Stat. 2083, 2267 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2006)); 
32 C.F.R. § 232.3(b)(1) (2014); 32 C.F.R. § 232.3(b)(1) (2007); see also Department of De-
fense Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a)(1), 123 Stat. 3409, 3454 
(2009) (exempting Title VII claims related to military contractors from mandatory arbitra-
tion). 
375. The CFPB has the authority to issue regulations prospectively banning binding pre-dispute 
mandated arbitration agreements in the markets over which it has regulatory authority. See 
12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (providing that the Bureau, “by regulation, may prohibit or impose con-
ditions or limitations” on arbitration agreements between consumers and financial product 
and service providers relating to “any future disputes between the parties” upon a finding 
that such regulations are “in the public interest and for the protection of consumers”). In 
May of 2015, 58 members of Congress called on the CFPB to issue rules “to prohibit the use 
of forced arbitration clauses in financial contracts and give consumers a meaningful choice 
after disputes arise.”  Press Release, Sen. Al Franken, Members of Congress Call on the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau To Issue a Strong Rule To Prohibit Use of  




diffusing disputes and the erasure of rights  
2883 
 
court access rights in light of the absence of bargaining, the quality of the pro-
cedural opportunities needed for arbitration, or the information that ought to 
be disclosed.376  Below, I trace the emergence and application of the Court’s  
legitimacy tests, and I explore the roles that Congress and federal agencies 
could play in structuring the proliferating Alternative Civil Procedure Rules 
and in regulating the diffuse sites in which they operate. 
B. Effective Vindication’s Genesis in an “International Commercial Transaction” 
and Under the Supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
The “judge-made” test of adequacy377 was announced in 1985 in Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., when the Court first applied the 
FAA to preclude litigation of a federal statutory right.378 The context, as Justice 
Blackmun explained for the Court, was a trilateral contract involving an “inter-
national commercial transaction” that included an arbitration agreement.379 As 
the dissent described the claim, the Puerto Rican dealer, Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, alleged that the two other parties (“major automobile companies”) 
were part of an “international cartel that has restrained competition in the 
American market . . . [and] allegedly prevented the dealer from transshipping 
some 966 surplus vehicles from Puerto Rico” to other U.S. dealers.380  
Relying on a mix of the FAA and the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (which the United States had joined 
fifteen years earlier), the majority sent the disputants—a Japanese automobile 
manufacturer, the Chrysler Corporation, and a Puerto Rican dealership—to  
 
376. Proposals to do more have been made, both in draft legislation and in commentary. See, e.g., 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. (2015); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, 
H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2012, H.R. 6351, 112th Cong. (2012); Fairness 
in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2009, H.R. 1237, 111th Cong. (2009); Fairness in Nurs-
ing Home Arbitration Act, S. 512, 111th Cong. (2009); Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Federaliza-
tion of Consumer Arbitrations: Possible Solutions, 2013 U. CHI. L. F. 271 (2013); Ramona L. 
Lampley, “Underdog” Arbitration: A Plan for Transparency, 90 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2574064 [http://perma.cc/CLS7-N6YY]. Thomas Carbon-
neau has also called for the revision of the FAA. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 17, at 95-134. 
377. This is Justice Scalia’s description. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 
2304, 2310 (2013).  
378. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
379. Id. at 616. 
380. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that the arbitration clause was 
part of the agreement between Soler and Mitsubishi and therefore did not bar the antitrust 
counter-claim that entailed a trilateral dispute, nor did the clause apply to claims outside the 
contract provisions relating to failure to perform. Id. at 643-45.  
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arbitration.381 The ruling could easily have been cabined: the three parties were 
businesses (albeit with different resources), and consent to the contract was 
not in question382—even if, as the dissent argued, there had been “no genuine 
bargaining over the terms of the submission” to arbitration.383  
Further, one reading of the opinion was that it applied only to international 
cases. The Court cited the Convention that the United States had joined, com-
mitting itself to enforcement of international awards. “[E]ven assuming that a 
contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context,”384 the Court em-
phasized the importance of “international comity, respect for the capacities of 
foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the interna-
tional commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes.”385 
Much of the opinion expressed confidence in arbitrators’ willingness to enforce 
U.S. antitrust law and their ability to deal with its complexity. Given that the 
parties’ “intentions” were for the international arbitral body to decide claims 
“arising from the application of American antitrust law,” the Court expressed 
its confidence that the arbitrators were “bound to decide [the] dispute in  
accord with the national law giving rise to the claim.”386 The Court added what 
might have been an aside but, in retrospect, came to be read as its essential  
caveat: “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statuto-
ry cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both 
its remedial and deterrent function.”387  
The Court’s next steps in the relocation of statutory claims to arbitration 
could also have been limited ones, dependent on supervision of arbitrations by 
federal agencies such as the SEC. In 1987, in Shearson/American Express v. 
McMahon, Justice O’Connor wrote for the Court to enforce a pre-dispute arbi-
tration clause “between brokerage firms and their customers.”388 She explained 
that unlike the 1950s era of Wilko v. Swan, “the SEC has sufficient statutory au-
thority to ensure that arbitration is adequate to vindicate Exchange Act rights, 
[such that] enforcement does not effect a waiver of ‘compliance with any  
 
381. Id. at 616-18 (majority opinion). 
382. The Court used “freely negotiated contractual choice of forum provisions” as the relevant 
benchmarks. See id. at 631. 
383. Id. at 666 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
384. Id. at 629 (majority opinion). 
385. Id.  
386. Id. at 636-37. 
387. Id. at 637. 
388. 482 U.S. 220, 222 (1987). 
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provision’ of the Exchange Act.”389 The role played by the SEC in ensuring the 
quality of arbitral processes also counted in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., which overruled Wilko expressly in 1989,390 and in 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., which enforced the FAA in a case alleg-
ing that a brokerage firm had engaged in age discrimination.391 
Thus, these initial cases involved either international commercial transac-
tions or domestic securities litigation that was subject to some administrative 
oversight. Disputes were diffused but in a limited category of cases and with 
the prospect of administrative oversight.  
C. Judicial Cost-Benefit Analyses and the Question of Collective Actions  
“Effective vindication” became the mantra thereafter, but the Court 
deemed that test to be satisfied without individually negotiated contracts,  
international transactions, or federal administrative oversight. Its approach has 
thus failed to develop a federal analogue of the unconscionability doctrines 
used by state courts to evaluate the structure of proposed arbitrations.392  
Illustrative is a 2013 decision by the Supreme Court of Washington, which 
concluded that a four-sentence arbitration clause proffered by a debt adjustor, 
LDL Freedom Enterprises, Inc., was unconscionable in three ways.393 First, 
that state’s consumer law provided a four-year period in which to bring a 
 
389. Id. at 238. The partial dissenters—Justice Blackmun joined by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall—disagreed, arguing that SEC oversight of arbitration under the Exchange Act did not 
solve the problems identified in Wilko, in that arbitration provided neither a record nor ju-
dicial review and put the complainant in a forum “controlled by the securities industry.” Id. 
at 242, 260 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens wrote 
separately to record his dissent that Wilko applied. Id. at 268 (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  
390. 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). 
391. 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991). The SEC continues to exercise oversight over Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitrations, as discussed infra notes 599-619 and accompa-
nying text.  
392. Some lower courts have distinguished the inquiry into effective vindication on the one hand, 
and unconscionability doctrine on the other, while others have connected them. For exam-
ple, the First Circuit concluded that the federal concern focused “more narrowly” on “illuso-
riness”—that “the arbitration regime . . . is structured so as to prevent a litigant from having 
access to the arbitrator to resolve claims, including unconscionability defenses.” Awuah v. 
Coverall N. Am., 554 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2009). 
393. See Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1201 (Wash. 2013). See generally 
James Dawson, Comment, Contract After Concepcion: Some Lessons from the State Courts, 124 
YALE L.J. 233 (2014).  
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claim, but the arbitration clause imposed a thirty-day statute of limitations.394 
Second, the amount at stake was $3,500 in actual damages, yet by requiring 
travel to California, the arbitration clause imposed prohibitive costs.395 Third, 
the “loser pays” provision was one-sided, benefiting only the company.396  
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court has not produced a single decision 
finding arbitration inadequate, inaccessible, or ineffective to vindicate rights.397 
For example, in 2000, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, rebuffed 
Larketta Randolph, who had alleged that Green-Tree Financial Corporation-
Alabama had violated the Truth in Lending Act and the Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act.398 Randolph argued that the arbitration clause had failed to address 
the question of costs, rendering the clause unenforceable.399 Over Justice Gins-
burg’s objections for the four dissenters that the burden of detailing costs 
ought to lie with the “repeat player” and that the question of arbitration’s  
accessibility required a remand,400 the Court held that the opponent of arbitra-
tion had to demonstrate that costs would be “prohibitive.”401  
The difficulty of meeting that burden became vivid in the 2013 decision of 
American Express v. Italian Colors,402 which like Mitsubishi, involved antitrust 
claims but this time in the “domestic context.”403 Justice Scalia, writing for  
the five-person majority, offered hypotheticals about what would constitute  
 
394. Gandee, 293 P.3d at 1201. 
395. Id. at 1200 (“Gandee struggles financially (as presumably do all Freedom’s customers) and 
the costs of arbitrating in California would exceed [Gandee’s] claim.”). 
396. Id. at 1200-01. 
397. Lower courts have found some obligations to arbitrate invalid, invoking a mix of uncon-
scionability and effective vindication failings. See, e.g., Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 
F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2013); Boaz v. FedEx Customer Info. Servs., Inc., 725 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 
2013); Hall v. Treasure Bay V.I. Corp., 371 F. App’x 311, 313 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding the re-
quirement that the employee pay the “entire costs” and that arbitrators not modify the em-
ployer’s disciplinary measure to be substantively unconscionable in the context of a mix of 
state and federal claims); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003). 
Yet in the wake of the 2011 and 2013 decisions in AT&T and Italian Colors, lower courts have 
retreated. See, e.g., Duran v. J. Hass Grp., LLC, 531 F. App’x 146, 147-48 (2d Cir. 2013), dis-
cussed supra notes 348-352. 
398. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
399. Id. at 90. 
400. Id. at 96-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
401. Id. at 92 (majority opinion). In the lower courts, this ruling has permitted claims that costs 
can be prohibitive. See, e.g., Valle v. ATM Nat’l, LLC, No. 14-CV-7993 KBF, 2015 WL 
413449, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-535 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 2015) 
(severing a “loser pays” provision in part based on financial resources of the plaintiffs). 
402. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
403. Cf. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).  
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inadequacy. He reiterated the phrasing from Randolph about a “prohibitively 
expensive” process and added another example—that “a provision in an arbi-
tration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights”404 could 
render arbitration “impracticable.”405  
But as Justice Kagan’s dissent pointed out, those examples rang hollow be-
cause the case appeared to fit them. Italian Colors, a small business, had argued 
that American Express had “used its monopoly power to force merchants” to 
accept what was alleged to be a tying arrangement, unlawful under antitrust 
law.406 The same contract included an arbitration provision barring class  
actions; the “variety of procedural bars that would make pursuit of an antitrust 
claim a fool’s errand” immunized the company from liability.407 The majority 
did not disagree that the costs of establishing an antitrust violation would be 
greater than any damages awarded to individual claimants but nonetheless  
enforced the single-file arbitration requirement.  
Justice Scalia’s majority ruling in Italian Colors explained that its outcome 
was forecast by his 2011 opinion in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion408 (which 
“all but resolves this case”409)—thereby anchoring the relationship of the ade-
quacy inquiry that the Court undertook in that preemption case and its doc-
trine on effective vindication. At issue in AT&T v. Concepcion was, as noted, a 
bar on class actions in courts or in arbitration that was imposed in the docu-
ments accompanying the purchase of a wireless service. 
 The idea of “class arbitration” had gained currency after 2003, when the 
Supreme Court ruled in Green-Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle410 that the ques-
tion of whether a contract precluded class arbitration was to be determined ini-
 
404. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310, 2315 (2013). 
405. Id. at 2310-11 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)); see 
also Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92. 
406. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
407. Id.; see Einer Elhauge, How Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforcement by Replacing It 
with Ineffective Forms of Arbitration, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 771 (2015). 
Whether the doctrine on arbitration would reach mandates prohibiting injunctive relief 
is not settled. See Gilles, supra note 368. One example comes from the proposed merger of 
AT&T. Customers sought to enjoin the merger by demanding arbitration; a judge held that 
the demand was not cognizable in arbitration but left open the possibility that the claims 
could be pursued in court. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Fisher, Civ. No. DKC 11-2245, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 124839, at *15-16 (D. Md. Oct. 28, 2011).  
408. 131 S. Ct 1740 (2011). 
409. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2312. 
410. 539 U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003).  
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tially by an arbitrator rather than a judge.411 The marketplace of providers  
responded by fashioning a procedure for class arbitrations that incorporated 
aspects of the federal class action rule, and the AAA database reflected the use 
of that provision, with more than 280 such actions listed by 2009.412  
But another sector of the market—potential defendants drafting arbitration 
clauses—had a different response. Many businesses wrote clauses prohibiting 
class arbitrations;413 some offered the symmetry that “YOU WAIVE ANY 
RIGHT TO PURSUE ON A CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH CONTROVERSY 
OR CLAIM AGAINST US . . . AND WE WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO PURSUE 
ON A CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM AGAINST 
YOU.”414 Such clauses were usually accompanied by an “anti-severability  
 
411. Id. Justice Stevens concurred and argued that class-wide arbitrations were permissible under 
the FAA. Id. at 456 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
joined by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy dissented; they read the contract as precluding 
class-wide arbitration. Id. at 458-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Thomas dissented, 
arguing that the FAA did not apply to proceedings in state courts. Id. at 460 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
412.  Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2011), https://www.adr.org/aaa 
/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial/documents/document/dgdf/mda0/~edisp/adrstg_0
04129.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2MN-3BDR]; see also Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbi-
tral Paradigm of Classwide Arbitration: Arbitral Power and Federal Preemption, 82 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 301, 303 n.20 (2004); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 122-23 
(2011). Class arbitrations continue to be filed. See Class Arbitration Case Docket, AM. ARB. 
ASS’N (2015), http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/services/disputeresolutionservices/casedocket 
[http://perma.cc/Y9E8-GV8K]; Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25. 
As the decision in AT&T reported, the AAA’s searchable class action docket included, as 
of 2009, 283 class actions of which 121 were active and 162 “settled, withdrawn, or dis-
missed” without merits rulings. AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (citing Brief of Am. 
Arbitration Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 22-24, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 2896309 [here-
inafter AAA Stolt-Nielsen Brief]). 
413. Brief of CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18, AT&T v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 709799; see Edward Wood Dunham, The 
Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 141 (1997). In addition, several 
arbitration contracts prohibit seeking relief “on behalf of the general public or other parties.” 
See Gilles, supra note 368, at n.22.  
414. Wireless Cellular Phone Document from AT&T (2002) (on file with author), and repro-
duced in Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1134-35. 
That provision was not sui generis. See, e.g., Prepay Wireless Service Agreement, VERIZON 
WIRELESS (2000), http://www.verizonwireless.com/privacy_disclosures/prepay_wireless 
_svc.html [http://perma.cc/X3L6-8PPC] (“EVEN IF APPLICABLE LAW PERMITS CLASS 
ACTIONS OR CLASS ARBITRATIONS, YOU WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO PURSUE ON A 
CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM AGAINST US . . . AND WE 
WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO PURSUE ON A CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH CONTROVERSY 
OR CLAIM AGAINST YOU.”). 
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provision,” stipulating that if a court found the clause unenforceable, the obli-
gation to arbitrate would become unavailable and all claims had to be brought 
to court.415 
The AT&T litigation thus became the first in which the Court addressed 
the lawfulness of preventing individuals from joining together in arbitration. 
The case had been filed by Vincent and Lisa Concepcion “on behalf of all con-
sumers who entered into a transaction in California wherein they received a cell 
phone for free or at a discount . . . but were charged sales tax” in excess of that 
“payable [as] calculated on the actual discounted price.”416 The overcharge was 
$30.22, and the Concepcions alleged that the providers had violated Califor-
nia’s consumer protection laws against deceptive and false advertising.417 The 
Concepcions’ theories were that the provider should either have absorbed the 
costs of the sales tax or not have advertised that the phones were free.418  
 
The AT&T 2014 service documents state that “you and AT&T are each waiving the right 
to a trial by jury or to participate in a class action.” Further, the form states that it “evidences 
a transaction in interstate commerce, and thus the Federal Arbitration Act governs.” AT&T 
Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T, supra note 2, § 2.2. 
The self-obliged symmetrical limitation aims to avoid questions about the enforceability 
of the provisions. See Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that state law may find unconscionable an agreement requiring con-
sumers to arbitrate their claims but which permits the provider to choose between arbitra-
tion and litigation). A more recent decision questioned but did not decide whether symmet-
rical constraints were required. See THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Ctr., LLC, v. Patton, 741 
F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir. 2014); see also Alltel Corp v. Rosenow, 2014 Ark. 375, at 8-9 (hold-
ing unenforceable an arbitration agreement lacking mutuality and explaining “there is no 
mutuality of obligation where one party uses an arbitration agreement to shield itself from 
litigation, while reserving to itself the ability to pursue relief through the court system” 
(quoting Independence Cnty. v. City of Clarksville, 386 S.W.3d 395, 399 (Ark. 2012))).  
415. See CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 45-46. 
416. Complaint at ¶ 14, Concepcion v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 06 CV 0675 DMS (NLS) 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2006), 2006 WL 1194855 [hereinafter Concepcion Complaint]; First 
Amended Complaint at ¶ 14, Concepcion v. Cingular, No. 06 CV 0675 DMS (NLS) (S.D. Cal. 
May 2, 2006), 2006 WL 1866797 [hereinafter Concepcion First Amended Complaint].  
417. The Concepcions relied on the 1970 Consumer Legal Remedies Act. See CAL. CIV. CODE  
§ 1760 (West 2015). Further, invoking FTC regulations, the Concepcions argued that foot-
note or asterisk references to special conditions were inadequate to prevent misunderstand-
ing. See Concepcion Complaint, supra note 416, at ¶¶ 23, 32-33, 46 (citing 16 C.F.R. § 251.1, 
which requires “extreme care” when offers advertise “free” goods or services, and which 
specifies that any obligations incurred must be explained “clearly and conspicuously at the 
outset”); Concepcion First Amended Complaint, supra note 416 at ¶¶ 23, 32-33, 46 (same). 
418. If sales tax were required, the Concepcions argued, then the provider should have absorbed 
it rather than “illicitly shift[] the tax burden to [its] customers.” Concepcion Complaint, su-
pra note 416, at ¶ 17(b); Concepcion First Amended Complaint, supra note 416, at ¶ 17(b). 
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California had both a statute and a decision (Discover Bank v. Superior 
Court)419 addressing the procedural hurdles that the Concepcions faced. Under 
California law, when class waivers were in a “consumer contract of adhesion,” 
predictably small damage disputes could arise between the parties,420 and the 
“party with the superior bargaining power” was alleged to have “carried out a 
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually 
small sums of money,” a waiver would be unenforceable because it functioned 
to exempt the party from responsibility for the allegedly willful injury inflict-
ed.421  
The 2011 AT&T decision held California’s rule preempted by the FAA be-
cause the rule stood as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of  
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”422 The AT&T Court rested its  
holding on “our cases,”423 which ascribed two rationales to the FAA: “judicial 
enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate”424 and elimination  
of the “costliness and delays of litigation.”425 Given that consumers could not  
negotiate arbitration provisions in cell phone documents (I have tried), the  
majority understandably focused less on consent and more on what it believed 
to be the procedural advantages of “bilateral” arbitration.426 
The FAA’s text, shaped in the 1920s, provided no descriptions of the form 
that arbitrations were to have. The Court imputed one through a purposive in-
terpretation, inflected with assessments of the costs and benefits of class  
actions. The majority extolled the virtues of “bilateral arbitration”—a term in-
troduced into FAA case law in 2010 by Justice Alito when ruling that silence  
in a contract about the availability of class arbitration could not be taken by  
 
419. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2015); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 
2005). 
420. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110. 
421. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2015).  
422. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (citation omitted). 
423. Id. at 1749. 
424. Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)). 
425. Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 470 U.S. at 220). The Court’s focus on arbitration’s 
“fundamental attributes,” id. at 1748, as an affordable and accessible dispute resolution fo-
rum prompted the California Supreme Court to conclude that a state prohibition on waiving 
access to state labor hearings (a so-called “Berman hearing”) was not preempted because 
such proceedings conferred the benefits of arbitration and therefore could be a step on the 
way to arbitration. See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184 (Cal. 2013), cert. de-
nied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014). 
426. AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751. 
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arbitrators as the basis for authorizing a class process.427 In the AT&T decision, 
bilateral arbitration came to embody “the principal advantage of arbitration—
its informality.”428 Further, the AT&T majority praised the speed and relatively 
low cost of bilateral arbitration in contrast with the slow pace of class arbitra-
tion.429  
As evidence, the Court drew (ironically, given its preemption of Califor-
nia’s law) on another of that state’s statutes, which mandated reporting by  
arbitration services.430 Based on information provided by the AAA, the majority 
concluded that “the average consumer arbitration between January and August 
2007 resulted in a disposition on the merits in six months, four months if the 
arbitration was conducted by documents only.”431 In contrast, of the 283 class 
arbitrations “opened” by the AAA, the “median time from filing to settlement, 
withdrawal, or dismissal—not judgment on the merits—was 583 days, and the 
mean was 630 days.”432  
The majority decided that class arbitrations were “more likely to generate 
procedural morass than final judgment.”433 In addition, confidentiality and 
protection of absentees became “more difficult.”434 Data aside, the majority 
opined that class arbitrations gave plaintiffs too much power, creating the risk 
of “in terrorem” settlements; defendants had to “bet the company” because 
class arbitration provided “no effective means of review.”435 (In 2007, as dis-
cussed below, it was the Court that read the FAA narrowly and refused to per-
mit “effective means of review.”436)  
 
427. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686-87 (2010) (discussing the 
“fundamental changes brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action 
arbitration”). The word “bilateral” appeared earlier in conjunction with arbitration to de-
scribe a form of arbitration without discussing it as preferred by the FAA. See, e.g., Transp.-
Commc’n Emps. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 385 U.S. 157, 177 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissent-
ing) (“The Board is essentially a permanent bilateral arbitration institution created by stat-
ute for settling disputes arising in the context of an established contractual relationship.”). 
428. 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (noting that “class arbitration requires procedural formality”).  
429. Id. 
430. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2015). 
431. AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (citing Analysis of the AAA’s Consumer Arbitration Case-
load, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2007), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004325 
[https://perma.cc/MC87-483H]; AAA Stolt-Nielsen Brief, supra note 412, at 22-24). 
432. AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751. 
433. Id. 
434. Id. at 1750. 
435. Id. at 1752. The lack of review stemmed from the Court’s narrow reading of the FAA in Hall 
Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). See infra Part IV.E. 
436. See infra Part IV.E. 
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The distance between the statute’s text and the Court’s analysis can be seen 
from its holding that providers can prohibit aggregation but that the FAA itself 
does not preclude parties from agreeing to use class arbitrations.437 Nor have 
courts concluded that the importation of various other procedures from the lit-
igation system is impermissible. Summary judgment motions have become a 
feature of some employment arbitrations,438 as has discovery. Parties can also 
shape appellate tiers within arbitration and choose time frames for decision 
making—rendering arbitration neither “speedy” nor “inexpensive.”439 Indeed, 
as illustrated by an AAA handbook, the category “arbitration” entails a host of 
procedural variations, depending on the submarket in which it is used.440  
The 1925 statute’s silence as to form reflects its historical context, authoriz-
ing enforcement when the practice was nascent and leaving ample room for ar-
bitration’s evolution, in use today for a range of disputes from high stakes, 
heavily lawyered, expensive commercial conflicts to family dissolutions. Not 
only was there a lack of evidence that the Act commanded or preferred bilater-
alism441 but, as Justice Breyer argued in dissent, the FAA was shaped for  
commercial arbitration between disputants of “roughly equivalent bargaining  
power.”442 For the dissent, aggregate arbitrations were therefore consistent 
with what Congress had in mind for its statute’s users.443 Thus, rather than 
contrasting class and individual arbitrations, the dissent compared class arbi-
trations to class actions in court. Based on another California study, Justice 
Breyer noted that “class arbitrations can take considerably less time than in-
court proceedings in which class certification is sought.”444 Moreover, a single 
 
437. AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct at 1751. Further, in 2013, the Court concluded that when par-
ties authorize arbitrators to interpret contracts and arbitrators conclude that class arbitration 
is permissible, that interpretation stands even if it is mistaken. See Oxford Health Plans, 
LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013). 
438. Colvin, supra note 16, at 81. 
439. The CFPB found that almost thirty percent of the wireless providers and more than forty 
percent of the credit card clauses provided for appeal, usually to three arbitrators. Some re-
quired a monetary threshold, which the study thought would benefit businesses more than 
consumers. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 75-79. 
440. See HANDBOOK ON ARBITRATION PRACTICE, AM. ARB. ASS’N 207-74, 385-94 (2010). The 
chapters are entitled “Discovery and Evidence in Arbitration,” id. at 207-74, and “A Practical 
Approach to Affording Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards: Using an Appellate Ar-
bitrator,” id. at 385-94. 
441. AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
442. Id. at 1759. 
443. Id. 
444. Id. (citing Admin. Office of the Courts, Class Certification in California: Second Interim  
Report from the Study of California Class Action Litigation, JUD. COUNCIL CAL. 18  
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class action was “surely more efficient than thousands of separate proceedings for 
identical claims.”445  
D. “Mass” Arbitration Clauses Without a Mass of Claims 
The image of “thousands of separate proceedings” seems like the logical 
consequence of the massive production of arbitration clauses. To know defi-
nitely the numbers of filings would require a database of providers required to 
make public their systems and usage rates. The federal system imposes no such 
general requirements,446 but a few states have mandated disclosures from their 
resident ADR providers of consumer arbitrations, and researchers (including 
those deployed by the federally created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) 
have made forays into submarkets to try to find filings.  
I offer details about how to research arbitration filings and the results of 
those inquiries in service of three points. First, Dispute Diffusion uncoupled 
from obligations of public access closes off systematic information about the 
volume and nature of the complaints. But for state regulation requiring data or 
the largesse of providers, we would know even less about arbitration in practice 
than we do. Second, the information available demonstrates the non-use of  
arbitration. Because so few individuals, as contrasted with those eligible to 
bring claims, do so in the newly mandated system, arbitration works to erase 
rather than to enhance the capacity to pursue rights. Third, exploration of the 
individualized system demonstrates the importance of collectivity to the pur-
suit of small-value claims. The Court’s enforcement of class action bans has 
been the key to losing the remedial role played by private enforcement of law. 
 
(2010), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/classaction-certification.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/LV62-UQCK]). 
445. Id. at 1756. 
446. As discussed infra note 463, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) requires 
that data on arbitration awards be publicly available. FINRA RULES § 12904(h), FIN. INDUS-
TRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html 
?rbid=2403&element_id=4192 [http://perma.cc/WZ7T-CW3V] (noting that for customer 
disputes, “[a]ll awards shall be made publicly available”); Id. §§ 12904(h), 13904(h), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4292 
[http://perma.cc/3UF7-PRBY] (providing the same rule for industry disputes); see  
also Dispute Resolution Statistics, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http:// 
www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources 
/Statistics [http://perma.cc/D2EA-A6PQ] (summarizing arbitration statistics) [hereinafter 
FINRA Dispute Resolution Statistics]; FINRA Arbitration Awards Online, FIN. INDUSTRY  
REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://finraawardsonline.finra.org [http://perma.cc/KF5Z-JRFD] 
(providing a searchable database of arbitration awards). 
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In researching the use of arbitration, I chose filings involving AT&T be-
cause of its place in the case law and because its designated arbitration service, 
AAA, complies with mandates to disclose information. Two sets of data about 
consumer AT&T arbitrations exist. The AT&T litigation record included  
information on arbitration for five years between 2003 and 2007; during that 
interval, 170 individuals—averaging 34 a year—were in arbitration with the  
company.447 More recent statistics come through research on five years from 2009 
to 2014. By culling the AAA’s web-based information, we identified 134 individual 
consumers—or about 27 per year—who filed claims through the AAA against 
AT&T.448 Given the estimate that the number of AT&T subscribers rose over the 
course of this ten-year period from 46 to 120 million customers each year, the 
available data reveal that virtually none use arbitrations. 
1. Public Access to, and Confidentiality in, Arbitration  
An account of the route to the data is in order because, as Frances Kellor  
recounted in her 1948 book on the AAA, arbitration is a private process. The 
businesses that shaped it preferred to have their disputes off screen, and they 
obliged arbitrators to keep confidential what they learned and did.449  
Decades later, that aura of privacy persists, even as the rule structure about 
confidentiality has become more complex. By authorizing disputants to go to 
court to confirm or vacate awards,450 the FAA itself “appears to presume that 
arbitration materials could become public.”451 Lawsuits filed about arbitration 
are, however, a small fraction of the claims arbitrated. Thus, public access relies 
 
447. Brief of Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation Professors, supra note 25, at 20 (citing Dec-
laration of Bruce L. Simon, supra note 25, at ¶¶ 8-9). These statistics include a period of 
time prior to AT&T’s 2004 merger with Cingular. Cingular had been the second-largest 
provider of wireless services, and AT&T had been the third-largest. The new entity, under 
the AT&T name, provided services to 46 million. Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 
1248, 1252 (W.D. Wash. 2009), rev’d, 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012). 
448. See AAA Data, July 2009-June 2014, Provider Organization Report, supra note 25.  
449. See, e.g., KELLOR, supra note 255, at 72, 88. Kellor’s role in shaping the AAA is discussed in 
Kessler, supra note 145. Whether a preference for confidentiality ought to be honored for 
companies with public investors is a question not explored here.  
450. See 9 U.S.C. § 13 (2012); see also PDV Sweeny, Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co., No. 14-cv-5183 
(AJN), 2014 WL 4979316 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2014) (concluding that arbitral award actions 
are “judicial documents” that are presumptively open); Martis v. Dish Network, No. 1:13-
cv-1106, 2013 WL 6002208 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2013). 
451. Richard Frankel, State Court Authority Regarding Forced Arbitration After Concepcion, in 
POUND CIV. JUST. INST , FORCED ARBITRATIONS AND THE FATE OF THE 7TH AMENDMENT: THE 
CORE OF AMERICA’S LEGAL SYSTEM AT STAKE?,. 55, 70 (2014), http://www.poundinstitute 
.org/sites/default/files/docs/2014PoundReport2.24.15.pdf [http://perma.cc/MFQ9-VQKW]. 
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primarily on the rules of ADR providers, the text of arbitration clauses, cus-
tom, and some federal and state regulations.  
 As noted, the major providers describe arbitration as a private process and 
authorize arbitrators to limit third-party access to hearings.452 In addition, spe-
cific arbitration clauses may require confidentiality. Illustrative is one imposed 
in 2002 and since withdrawn by AT&T, instructing that: “Neither you nor [the 
company] may disclose the existence, content or results of any arbitration or 
award, except as may be required by law [or] to confirm and enforce an 
award.”453  
The legality of such rules is a subject of debate. In 2003, the Ninth Circuit 
held this provision unconscionable under California law,454 but other circuits 
(the Second, Third, and Fifth) have not objected to such provisions.455 Instead, 
those courts approached “confidentiality clauses [as] so common in the arbitra-
tion context”456 that limited confidentiality would undermine the “character of 
arbitration itself.”457 Moreover, although the Supreme Court’s case law does 
not much discuss confidentiality, the few references assume its existence and 
importance. For example, in 2010, Justice Alito quoted the AAA class arbitra-
tion rule, that “the presumption of privacy and confidentiality” did not apply  
to class actions as an example of the “fundamental changes” distinguishing bi-
lateral and class-action arbitrations.458 Likewise, Justice Scalia commented in 
AT&T v. Concepcion that confidentiality “becomes more difficult” with class ac-
tion arbitrations.459  
 
452. As the AAA explains in its Ethical Principles, an “arbitration proceeding is a private process.” 
AAA Ethical Principles, supra note 28. 
453. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 n.16 (9th Cir. 2003). 
454. Id. at 1126; see also Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc. 601 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit, 
joined by some state courts, concluded that confidentiality either gives rise to or contributes 
to a contract’s unconscionability. See, e.g., Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns Co., 376 S.W.3d 
561, 578-79 (Ky. 2012). 
455. See Guyden v. Aetna Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 384-85 (2d Cir. 2008); Iberia Credit Bureau Inc. v. 
Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175-76 (5th Cir. 2004); Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Serv., 
VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 279-81 (3d Cir. 2004). Further, one court concluded that a for-profit 
educational service could seek an injunction against former students to prevent them from 
disclosing the outcomes of arbitration. See ITT Educ. Serv., Inc. v. Arce, 533 F.3d 342 (5th 
Cir. 2008). 
456. Guyden, 544 F.3d at 385. 
457. Id. (quoting Iberia Credit Bureau, 379 F.3d at 175).  
458. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010) (quoting from the 
class action arbitration rules provided as an Addendum to AAA Stolt-Nielsen Brief, supra 
note 412, at 10a). 
459. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011).  
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In practice, however, mandates to keep consumer information confidential 
are infrequent. The 2015 study by the CFPB concluded that in consumer debt, 
confidentiality was required in seven percent of the credit card clauses reviewed 
and in none of the arbitration obligations imposed by the wireless service pro-
viders.460  
Yet, unlike courts, obliged by statutes and constitutions to account for their 
work, ADR providers are subject to fewer regulations, and First Amendment 
and Due Process rights of access have not thus far been read to apply directly to 
them. ADR providers do not routinely create public venues for observation of 
their proceedings, and many providers decline to make public the number and 
kinds of claims with which they deal, or do so only by way of a special  
arrangement with selected researchers.461 Arbitrators continue to be bound by 
obligations of non-disclosure; companies do not routinely post decisions and 
disposition data, and individuals can only learn about filings and outcomes 
through networks linking similarly situated individuals and lawyers.  
Important exceptions—from transnational conventions, federal regulations, 
and state law—permit windows into a few segments of the arbitration market. 
In 2013, UNCITRAL issued rules to govern transparency in treaty-based inves-
tor-state arbitration.462 Domestically, federal regulation of public companies 
 
460. See CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 52-53. 
461. The 2015 AAA Materials cited here are one example, and thus I join several empirical anal-
yses thanking the AAA for making available data that were not otherwise in the public do-
main. See also Colvin & Pike, supra note 179, at 59 n.1, 62 (noting that the AAA enabled full 
file reviews of 217 cases, thereby permitting access beyond what was available under state 
mandates); O’Connor & Rutledge, supra note 236, at 105. Further, Colvin and Gough note 
that the AAA uses a “broad interpretation” of California’s disclosure requirements, thereby 
augmenting the public disclosure of information. Colvin & Gough, supra note 32, at 12. 
462. UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, supra note 261. As the press release explained, while “con-
fidentiality is often a valued feature of commercial arbitration,” the public interest in arbitra-
tions involving the state prompted the need to make such arbitrations more transparent and 
accessible. See Press Release, Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, General Assembly Adopts the 
United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, 
U.N. Press Release UNIS/L/210 (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en 
/pressrels/2014/unisl210.html [http://perma.cc/9YPE-M68C]. 
The Transparency Rules require the arbitral tribunal, when exercising its discretion, to 
“take into account” the “public interest in transparency” along with the “parties’ interest in a 
fair and efficient resolution of their dispute.” UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, supra note 
261, at art. 1, ¶ 4. The Rules also specify that when conflicts arise between arbitration rules 
and the Rules on Transparency, the latter “shall prevail.” Id. art. 1, ¶ 7. Once arbitration is 
noticed, the Transparency Rules require that “the repository [] make all documents available 
in a timely manner, in the form and in the language in which it receives them”; that various 
documents, including a list of exhibits and expert reports, be made available to the public; 
that the tribunal permit third parties to submit information to it; and that hearings “shall be 
public” and the tribunal shall “facilitate public access,” subject to the need to protect “confi-
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and rules of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)463 require 
some disclosures. Further, as noted, a few states call for ADR providers to pub-
lish data on consumer arbitrations in “a computer-searchable format” (to use 
the terms of California’s 2002 statute) on the web.464  
 
dential information” of some parts of the hearing. Id. art. 2-4, 6; see also Lise Johnson, The 
Mauritius Convention on Transparency: Comments on the Treaty and Its Role in Increasing 
Transparency of Investor-State Arbitration (Columbia Ctr. on Sustainable Inv. Policy  
Paper, 2014), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/12/10.-Johnson-Mauritius-Convention-on 
-Transparency-Convention.pdf [http://perma.cc/WTF3-B5RK]; Julia Salasky, The New 
UNCITRAL Rules and Convention on Transparency, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI.: IN-
VESTMENT & HUM. RTS. PROJECT (Aug. 6, 2014), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/investment-and 
-human-rights/portfolio-items/transparency-in-investment-treaty-arbitration-and-the-un 
-guiding-principles-on-business-and-human-rights-the-new-uncitral-rules-and-convention 
-on-transparency [http://perma.cc/5DJB-R42X].  
463. See FINRA RULES §§ 12904(h), FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://finra 
.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4192 [http://perma 
.cc/WZ7T-CW3V]; 13904(h), FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://finra 
.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4292 [http://perma 
.cc/3UF7-PRBY] (“All awards shall be made publicly available.”); see also FINRA Arbitration 
Awards Online, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://finraawardsonline.finra.org 
[http://perma.cc/DT7M-NRWC]; Dispute Resolution Statistics, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AU-
THORITY (2015), http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution 
/AdditionalResources/Statistics [http://perma.cc/H3FA-U5RP].  
464. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a), (b) (West 2015) (originally enacted in 2002, effective 
2003, and amended in 2014). The information gathered for my discussion on AAA filings 
was governed by the mandates of California’s 2003 statute and hence subsequent references 
to the statute use that version. 
In the 2014 revisions, California required that “[t]he information required by this sec-
tion shall be made available in a format that allows the public to search and sort the infor-
mation using readily available software.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(b) (West 2015). 
Furthermore, the 2014 statute mandated that data are to be “directly accessible from a con-
spicuously displayed link.” Id. § 1281.96(b). The statute—in 2003 and in 2014—also requires 
that paper copies be provided upon request, exempts companies doing fewer than fifty year-
ly consumer arbitrations from web-based quarterly reporting, and protects companies from 
liability for providing the information. See id. § 1281.96(a), (c)(2), (e). The 2014 amendment 
added additional disclosure requirements, including whether “arbitration was demanded 
pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration clause and, if so, whether the pre-dispute arbitration 
clause designated the administering arbitration company.” Id. § 1281.96(a)(1). 
Maryland, Maine, and the District of Columbia enacted similar provisions after Califor-
nia’s 2002 enactments. See D.C. CODE § 16-4430 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 1394 
(2010); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West 2011). The statutes vary slightly. Mary-
land, for example, also requires information on where arbitrations were conducted. MD. 
CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903(a)(11). Maine mandates that the information remain avail-
able for at least five years. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 1394. The District of Columbia authoriz-
es private parties and the Attorney General of the District of Columbia to seek injunctive re-
lief and recover the costs of doing so; as of 2014, no reported case law has resulted. D.C. 
CODE § 16-4430(i) (providing that “any affected person or entity, including the Attorney 
General of the District of Columbia, can request a court to enjoin the arbitration organiza-
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California’s 2002 mandate has become a key source of data. Arbitration 
providers are asked to furnish, for “each consumer arbitration,” the name of 
the “nonconsumer party” (if “a corporation or other business entity”); the 
“type of dispute” (and for employees, details about their wage brackets); 
whether an attorney represented the consumer; the time from the demand 
made to disposition; the mode of disposition (“withdrawal, abandonment, set-
tlement, award after hearing, award without hearing, default, or dismissal 
without hearing”); the prevailing party; the amount sought; the amount 
awarded and other relief provided; and the arbitrator’s name, fee, and the fee’s 
allocation among the parties.465  
Yet information remains spotty. A 2013 study, Reporting Consumer Arbitra-
tion Data in California, concluded that most providers were not in compliance 
with the state law;466 only eleven of the twenty-six entities identified as arbitra-
tion providers filed any of the required information.467 Not surprisingly, the 
 
tion from violating the section and order such restitution as appropriate” and providing for 
recoupment of attorneys’ fees and costs if those seeking to enjoin the arbitration organiza-
tion prevail by settlement or court order). California’s statute calls for compliance but speci-
fies no particular method. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(f) (“It is the intent of the Legisla-
ture that private arbitration companies comply with all legal obligations of this section.”).  
465. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a). California’s Judicial Council defined “consumer arbitra-
tion” in its Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration. See Ethics Stand-
ards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration, CAL. JUD. COUNCIL (2002), http:// 
www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ethics_standards_neutral_arbitrators.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/8RLM-BV5H]. A “consumer arbitration” is “an arbitration conducted under a predispute 
arbitration provision contained in a contract . . . with a consumer party . . . drafted by or on 
behalf of the nonconsumer party; and . . . [t]he consumer party was required to accept the 
arbitration provision in the contract.” Id. at 3. A “consumer party” includes: 
 (1) [a]n individual who seeks or acquires, including by lease, any goods or ser-
vices primarily for personal, family, or household purposes including, but not 
limited to, financial services, insurance, and other goods and services as defined in 
section 1761 of the Civil Code; (2) An individual who is an enrollee, a subscriber, 
or insured in a health-care service plan within the meaning of section 1345 of the 
Health and Safety Code or health-care insurance plan within the meaning of sec-
tion 106 of the Insurance Code; (3) An individual with a medical malpractice 
claim that is subject to the arbitration agreement; or (4) An employee or an appli-
cant for employment in a dispute arising out of or relating to the employee’s em-
ployment or the applicant’s prospective employment that is subject to the arbitra-
tion agreement. 
  Id. at 4. 
466. David J. Jung, Jamie Horowitz, Jose Herrera & Lee Rosenberg, Reporting Consumer Arbitra-
tion Data in California: An Analysis of Compliance with California Code of Civil Procedure 
§1281.96, PUB. L. RES. INST. 9, 51 (2013), http://gov.uchastings.edu/docs/arbitration 
-report/2014-arbitration-update [http://perma.cc/9M5X-8LH2] [hereinafter Reporting Con-
sumer Arbitration Data].  
467. Id. at 1. 
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AAA is a leader in compliance. As it describes on its webpage, Consumer Arbi-
tration Statistics, the information is “made available pursuant to state statutes” 
and “updated on a quarterly basis, as required by law.”468  
The web-based materials are a revolving set; when a new quarter is posted, 
the older quarter is taken down, such that only five years of data are online. To 
understand the use of arbitration, we evaluated a lengthy chronicle of claims 
from across the country that were filed and closed from July 2009 to June 
2014.469 That list totaled 17,368 individual claims (sometimes related to the 
same case470), of which 7,303 (or forty-two percent) fell in the consumer cate-
gory, excluding real estate and construction.471 The spreadsheets delineate  
seven categories: three kinds of consumer arbitrations (consumer, consumer 
construction, and consumer real estate), “employer promulgated employ-
ment,” “other industry,” residential construction, and residential real estate.472 
Reading the entries, one generally learns the names of the business  
entity473 and of arbitrators and lawyers (if appearing),474 as well as whether the 
 
468. Consumer Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2015), http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe 
/gc/consumer/consumerarbstat [http://perma.cc/R2R7-MQRA].  
469. See AAA Data, July 2009-June 2014, Provider Organization Report, supra note 25. The data de-
scribed were obtained by “filtering” the Excel sheet columns through the “Data” tab and 
then electronically searching the document. We downloaded and stored the data to preserve 
that time-span of information. As noted, Lexis and Westlaw allow subscribers to search the 
texts of arbitral awards provided by the AAA with some redactions. See supra note 244. 
470. The AAA provides an entry for each individual filing (whether singly or as part of a joint 
claim) and an entry for each respondent. For example, if a complaint is made against a car 
dealer and that car’s manufacturer, the AAA would create two separate listings for each of 
the complaints. The AAA spreadsheet therefore contains 17,368 rows corresponding to each 
such individual filing. See AAA Data, July 2009-June 2014, Provider Organization Report, supra 
note 25. The AAA website stated that these 17,368 rows represented 16,436 cases filed after 
June 2009 and closed before July 2014. Because the AAA posts changes quarterly to its web 
materials, this information no longer appears but is on file with the author. Consumer Arbi-
tration Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2014) (on file with author). 
471. Id. 
472. Id. A few real estate claims, involving brokers, may be categorized by the AAA as falling un-
der the general category of consumer complaints. Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25 
473. See AAA Data, July 2009-June 2014, Provider Organization Report, supra note 25. Individual 
consumers are not named; claims are listed by file numbers. 
474. Enough information is included to calculate the number of arbitrations per year conducted 
by a particular arbitrator. See AAA Data, July 2009-June 2014, Provider Organization Report, 
supra note 25 (filtering the “Arbitrator_Name” column). For example, in claims against 
AT&T that were listed in the database, 598 individuals served as arbitrators of at least one 
claim. See id. (filtering arbitrator data in claims involving AT&T for “unique records only”); 
Memorandum from Adam Margulies to author, Identifying Arbitrators (Feb. 26, 2015) (on file 
with author). 
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claim closed by settlement or award, the amounts sought, the fees,475 and fee 
allocations between the disputants.476 Of the 5,224 claims “terminated by an 
award,” about half included a dollar figure.477 The information on prevailing 
parties comes with the caveat that arbitrators are the source; the AAA has not 
“reviewed, investigated, or evaluated the accuracy or completeness” of such in-
formation.478 
2. Accounting for Individual Consumer and Employee Arbitrations 
Below, I detail some of the results of parsing these data as well as materials 
gathered by other researchers. My focus is on the use of arbitration, the rules 
and fee structures of the AAA, the provisions made for indigent claimants, and 
compliance with awards. The density of this account aims both to provide in-
formation not otherwise available and to make plain the challenges entailed in 
doing so.  
By way of a preview, seven conclusions emerge from this brief survey of 
available data. First, obtaining the information is labor-intensive, and the re-
sults are partial at best. Second, public records indicate that almost no individ-
ual consumers use arbitration. Third, navigating the sea of arbitration clauses 
and governing rules requires sophistication. Assistance—such as easily accessi-
ble forms on fee waivers and consumer-friendly user guides—is hard to find. 
Fourth, no comprehensive provisions enable indigent consumers to obtain 
waivers of filing fees. Fifth, the major ADR providers have little current capaci-
ty to administer a large number of arbitrations. Sixth, deciding on the optimal 
numbers of arbitrations requested or completed is difficult. But, and seventh, if 
 
475. The AAA changed its fee system in March 2013, as noted above. Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, 
supra note 25. 
476. Information on the prevailing party appeared in 34% of the claims when awards are made, 
and the salary range of employees appeared in 37% of the 6,795 employment claims. See 
AAA Data, July 2009-June 2014, Provider Organization Report, supra note 25. These data were 
obtained by filtering the Provider Organization Report by category and subcategory. See id. 
For prevailing party data, we first filtered the “Type_of_Disposition” column for “Awarded” 
claims (5,224 claims), and then filtered the “Prevailing_Party” column so that it included on-
ly cells with information rather than “—-,” resulting in 1,760 claims, or 34% of 5,224 claims. 
Similarly, for salary range data, we first filtered the “TypeDispute” column for “Employer 
Promulgated Employment” claims (6,795 claims), and then filtered the “Salary_Range” col-
umn to include only cells with information rather than blank cells or cells indicating “Not 
Provided by Parties.” The result was 2,546 claims, or 37% of 6,795 claims.  
477. The zero appearing in the other half may reflect that no monetary relief was provided. See id. 
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the justification for applying the FAA to consumers is that it opens doors to 
dispute resolution that were otherwise closed, little evidence comes from the 
number of claimants using arbitration individually in the years since the Su-
preme Court expanded the aegis of the FAA and closed off collective action.  
a. Finding the Filings 
To create a manageable, focused inquiry, we reviewed the five-year span of 
AAA data to identify consumer arbitrations involving AT&T. Within the set of 
7,303 consumer claims unrelated to commercial real estate or residential con-
struction, the AAA 2009-2014 spreadsheet listed 1,283 brought against AT&T 
in any of its corporate forms.479 Because one law firm confirmed that it filed 
1,149 individual claims against AT&T Mobility,480 a question emerged about 
whether those claims represented individual use of the system.481 After learning 
from the firm that it had filed hundreds of arbitration claims (some related to 
“phantom” data charging and others to oppose a proposed AT&T merger with 
T-Mobile) in an effort to create two de facto class actions, we excluded that 
firm’s filings from our count.482 
 
479. We identified 1,100 claims, of which 169 were filed against “AT&T Corporation”; 12 against 
“AT&T*”; and 2 against “AT&T Services, Inc.” Id. In addition, one law firm filed two other 
claims against “Cingular Wireless” in 2013. Id. One claimant sought $1,477,099 from Cingu-
lar was awarded $485,152.22. The disposition of the other claim, which sought $723,549 
from Cingular, was marked “administrative.” Id. AT&T merged with Cingular Wireless  
in 2004. See Cingular Timeline, AT&T, https://www.att.com/Common/merger/files/pdf 
/Cingular_timeline7.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LUU-FG2D]. 
480. See id. (first, filtering “Nonconsumer” column for text containing “AT&T” or any similar 
title; second, filtering “Consumer Attorney Firm” for “Bursor & Fisher, PA”). The filings 
were made between July 2011 and November 2012. The AAA data listed 1,148. An interview 
confirmed that the firm had filed the additional claim on the AAA list, as well as a set of oth-
er claims related to a different legal argument. See Telephone Interview with L. Timothy 
Fisher, Bursor & Fisher (Feb. 11, 2015). 
481. In January 2011, before the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
that law firm had sought class action certification in a case alleging that “AT&T’s billing sys-
tem for iPhone and iPad data transactions” systematically overcharged consumers for data 
not provided or used. Hendricks v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1017-18 
(N.D. Cal. 2011). In October 2011, a federal district court held that the Supreme Court’s rul-
ing in AT&T precluded class certification, notwithstanding the argument about costs of 
pursuit, and that “large expenses interfer[ed] with the vindication of statutory rights.” Id. at 
1021. 
482. Interview with L. Timothy Fisher, supra note 480. As Fisher recalled, the firm filed about 
1,000 claims on phantom charges and a similar number related to the merger. Not all of 
those filings are listed on the AAA website. We learned that arbitration hearings were held 
in twenty-four of the over-charging claims. Id. The firm gave me a copy of one of the deci-
sions, in which the complainant’s expert and AT&T’s witnesses testified and the arbitrator 
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Holding those filings aside, consumers brought 134 claims against AT&T, 
or an average of 27 per year.483 (AT&T did not initiate any claims against con-
sumers during the five-year period studied but did file a counterclaim in one of 
the consumer-initiated claims.484) That rate of consumer filings fits the picture 
provided in the record in Concepcions’ litigation. Then, AT&T had almost sev-
enty million customers by 2007 and, in the five years between 2003 and 2007, 
some 170 consumers—or about 34 a year—arbitrated under the AAA procedures 
with AT&T Mobility, AT&T Wireless, or Cingular Wireless.485 (How many used 
the available pre-arbitration processes was not clear.)  
 
found against the complainant; the Award stated that the arbitrator’s compensation of $750 
was to be paid by AT&T under “the parties’ arbitration agreement.” Patrick Hendricks v. 
AT&T Mobility, LLC, Case No. 74-434-E-000041-12 (Award, Commercial Arb. Tribunal, 
Am. Arb. Ass’n May 21, 2012) (on file with author). 
As for the effort to stop the merger, a district court granted an injunction against Sandra 
Smith, one of the “1,109 AT&T customers” represented by that firm, from trying to use ar-
bitration to do so. Order at 2, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Smith, No. 11-cv-5157 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 
2011). The court relied on the AT&T clause stating that arbitrators were to decide all issues 
except those “relating to the scope and enforceability of the arbitration provision.” Id. at 4. Fur-
ther, AT&T had provided that arbitrators could not “preside over any form of a representa-
tive or class proceeding.” Id. at 6. The court therefore concluded that AT&T would likely 
prevail on the argument that, functionally, Smith was barred by that clause because she was 
proceeding as a representative. Id. at 12-16.  
Further, the court found that AT&T would suffer irreparable harm by having “its re-
sources, attention, and witnesses” diverted from responding to the Department of Justice’s 
lawsuit against the merger. Id. at 16, 2011 WL 5924460, at *9. In addition, the “compressed 
schedule” required by the AAA for arbitration imposed burdens that would “stretch” the 
company “too thin.” Id. Finding that the balance of hardships and public interest tipped to-
wards AT&T, the court enjoined the arbitration. Id. at 16-20. For a review of other decisions 
on the arbitrability of the merger, see Schatz v. Cellco Partnership, 842 F. Supp. 2d 594, 601-
603 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
483. One other law firm, Edelson McGuire, LLC, was listed as filing twenty claims. See AAA Da-
ta, July 2009-June 2014, Provider Organization Report, supra note 25 (first, filtering “Noncon-
sumer” column for text containing “AT&T”; second, filtering “Consumer Attorney Firm” 
for “Edelson McGuire, LLC”). That group of claims is included among the 134 claims be-
cause the number of individual filings by the firm was small and the amounts sought varied, 
as did the filing dates and the dispositions.  
484. See id. (listing “Consumer” for each claim involving AT&T in the “Initiating_Party” col-
umn). Evidence for the potential counterclaim comes in the form of one non-blank entry—
approximately $1287—within a column listing amounts claimed by the business. 
485. See Brief of Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation Professors, supra note 25, at 20 (citing 
Declaration of Bruce L. Simon, supra note 25, at ¶¶ 8-9) (reporting on data collected from 
American Arbitration Association website statistics). The district court noted that AT&T has 
reported a higher figure (570) of customers who had pursued arbitration but had “failed to 
identify the nature or amount of these claims” or whether any involved deceptive advertis-
ing. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05-cv-1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 
11, 2008).  
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 During much of the period between 2003 and 2014, AT&T and its prede-
cessor companies also noted that customers could use small claims court.486 
We sought to learn about those filings for a five-year period running from 2010 
to 2014 in two jurisdictions, California and Illinois. Those states were chosen 
because of California’s role in regulating arbitration, Illinois’s large court-
annexed arbitration program, the size of each state, and the capacity to access 
online some of the small claims court filings in counties in each state. In Cali-
fornia, where accessible databases came from twenty-five of its fifty-eight 
counties (this set includes less than thirty percent of the state’s population), we 
identified 66 cases in fifteen counties in the five years between 2010 and 2014 in 
which AT&T was a defendant and three in which it was a plaintiff.487 Counties 
in Illinois had more web-accessible data, and during the same five-year period, 
we located 140 cases in fourteen counties that involved breach of contract or 
fraud.488  
Given uneven access to data on small claims, these very preliminary num-
bers raise the possibility that more consumers (as well as AT&T itself) may be 
choosing the option of pursuing claims in court rather than in arbitration.  
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau also sought to understand the role 
played by small claims courts. The CFPB found that, in 2012, fewer than  
870 consumers filed against credit issuers in small claims court in a set of juris-
dictions totaling about 85 million people; the CFPB identified credit card  
issuers turning to courts repeatedly—eighty percent of 41,000 claims—for debt  
 
AT&T amended the terms of its arbitration provisions as the litigation was ongoing, 
and made the terms more consumer-friendly. As of 2015, for “any non-frivolous claim that 
does not exceed $75,000, AT&T will pay all costs of the arbitration.” AT&T Wireless Cus-
tomer Agreement, supra note 2, at § 2.1. In addition, AT&T offers to pay at least $10,000 as 
well as double attorneys’ fees to any consumer who wins more in arbitration than was of-
fered in settlement. Id. at § 2.2(4). AT&T has not made public the numbers of such claims 
paid. 
486. See AT&T Wireless Customer Agreement, supra note 2, § 2.2(1). According to Andrew Pincus, 
who has represented AT&T, a small claims option was available in the AT&T provisions, as 
well as in those from its predecessor Cingular, since “at least mid-2003,” and perhaps earlier. 
E-mail from Andrew Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown LLP, to author (Feb. 18, 2015) (on file 
with author). Provisions from the 2003 and 2006 versions are also on file with author. 
487. Memorandum from Diana Li, Jonas Wang, John Giammatteo, Marianna Mao, Ben 
Woodring & Chris Milione to author, Small Claims Court Filings: A Preliminary Analysis 
(March 16, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Small Claims Court Filings memo]. These 
counties were: Santa Clara, Ventura, Santa Cruz, Fresno, Stanislaus, Placer, Kern, El Dora-
do, Contra Costa, San Joaquin, San Francisco, San Mateo, Monterey, Marin, and Mendo-
cino.  
488. Id. Those counties were Cook, Lake, St. Clair, Vermilion, Clinton, LaSalle, DuPage, Madi-
son, Bard, Champaign, Winnebago, Macon, McHenry, and Jackson.  
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collection.489 Further, when looking at federal court filings, during three years 
from 2010 to 2012, in five consumer product markets, the CFPB identified 
3,462 individual cases or more than 1,100 per year, in addition to 470 consumer 
class action filings.490  
 The variables that could make courts more accessible than arbitration in-
clude fees that are sometimes lower (for example, counties in California charge 
from $30 to $75 per small claims court filing; in Illinois, the fees ranged from 
$35-$50 to $119-$337 per filing491), knowledge about how to use the system, 
and the ease of sharing information among claimants—in that all of these 
courts are open to the public.492 Yet overall, relatively few individuals pursue 
claims anywhere. The CFPB’s survey offered the explanation that the people 
surveyed rarely thought they would themselves bring cases.493 What its data 
coupled with my research make plain is that the private enforcement of small-
value claims depends on collective, rather than individual, action.   
More information about the volume of filings in arbitration comes from the 
AAA 2009-2014 data, which reported that it conducts about 1,500 consumer 
 
489. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 1, at 15-16; § 7, at 11-12. The CFPB encountered 
the challenges we had in that a central database for small claims courts does not exist, and 
access to data varies by jurisdictions. The CFPB data sampled case filings by selecting state 
databases that aimed to provide statewide data and that permitted party-name searches, by 
years; the CFPB supplemented its analysis through review of some county-level data from 
the “30 most populous counties in the United States.” Id. § 7, at 5-6. 
490. Id. § 6, at 27-28, 16. The CFPB chose to exclude auto loans in its individual case analysis be-
cause a preliminary review identified 27,000 filings and that large number made manual in-
quiries too challenging. Id. § 6, at 11 & n.22. Hence it has likely undercounted the number of 
consumers seeking to use courts. Auto loans were part of its class action analysis. Id. In some 
of the individual cases within the CFPB count, motions to arbitrate were filed. Id. § 6, at 8. 
Although the CFPB also sought to identify individual filings in a subset of states, data chal-
lenges made that plan unworkable. Id. § 6, at 15. The CFPB did identify 92 state class ac-
tions in the counties it studied, of which 19 were removed to federal court. Id. § 6, at 16. 
491. Memorandum from Diana Li, Jonas Wang, John Giammatteo, Marianna Mao, Ben 
Woodring & Chris Milione, supra note 487. That review relied on the California small claims 
fee schedule, see Statewide Civil Fee Schedule, SUPERIOR CT. CAL. 5-6 (Jan. 1, 2015), http:// 
www.cc-courts.org/_data/n_0003/resources/live/2015CivilFeeSchedule.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/79LC-JEXJ], and on county websites that provided Illinois fee data. In California, those 
who have filed more than 12 small claims in California within the previous 12 months pay 
$100 to file the next claim. Statewide Civil Fee Schedule, supra; see also Small Claims Court Fil-
ings memo, supra note 487. 
492. All courts permit individuals to look at files, if stored on site. Online access to filings is often 
available, in some courts without charges and in others behind a paywall. Search tools and 
the capacity to search in depth varied by county and state. See Memorandum from Diana Li, 
Marianna Mao, Jonas Wang, Benjamin Woodring, John Giammatteo, & Chris Milione, to 
author, Public Access to Small Claims Court (Feb. 28, 2015) (on file with author).  
493. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 3, at 16-18. 
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arbitrations (as defined by the AAA) a year.494 Paralleling those figures is re-
search identifying 4,857 AAA consumer-filed arbitrations between 2009 and 
2013.495 The definition used by the AAA is somewhat narrower than what Cali-
fornia counts as a consumer arbitration,496 putting the figure at about 3,500 per 
year.497 Another way to assess available information is to include the AAA data 
with those of other providers reporting consumer arbitrations under state 
mandates. On that count, filings averaged about 5,000 to 6,000 a year during 
the period from 2009 to 2014.498   
 
494. From the data the AAA posted for 2009-2014, we tallied 1,054 consumer filings in 2010; 
1,047 in 2011; 2,821 in 2012; and 1,535 in 2013. See AAA Data, July 2009-June 2014, Provider 
Organization Report, supra note 25 (excluding consumer construction and consumer real es-
tate filings). This analysis parallels but is not identical to the numbers provided to us by the 
AAA, which listed 1,063 consumer filings in 2010; 1,425 in 2011; 2,811 in 2012; and 1,741 in 
2013. Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25.  
495. Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 38, at 33.  
496. Section 1281.96 of the California mandate on reporting consumer arbitrations requires dis-
closure of the “nature of the dispute involved as one of the following: goods; credit; other 
banking or finance; insurance; health care; construction; real estate; telecommunications, 
including software and Internet usage; debt collection; personal injury; employment; or 
other.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a)(3) (West 2015). The earlier version of that sec-
tion, enacted in 2002, required disclosure of the “type of dispute involved, including goods, 
banking, insurance, health care, employment.” Id. § 1281.96(a)(2) (West 2014); see also  
David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1285 
n.90 (2009). 
497. See AAA Data, July 2009-June 2014, Provider Organization Report, supra note 25. 
498. Specifically, in addition to the 17,368 entries over five years from the AAA, the data include 
filings from the Office of the Independent Administrator designated by Kaiser Foundation 
Health Plan, Inc. for its California health plan members. Welcome, OFF. INDEP. ADMINIS-
TRATOR (2015), http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com [perma.cc/US6M-YSD3]. That office  
provides a non-searchable database listing 9,123 cases over a period of twelve years from  
January 2003 to December 2014. A searchable five-year database listed 3,294 arbitrations 
from January 2010 to December 2014. Sortable Disclosure Table, OFF. INDEP.  
ADMINISTRATOR (2015), http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/51/consumer-case-information 
/disclosure-table-about-arbitrations-received-in-past-five-years-sortable/sortable-dislosure 
-table [http://perma.cc/R6A7-KX6U]. JAMS recorded 2,921 entries filed from 2009-2014. 
JAMS Consumer Case Information, JAMS (2015), http://www.jamsadr.com/consumercases 
[http://perma.cc/3F47-5YKW] (click to download “Consumer Case Information” Excel 
sheet).  
Judicate West disclosed 2,250 arbitrations from 2006 to 2014, with 2,221 filed since 
2009. Quarterly Consumer Arbitration Disclosure, JUDICATE W. (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www 
.judicatewest.com/files/forms/arb_forms/Quarterly_Cons_Arb_Disc.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/R2Z6-2KJR] (counting cases by determining the number of times “Case Number” appears 
and determining date range by searching by year for “Filing Date”). A manual search identi-
fied that twenty-nine of the arbitrations reported were filed before 2009. ADR Services, Inc. 
listed 2,181 arbitrations from January 2006 to October 2014, with 2,137 filed since 2009.  
Consumer Arbitration Record, ADR SERVS. INC. (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.adrservices 
 
  
the yale law journal 124:280 4   20 15  
2906 
 
Above, I discussed the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s inquiries 
into court filings. CFPB data on arbitrations go beyond my focus on claims in-
volving AT&T; the CFPB looked at six credit-related markets for which, again, 
the AAA is the predominant provider of arbitration services.499 The CFPB’s 
 
.org/pdf/Consumer%20Arbitration%20Record%202014.10.01.pdf [http://perma.cc/YTZ2 
-R7EJ] (counting cases by determining the number of times “Case Number” appears; de-
termining date range by searching by year for “Date Demand Received”). A manual search 
identified that forty-four of the arbitrations reported were filed before 2009.  
Resolution Remedies reported 240 arbitrations from 2009 to 2014. Consumer  
Arbitration Disclosure Report—Standard 8 Report, RESOL. REMEDIES (Oct. 2014), http://www 
.resolutionremedies.com/documents/Standard8Report-Oct2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/SWP3 
-HAMY] (determining date range by searching by year for “Date”). Many of the entries, 
however, are labeled as mediations. In order to count the number of arbitrations, a case-
sensitive search for “Arb” was conducted—after saving the document and opening outside 
the Google Chrome web browser, which did not allow a case-sensitive search—because a 
non-case-sensitive search for “arb” provides many erroneous hits. A cursory review of the 
240 hits found via a case-sensitive search indicated no errors in the count. Alternative Reso-
lutions Centers reported 170 arbitrations from January 2009 to September 2013. ARC Con-
sumer Arbitrations, ALTERNATIVE RESOL. CENTERS (Apr. 1, 2014) (on file with author) 
(counting cases by determining the number of times “Case Name” appears; determining 
date range by searching by year for “Case Date”). Alternative Resolution Centers removed 
its old database and switched to a spreadsheet format. See Disclosures, ALTERNATIVE RESOL. 
CENTERS (2014), http://www.arc4adr.com/consumerreporting.html [http://perma.cc/FG72 
-DWTW] (select “download spreadsheet”). National Arbitration and Mediation (NAM) re-
ported eighteen arbitrations from September 2007 to July 2014, with all but one filed after 
July 2009. NAM Consumer Arbitrations, NAT’L ARB. & MED. (2014), http://www.namadr 
.com/Consumer_cases.cfm [http://perma.cc/Z2VK-TAA5].  
Excluded from the count of the some 28,000 total consumer filings under the California 
mandate from 2009 to 2014 were 20,000, listed from 2009 to 2011, by the National Arbitra-
tion Forum (NAF). See California CCP 1281.96 Reports, NAT’L ARB. F., http://www.adrforum 
.com/main.aspx?itemID=563&hideBar=False&navID=188&news=3 [http://perma.cc/UW63 
-M5GS]. Unlike the other providers, these filings are categorized by the arbitration’s end 
date, and almost all were filed before 2009. NAF stopped administering new consumer arbi-
trations on July 24, 2009, pursuant to a consent judgment, after the State of Minnesota 
brought suit alleging that NAF had undisclosed ties to the credit collection industry. See 
Minn. v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum., No. 27-CV-09-18550, 2009 WL 5424036 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
July 17, 2009) (consent judgment); Press Release, Minn. Office of the Att’y Gen., National 
Arbitration Forum Barred from Credit Card and Consumer Arbitrations Under  
Agreement with Attorney General Swanson (July 19, 2009), http://pubcit.typepad.com/files 
/nafconsentdecree.pdf [http://perma.cc/VTH9-ECAY] (containing also Letter from Lori 
Swanson, Att’y Gen. of the State of Minn., to President, Am. Arbitration Ass’n (July 19, 
2009)); see also National Arbitration Forum To Cease Administering All Consumer Arbitrations 
in Response to Mounting Legal and Legislative Challenges, NAT’L ARB. F., (July 19, 2009), 
http://www.adrforum.com/newsroom.aspx?itemID=1528 [http://perma.cc/QZA3-JG5M]. 
499. See CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 1, at 10; § 2, at 34-35 (identifying the AAA 
as a provider in eighty-three percent of credit card arbitration clauses and in eighty-
six percent of the surveyed mobile wireless arbitration clauses); Tables 4-5, § 2, at 36-39 
(summarizing providers in contracts in the six sectors studied); see also CFPB 2013 Prelimi-
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2013 Preliminary Results reported millions of consumers subject to arbitration 
and found an average of 415 individual AAA filings per year from 2010 to 2012 
in four consumer product markets—credit card, checking account, payday 
loans, and prepaid cards.500 In its 2015 report, the CFPB added two products, 
private student loans and auto loans,501 to its analysis—bringing the three 
years’ annual average up to 616.502 About two-thirds were filed by consumers, 
while the remaining included disputes brought by both parties as well as those 
filed by companies.503 A summary of the information we excavated and of that 
detailed by the CFPB is provided in Figure 7.504 
Turning to employment, a 2008 study suggested that, across the country, at 
least thirty million employees were obliged to use arbitration.505 The AAA was 
(again) the “largest provider” of employment-related arbitration; researchers es-
timated that about 1 in 10,000 employees used its system.506 Between 2010 and 
2013, the AAA reported 1,349 to 1,599 filings nationwide under employer-




nary Results, supra note 31, at 13. (“The AAA is the predominant administrator for consumer 
arbitration about credit cards, checking accounts, and GPR prepaid cards.”). 
500. CFPB 2013 Preliminary Results, supra note 31, at 13. 
501. 2015 CFPB Arbitration Study, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 17, § 5, at 3. 
The median amount of consumers’ “affirmative claim[s]” was $11,500. Id. § 1, at 12. 
502. Id. § 1, at 11. 
503. Id.  
504. Another effort at identifying a subset of cases, those involving social media, comes from 
Rustad and Koenig, who located four social media arbitration dispositions over the course 
of a decade in AAA data. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 235, at 369-72. 
505. Colvin & Gough, supra note 32, at 2.  
506. Colvin & Pike, supra note 179, at 82.  
507. Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25.  
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Figure 7.  
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616**  1,847  
 
* Consumers filed all 134 of the consumer claims involving AT&T. 
** Consumers filed approximately two thirds, and companies about one third, of the 
616 claims per year.  
 
The question is what to make of the small numbers of claims filed. The low 
filing rates for consumer arbitrations could reflect a lack of need to do so. Pub-
lic enforcement may suffice, or manufacturers and service providers could gen-
erally be in compliance with legal obligations and voluntarily remedy the 
breaches that do occur. For example, in terms of informal resolutions, AT&T re-
ported that it paid $1.3 billion in 2007 in “manual credits to resolve customer con-
cerns and complaints.”508 Further, AT&T’s current promise to provide extra 
payments to consumers who succeed in arbitration creates an incentive for the 
company to settle claims. Yet AT&T does not publish data on its settlements  
or on when it pays premium awards after arbitration. Thus, one is left to  
speculate on whether AT&T’s responsiveness explains the few claims filed  
or whether the accommodations made are but a small fraction of consumer  
complaints that could have been brought.  
 
508. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05-CV-1167-DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *3 (S.D. 
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008). 
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Support for a thesis of under-claiming comes from a series of federal agen-
cies’ complaints asserting that the major wireless service providers imposed il-
legal overcharges through a practice known as “cramming.” In October of 2014, 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a federal lawsuit alleging that 
AT&T had billed consumers $9.99 per month for unauthorized third-party 
subscriptions that were not clearly identified in its billing.509 According to the 
complaint, when customers noticed the charges and did complain, they re-
ceived either inadequate refunds or none at all.510 The FTC alleged that AT&T 
kept between 35-40% of the unauthorized charges and that, as a result, in 2013 
AT&T gained more than $160 million in revenue.511  
Four days after the filing, the FTC and AT&T announced a settlement, 
joined by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and several states, 
to return $80 million to consumers, to provide $20 million to the participating 
states, and to give $5 million to the U.S. Treasury.512 In December of 2014, the 
CFPB filed a similar lawsuit against Sprint and alleged “millions of dollars” of 
unauthorized third-party charges; that complaint estimated $2 billion were, 
annually, overcharged to consumers.513 Later that month, T-Mobile settled an 
FTC complaint lodged against it for cramming and agreed to refund $90 mil-
lion in unwanted charges, to pay an $18 million fine to state attorneys general, 
and to pay $4.5 million to the FTC.514  
These government filings could be interpreted as providing all the legal 
remedies needed. Such efforts surely provide a buffer against the dearth of in-
dividual claims. Yet research by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau de-
scribes how much the government itself relies on private enforcement as one 
 
509. Complaint at 3, FTC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014), 
http://www.ftc.gov/es/system/files/documents/cases/141008attcmpt1.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/7AXP-67UX]. 
510. Id. at 3-4. 
511. Id. 
512. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 16, FTC v. AT&T 
Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014) http://www.ftc.gov/es/system/files 
/documents/cases/141008attstip2.pdf [http://perma.cc/RKZ8-XDPL]. The settlement stipu-
lated that AT&T would have to report to the FTC on its compliance with the settlement or-
der for at least six years. Id. at 31. 
513. Complaint at 3, CFPB v. Sprint Corp, No. 14 CV 9931 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2014) http://files 
.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412_cfpb_cfpb-v-sprint-complaint.pdf [http://perma.cc/WF4F 
-PSWN].  
514. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 10, FTC v. T-Mobile 
USA, Inc., No. 2:14-ev-00967 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2014); Diane Bartz, U.S. Settles Lawsuit 
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way to ferret out illegal action. The CFPB concluded that when government 
entities pursued particular claims that were also the subject of class actions, the 
government filed its complaints in about two-thirds of the cases after those 
filed by private parties.515 That pattern highlights the inter-dependencies be-
tween public and private enforcement, as well as the importance of the capacity 
to pursue claims collectively.  
If one argument for private enforcement comes from a policy analysis of the 
role it plays in enforcing obligations, another comes from law. State and federal 
legislation has authorized private rights of action, empowering individuals to 
bring claims. Such provisions reflect both majoritarian distrust of centralizing 
too much power in government and commitments to the entrepreneurialism of 
private enforcement.516 This mix of law and policy makes the absence of claims 
a source of concern.  
b. Locating the Rules and Fee Structures 
Two other factors—ease of knowing how to file claims and the costs of do-
ing so—affect the likelihood of pursuing claims. In addition to the challenges 
of learning about other claimants, Dispute Diffusion makes it difficult to locate 
the governing rules and the fees involved in arbitration. Atop the rules of spe-
cific providers (like the AAA), arbitration clauses may be a source of proce-
dures, as can be individual arbitrators, imposing their own specifications. 
Thus, just as the case law contesting arbitration clauses requires lawyer exper-
tise if one is considering contesting any of the obligations imposed, using the 
arbitration system itself entails sophistication to learn which rules and fees ap-
ply.517 
A few details on the layers of rules that have governed arbitration within 
the AAA system illustrate the subtleties of deciding—from reading docu-
ments—which rules govern. For decades, the AAA has had Commercial Arbi-
tration Rules; the AAA added what it now calls its Consumer-Related Disputes: 
Supplementary Procedures518 in 1999 to response to the concerns prompting the 
 
515. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 1, at 17-18. 
516. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 19-59 (2010). 
517. The CFPB determined that many clauses were challenging for consumers to decipher on its 
“readability” scores. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 27-29. In terms of 
complexity, the study looked at the number and length of rules, and reported that the AAA’s 
2014 Consumer Arbitration Rules were 10,560 words, shaping 55 rules; the Philadelphia 
Municipal Court Rules ran 9,649 words, detailing 38 rules. Id. § 4, at 7. 
518. The original 1999 rules were, as amended in April 1, 2000, named the AAA’s Arbitration 
Rules of Resolution of Consumer-Related Disputes. See AAA Green Tree Brief, supra note 179, at 
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1998 AAA-sponsored Consumer Due Process Protocol.519 The Consumer Supple-
ment imposed no administrative fees on consumers seeking $75,000 or less and 
permitted consumers to pay no more than 50 percent of arbitrators’ fees, which 
were capped at $125 for claims not exceeding $10,000.520 In 2013, the AAA re-
vised its fee rules for consumer claims.521 The AAA instituted its own $200 ad-
ministrative filing fee, to be paid by consumers (unless arbitration clauses  
specify that businesses absorb that fee).522 In addition, the AAA required busi-
nesses to pay all the arbitrators’ fees523 and applied parallel provisions for its 
employer-promulgated rules.524 
In 2014, the Consumer Supplemental Protocol was replaced by a freestand-
ing set of Consumer Arbitration Rules,525 not tied to an amount in controversy 
and to be used even when a consumer agreement specifies other rules.526  
Although conversations with AAA staff clarified that the 2014 Consumer Rules 
 
*4 & Appendix B. The current set of procedures can be found at Consumer-Related  
Disputes: Supplementary Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS’N 8 (2014), https://www.adr.org 
/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GET_FILE&dDocName=ADRSTAGE2009997&RevisionSelection 
Method=LatestReleased [https://perma.cc/6JQ4-G3M9] [hereinafter AAA Consumer Sup-
plementary Procedures] (providing under C-1.(a) that “[t]he Commercial Dispute Resolution 
Procedures and these Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes shall ap-
ply” for consumer arbitrations and that “[t]he AAA’s most current rules will be used when 
the arbitration is started”). 
519. AAA Consumer Due Process Protocol, supra note 232. 
520. Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25. For claims between $10,000 and $75,000, the max-
imum consumer payment for arbitration fees permitted was $375. Providers could absorb all 
fees if they volunteered to do so. Id. 
521. Id.  
522. Id.; AAA Consumer Supplementary Procedures, supra note 518, at 14. 
523. AAA Consumer Supplementary Procedures, supra note 518, at 14.  
524. AAA Employment Arbitration Rules, supra note 318; Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25.  
525. AAA 2014 Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra note 244. For parallel employment arbitration 
protocols that likewise impose a non-refundable $200 “when a claim is filed,” see AAA Em-
ployment Arbitration Rules, supra note 318, at 32. 
526. Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25. The rules are not quite so clear; they state that they 
apply whenever an arbitration clause is part of a “consumer agreement,” unless the arbitra-
tion agreement specifies “a particular set of rules other than the Consumer Arbitration Rules.” 
See AAA 2014 Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra note 244, at 9. 
Thus, if consumers read arbitration clauses, it is possible to be confused about which set 
governs. For example, on its arbitration information webpage, AT&T explains that 
“[b]ecause the AAA may update [the commercial and supplementary consumer] rules from 
time to time, and because the applicable rules for any particular arbitration will be the ones 
in force at the time, please check the Government & Consumer section on AAA’s website to 
see the latest version.” AT&T also provides a hyperlink to the section. Resolve a Dispute with 
AT&T via Arbitration, AT&T (2015), http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jsp?sid=KB72565 
&cv=820 [http://perma.cc/33NH-8NEN]. 
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displace others, AAA documents make reference to the possibility of substitut-
ing other rules, “such as the Real Estate or Wireless Industry Arbitration 
Rules, for the Commercial Dispute Resolution Procedures in some cases,”527 as 
well as the Wireless Rules, which are now superseded by the Consumer 
Rules.528 In short, the various procedures and specific arbitration clauses offer 
more of a maze than a roadmap to which rules apply and how much discretion 
individual arbitrators have in a system that is unbounded by precedent.  
The question of costs is one that the AAA describes as a matter left largely 
to its own judgment, exercised in reference to what courts and other dispute 
providers do and to the Consumer Due Process Protocol’s commitment to costs 
being “reasonable.”529 As noted, in 2013, the AAA instituted a filing fee for con-
sumers, pegged it at $200, and continued applying that fee in the 2014 revi-
sions.530  
 
527. AAA Consumer Supplementary Procedures, supra note 518, at 8. 
528. Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25. The Wireless Rules were aiming to provide “flexi-
bility to handle small claims; large, complex cases; and everything in between.” Michael F. 
Altschul & Elizabeth S. Stong, Cellular Industry Moves to ADR: AAA Develops New Arbitration 
Rules To Resolve Wireless Disputes, ADR CURRENTS, Fall 1997, at 6, 6-7. 
The overlap of rule sets and references make the question of application less than 
straightforward. For example, Rule R-1 of the Wireless Industry Arbitration Rules states 
that “[t]he parties shall be deemed to have made these Rules a part of their arbitration 
agreement whenever they provide for arbitration by the American Arbitration  
Association (AAA) or under its Wireless Industry Arbitration Rules.” Wireless Industry  
Arbitration Rules, AM. ARB. ASS’N 7 (2014), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs 
/groups/commercial/documents/document/dgdf/mda0/~edisp/adrstg_004134.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/S6QN-NH73] [hereinafter Wireless Industry Arbitration Rules]. Thus, for the un-
guided, it was unclear whether “provid[ing] for arbitration by the American Arbitration As-
sociation,” Wireless Industry Arbitration Rules, supra, at 7, alone triggered the wireless indus-
try arbitration rules when they were not otherwise specified in an arbitration clause. For 
instance, AT&T’s consumer agreement identifies the AAA as the arbitration provider and 
states that the arbitration will be “governed by the Commercial Arbitration Rules and the 
Supplementary Procedures.” AT&T Wireless Customer Agreement, supra note 2, § 2.2(3). 
529. Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25; AAA Consumer Due Process Protocol, supra note 232, 
at Principle 6 (“Reasonable Cost”). 
The CFPB found variation in whether institutions paid or reimbursed the consumers’ 
initial filing fees, as well as in the requirements for doing so, in whether arbitrators could 
impose post-arbitration costs on consumers, and in whether consumers obtained attorney 
fee awards. See CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 57-64 (summarizing cost 
provisions in arbitration clauses in the six markets studied). Moreover, “[s]ignificant shares 
of arbitration clauses across almost all markets . . . did not address attorneys’ fees.” Id. § 2, at 
66. Some clauses provided that attorneys’ fees were to be awarded to prevailing consumers. 
Id. § 2, at 67-68. 
530. AAA Consumer Supplementary Procedures, supra note 518, at 14; Consumer Arbitration Rules, 
supra note 525. 
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But not all consumers have to pay that fee because, in 2002, as part of its 
packet of arbitration regulations, California required fee waivers for “indigent 
consumers,” defined as those with incomes of less than “300 percent of the fed-
eral poverty guidelines.”531 California instructed providers to give consumers 
notice of this option and to create forms for sworn declarations that a particular 
consumer qualified; providers were not to ask for additional information.532  
In compliance, the AAA has a form labeled “Waiver of Fees Notice for Use 
by California Consumers Only”533 and another document (not available on the 
web) for the rest of the country, entitled an “Affidavit in support of Reduction 
or Deferral of Filing and Administrative Fees.”534 That affidavit form requires 
consumers outside of California to make detailed disclosures of assets, income, 
and liabilities and does not indicate the availability of full waivers. The AAA 
reports that it has given waivers when requests are made535 but that it does not 
track the numbers or kinds of waivers, deductions, or deferrals given.536 Thus, 
 
531. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(b)(1) (West 2015).  
532. Id. § 1284.3(b)(2). 
533. See American Arbitration Association Affidavit for Waiver of Fees Notice 
 for Use by California Consumers Only, https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF;jsessionid 
=kbxxPbvFTQmmP8cycYdvlLjfxmgYV4dLDBNsfjx1gH347bx1GqLL!1786312740?doc=ADR
STG_004304 [http://perma.cc/63NM-A4E3]; American Arbitration Association Affidavit for 
Waiver of Fees Notice for Use by California Consumers Only, AM. ARB. ASS’N (Oct 21,  
2011), http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004304 [http://perma.cc/3GB4 
-PFUX]; see also Forms, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2015), http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/services 
/fileacase/forms [http://perma.cc/6RR6-YSRZ] (including fifty-eight other forms as well as 
the fee waiver hardship form for California consumers). 
534. Affidavit in Support of Reduction or Deferral of Filing and Administrative Fees, Am. Arb. 
Ass’n (on file with author). Unlike the fee waiver form for California consumers available 
through the AAA website, the AAA website does not include ready access to this Affidavit 
form; the web discussion under the heading “Administrative Fee Waivers and Pro Bono Ar-
bitrators” states  that “parties are eligible for a waiver or deferral of the administration fee if 
their annual gross income falls below 200% of the federal poverty guidelines.” Administrative 
Fee Waivers and Pro Bono Arbitrators, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF 
%3Bjsessionid%3DR295PCqYD5MkNKhQqm9H7jhSMwYh2NnsYFSbG6yrMhgmGVB299
lc!1082660915%3Fdoc%3DADRSTG_004098 [http://perma.cc/X8BM-YP9H]. There, the 
AAA explains that, for its “hardship affidavit,” “additional information . . . may be consid-
ered,” including “past income, assets . . . and income prospects,” and that the decision is dis-
cretionary. Id.; see also CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 4, at 11 n.51 and accom-
panying text (reporting that the “consumer can apply for a hardship waiver of otherwise 
applicable administrative fees,” but not citing to the form itself).  
535. Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 15.  
536. Id. The CFPB found twenty-two consumer requests for fee waivers, and twenty-three “Cali-
fornia” fee waiver requests amidst the 1,847 disputes that the AAA administered and the 
CFPB studied; the results of the requests were not recorded based on the “limited data.” 
CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, at § 5, at 77. Research on arbitration mandates in 
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aside from California, robust and publicly accessible analogues to court-based 
“in forma pauperis” proceedings are not available in arbitration.537  
c. Concerns about Compliance 
If the problems of rules and costs ex ante impose barriers to filing, uneven 
implementation of the awards made ex post may also discourage filing. Com-
pliance analyses are hard to come by, and here I turn to information resulting 
from SEC regulation of the financial securities arbitrations, including under 
FINRA, and by way of reports from the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO). In the wake of the Supreme Court’s rulings in the 1980s permitting 
enforcement of arbitration clauses related to securities transactions, concerns 
emerged about industry-based arbitrations administered by the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers, the New York Stock Exchange, the American 
Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, and the Municipal  
Securities Rulemaking Board.538 
Responding to requests by members of Congress to study securities arbi-
trations,539 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued six reports be-
tween 1992 and 2003.540 A 2000 GAO study, sampling 247 claims out of 11,290 
 
social media identified that the majority of provisions reviewed did not explain costs and 
that some were misleading on costs. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 235, at 387-92. 
537. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012). The federal court filing fee, as of 2015, was $350. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2012).  
538. See, e.g., J. Kirkland Grant, Securities Arbitration: Is Required Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 24 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 389, 480 (1989). 
539. See GAO, 1992, HOW INVESTORS FARE, supra note 364, at 4, 21. 
540. See id.; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-162R, FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON MAT-
TERS RELATING TO SECURITIES ARBITRATION (2003) [hereinafter GAO, 2003, FOLLOW-UP 
REPORT]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-790, EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES: 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO BETTER ENSURE THAT SECURITIES ARBITRATORS ARE QUALIFIED 
(2003); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-115, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS (2000) [hereinafter GAO, 
2000, PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-162R, 
PROCEDURES FOR UPDATING ARBITRATOR DISCLOSURE INFORMATION (2000); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-94-17, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: HOW REGIS-
TERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES (1994).  
The 1992 study of about 2,000 outcomes during a six-month period concluded that in-
vestors did no better or worse in industry-based arbitrations than in those conducted by the 
AAA. GAO, 1992, HOW INVESTORS FARE, supra note 364, at 6-7, 35. The GAO found that in-
vestors received an award in 59% of cases at an industry-sponsored forum and 60% of cases 
before American Arbitration Association arbitration. Id. at 38. The GAO found that if a hear-
ing was held and a lawyer present, awards were more likely. Id. at 40. The GAO also raised 
questions about qualifications and training of the industry-based arbitrators. See id. at 55-61. 
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arbitrated by industry providers, found that an estimated $129 million of the 
$161 million (or about eighty percent) of awards to investors went “unpaid.”541 
A 2003 follow-up review concluded that in 2001, about $55 million of the 
$100.2 million in arbitration awards had gone unpaid—an improvement over 
the 1998 results, even as about half the successful investors did not receive 
funds.542  
E. Contracting for Judges in a Market for Courts 
Another window into arbitration’s relationship to legal rights comes from 
those with the capacity to shop for services. Some negotiated contracts build 
courts into their customized agreements. A 2008 study of high-value companies 
concluded that the firms left open the option of using courts when negotiating 
contracts with each other; fewer than one in ten contracts bound themselves to 
use arbitration exclusively.543 Yet three-quarters mandated arbitration for their 
consumers.544 Other customized agreements call for judicial oversight of arbi-
trations to ensure compliance with the contracts’ directions. The legality of do-
ing so reached the Supreme Court in 2008 in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, 
Inc.545—providing another illustration of the role of public law in structuring 
the parameters of “private” arbitration.  
The case was atypical in that the particular contract was forged as a settle-
ment of a federal lawsuit relating to the termination and indemnification obli-
gations of a tenant (Mattel) to its landlord (Hall Street). After Mattel won a 
bench trial on the termination question, the parties agreed that arbitrators 
would decide indemnification—with the caveat that a court “shall vacate, 
modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s findings of fact are not 
supported by the substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions 
of law are erroneous.”546 Hall Street, which lost the arbitration, argued that the 
 
The 2000 GAO follow-up reported that its proposals had generally been put into place. 
GAO, 2000, PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS, supra, at 4. 
541. See GAO, 2000, PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS, supra note 540, at 5. 
542. See GAO, 2003, FOLLOW-UP REPORT, supra note 540, at 9.  
543. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: 
An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 871, 876, 883 (2008). Criticism of the analysis comes from Christopher R. 
Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433 (2010). 
544. See Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 543, at 876. 
545. 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
546. Id. at 579. Thereafter, the district court vacated the award based on the view it was legally 
erroneous. Id. at 580. The Court noted the peculiarity of the arbitration agreement’s rela-
 
  
the yale law journal 124:280 4   20 15  
2916 
 
arbitrator erred as a matter of law by not including an Oregon Water Quality 
Act provision as a measure of environmental contamination.547 
The question of the enforceability of that provision was litigated under the 
FAA, which authorizes judges to void arbitration awards “procured by corrup-
tion, fraud, or undue means”; when evidence exists of “partiality or corruption 
in the arbitrators”; when arbitrators are “guilty of misconduct” in conducting 
the hearing or otherwise prejudicing a party; or “where the arbitrators exceed-
ed their powers, or so imperfectly executed [their powers] . . . .”548 Not men-
tioned directly are errors of law, perhaps because in the 1920s, arbitrators were 
“supposed to apply the contract” and not necessarily “apply the law.”549 
Given that the contract at issue in Hall Street stipulated review for errors of 
law, the Court could have upheld judicial review under the FAA’s excess-of-
powers provision. Doing so could have had a wider impact, permitting judicial 
oversight of arbitrations predicated on the effective vindication/adequacy ra-
tionale. Alternatively, the Court could have read the FAA as celebrating the  
authority of parties to negotiate provisions, including contracting for courts’ 
jurisdiction.550 Or the Court could—as the New Zealand Supreme Court has 
 
tionship to the district court’s Rule 16 powers—leaving open alternative grounds for the 
lower court to review the outcome of arbitration. Id. at 592. 
547. Id. at 580.  
548. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012). Modification and correction are available under § 11 for an “evident 
material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake” to the persons or property 
referenced, or where “arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them,” or 
the “award is imperfect in matter of form.” 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2012). 
The case law has also referenced vacatur based on “manifest disregard of law.” See Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670-73 (2010). Whether this doctrine 
retains its vitality in light of Hall Street has divided the federal appellate courts. See, e.g., Sa-
rah Rudolph Cole, The Federalization of Consumer Arbitration: Possible Solutions, 2013 U. CHI. 
LEGAL. F. 271; Ann C. Gronlund, The Future of Manifest Disregard as a Valid Ground for Vacat-
ing Arbitration Awards in Light of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. 
v. Mattel, Inc., 96 IOWA L. REV. 1351 (2011); Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the 
Law? The “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137 (2011). 
In 2014, the Florida Supreme Court relied on Hall Street to conclude that “courts cannot 
review the claim that an arbitrator’s construction of a contract renders it illegal.” Visiting 
Nurse Ass’n of Fla., Inc. v. Jupiter Med. Ctr., Inc., 154 So. 3d 1115, 1132 (Fla. 2014), cert. de-
nied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. May 4, 2015) (No. 14-944). Jupiter Medical Center had sought 
to vacate a $1.25 million award on the grounds that the arbitrators’ interpretation of a “pur-
chase and lease” agreement had turned it “into a patient-steering and kickback scheme that 
violates both the federal Medicare law and state anti-kickback statutes.” Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari at 2, Visiting Nurse Ass’n, No. 14-944 (U.S. Feb. 5, 2015).  
549. Ware, supra note 17, at 74. 
550. See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 629 n.142 (2005). 
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since concluded—have held that the agreement for judicial review was integral 
to the contract and that its invalidation undid the decision to arbitrate.551 
 Instead, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, read the FAA’s direction that 
courts “must grant” confirmation of arbitration orders as preventing the Court 
from interpreting the FAA’s excess-of-powers provision to authorize judicial 
oversight; further, the Court read the FAA grounds as exclusive, precluding 
parties from adding additional bases on which to review awards.552 That nar-
rowness made “sense” because it maintained “arbitration’s essential virtue of 
resolving disputes straightaway.”553 The Court fashioned the procedural rule by 
substituting its preferences—for speed in this instance—over the parties’ pref-
erences for oversight by judges.  
Yet the majority added the caveat that parties could provide for “enforce-
ment under state statutory or common law, . . . where judicial review of differ-
ent scope is arguable.”554 As a consequence, a few state courts have read Hall 
Street to permit them to accord review more expansive than under the FAA—as 
a matter of state “procedure” rather than arbitration’s “substance”—and there-
fore as not preempted by the FAA.555 The result is a dialogue among judges in 
 
551. Carr & Brookside Farm Trust Ltd. v Gallaway Cook Allan [2014] NZSC 75 (SC) para. 70. The 
court noted that the parties’ attention to the scope of review evidenced that the “appeal right 
did go to the heart of their agreement to submit their dispute to arbitration,” and hence that 
the agreement to arbitrate failed. Id. at para. 72.  
That approach assumed the authority of the Court, rather than the arbitrators, to decide 
the relationship of arbitration clauses to contracts, and the U.S. Supreme Court has ceded a 
great deal of that decision making to arbitrators. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 
U.S. 63 (2010); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); supra text 
accompanying notes 346-347.  
552. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584-87 (2008). Justice Souter’s distress about 
the potential for litigation to be cumbersome can also be found in his opinion in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), expanding the requirements for pleading antitrust 
claims. Justice Stevens disagreed there, as he did in Hall Street, where he argued that the 
FAA ought not to be read as precluding enforcement of “perfectly reasonable judicial review 
provisions in arbitration agreements fairly negotiated by the parties and approved by the 
district court.” Hall St., 552 U.S. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer filed a sepa-
rate dissent. 
553. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 588. The remand was to address whether the Federal Rules under which 
the agreement was negotiated provided additional authority for courts to review the out-
comes. Id. at 592. 
554. Id. at 590. As a matter of federal law, if a contract designates a state such as California as 
providing the governing law, then broader review of arbitration may be available in federal 
courts as well. See Biller v. Toyota Motor Corp., 668 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 2012).  
555. In response, several current arbitration agreements of large-scale providers specified that 
their agreements were governed by federal law. See, e.g., Cardmember Agreement, AM. EX-
PRESS 6 (2014), http://web.aexp-static.com/us/content/pdf/cardmember-agreements/green 
/AmericanExpressGreenCard.pdf [http://perma.cc/DMX7-5P8D] (providing that the arbi-
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different jurisdictions about the values and priorities of the public law of pri-
vate arbitration. Some state courts have endorsed judicial review and explained 
their rulings as respecting freedom of contract and as enhancing arbitration’s 
appeal (pun intended).556 
 Illustrative is a decision by the Texas Supreme Court, which reviewed a 
contract specifying that an arbitrator did “not have authority (i) to render a de-
cision which contains a reversible error of state or federal law, or (ii) to apply a 
cause of action or remedy not expressly provided for under existing state or 
federal law.”557 Given that arbitration’s “essential virtue” was agreement and 
that parties could choose arbitration for a variety of reasons (“speed and cost,  
. . . flexibility, privacy, and in some instances, expertise”), the Texas Court 
permitted judicial review.558 Moreover, the court rejected what it called “haste” 
as either a primary or a good goal for arbitration.559 Rather, parties ought to be 
 
tration agreement is governed by the FAA); Sample Cardmember Agreement, DISCOVER  
4 (2014), https://www.discovercard.com/assets/Prime_Combined_it.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/3UVX-YCE9] (same); Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, COMCAST 16 (2014), 
http://cdn.comcast.com/~/Media/Files/Legal/Subscriber%20Agreement/ResServices_Hom
eNetworkingUniLegal_STD_ENG.pdf [http://perma.cc/SEE5-XCUP] (“[T]he Federal Ar-
bitration Act (‘FAA’), not state arbitration law, shall govern the arbitrability of all Disputes. 
. . . No state statute pertaining to arbitration shall be applicable under this Arbitration Pro-
vision.”). 
The scope of the non-preemption of parties’ stipulation of state law governance is be-
fore the Court again. See also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d, 190 (Ct. App. 
2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Mar. 23, 3015) (No. 14-462). Imbrugia had filed 
a class action in 2008 against DIRECTV and alleged violations of state consumer and other 
laws. In the arbitration clause, DIRECTV had provided that “[i]f, however, the law of your 
state would find this agreement to dispense with class arbitration procedures unenforceable, 
then this entire Section . . . is unenforceable.” Id. at 192. The state court concluded that the 
contract made the provision nonseverable and therefore that the requirement to arbitrate 
was not enforceable; further, to the extent it was ambiguous, it was to be construed against 
the drafter. Id. at 196.  
556. See, e.g., Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 594, 604-05 (Cal. 2008) 
(noting that the decision to permit review encourages parties to use of courts instead of risk-
ing a “capricious arbitration award” and that parties, who are “best situated” to make the 
tradeoffs, can choose to “accept the risk of legal error in exchange for the benefits of a quick, 
inexpensive, and conclusive resolution” or additional litigation in court). Parties could not, 
however, contract for “unfamiliar standards of review.” Id. at 605. State rulings rejecting 
contracts to expand courts’ oversight of arbitration awards under state law include HL 1, 
LLC v. Riverwalk, LLC, 15 A.3d 725 (Me. 2011); and Brookfield Country Club, Inc. v. St. James-
Brookfield, LLC, 696 S.E.2d 663 (Ga. 2010).  
557. NAFTA Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 91 (Tex. 2011). 
558. Id. at 94. 
559. Id. In a concurrence, Chief Justice Jefferson commented that “our system is failing if parties 
are compelled to arbitrate because they believe our courts do not adequately serve their 
needs” and called for efforts to fix the system rather than creating incentives for people to 
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allowed “an alternative to litigation” without needing to be “willing to risk an 
unreviewable decision.”560 Under this approach, the parties’ arbitrators be-
come—if an appeal is filed—de facto lower court judges, working under higher 
courts’ supervision. 
The desirability of decisions by judges is also evident in a 2009 enactment 
by the Delaware legislature, seeking to maintain the state’s “preeminence” in 
corporate dispute resolution by redesigning procedures to make its courts 
competitive with private sector dispute resolution providers.561 The legislature 
offered an arbitration program run by the Chancery Court’s judges and held in 
their courthouses.562 To be eligible, at least one of the disputants had to be  
incorporated in Delaware, at least a million dollars had to be at stake, and  
disputants had to pay $12,000 in filing fees and $6,000 daily to the state there-
after.563 Filings were not to be on the public docketing system, and the public 
was not permitted to attend hearings.564 The decisions were to be enforceable 
as judgments, subject to review by the Delaware Supreme Court, which had 
not, as of 2013, provided rules about whether appeals would also be confiden-
tial.565 
As a federal district judge would later describe it, litigants could purchase 
what was “essentially a civil trial” conducted by Delaware’s Chancery judges.566 
That decision finding the procedure unconstitutional came in response to a 
challenge by the “Delaware Coalition for Open Government,” arguing that 
 
“circumvent the courts and opt for private adjudication.” Id. at 103-04 (Jefferson, C.J., con-
curring).  
560.  Id. at 95 (majority opinion). Similarly, Alabama’s Supreme Court opened the door to judi-
cial review in order to honor “the contractual rights and expectations of the parties,” includ-
ing their authorization of “de novo review of the award entered.” Raymond James Fin. 
Servs. Inc. v. Honea, 55 So. 3d 1161, 1168-69 (Ala. 2010) (reading a provision in an agree-
ment between a broker and a client that, if damages were awarded in excess of $100,000, a 
court could conduct de novo review based on the transcript of the arbitration). One of the 
justifications for permitting class action bans, relied on by the majority in AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, was that unreviewability put defendants at too great a risk. 131 S. Ct. 
1740, 1752 (2011) (“We find it hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with 
no effective means of review . . . .”). See supra notes 417-445 and accompanying text. 
561. H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit X, § 349 (2009); DEL. 
CT. CH. R. 96-98. 
562. Standing Order of Del. Ch. at 1 (Jan. 4, 2010), DEL. STATE CTS., http://courts.delaware.gov 
/forms/download.aspx?id=42348 [http://perma.cc/WW4D-8SGE]. 
563. Id. 
564. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 496 (D. Del. 2012) (citing 
DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(a)(4), 98(b)). 
565. See id. at 496 & n.4. 
566. Id. at 502. 
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Delaware’s legislation violated the public’s First Amendment’s right to observe 
court proceedings.567 Delaware’s Chancery Court judges appealed and lost 
again in a split decision in which the Third Circuit concluded that “Delaware’s 
government-sponsored arbitration” could not constitutionally be held in a 
courthouse yet be closed to the public.568  
The relevance of the Delaware legislation to the meaning of “effective vin-
dication” comes from its provision that litigants with resources could be pro-
vided state-employed judges, authorized to resolve their conflicts—in private. 
As one amicus supporting a petition for certiorari to overturn the Third Circuit 
explained, businesses were “weary of private arbitration” and sought “predict-
ability” by turning to the Chancery judges.569 These individuals were “first-rate 
adjudicator[s],” schooled in its law, well-known for their “efficient case man-
agement” and for their rules requiring hearings within three months of  
filing.570 Moreover, when going to court, parties had “to comport themselves 
civilly, to assess their positions soberly, and to present their cases in a way that 
respects the other demands on the judge’s time.”571  
F. Regulated Arbitrations: Court-Annexed Arbitration in Federal Courts, 
Agency Supervision, and European Directives 
Outsourcing dispute resolution depends on law, which currently imposes a 
form of regulation—licensing variability, permitting privacy, prohibiting much 
by way of court oversight, and according a great deal of authority to private 
providers to preclude collective redress.572 The “public” is thus pervasive in the 
“private” of arbitration. But other forms of regulation are possible, and such 
 
567. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 512 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 1551 (2014). 
568. Id. at 521; see infra 654-668 and accompanying text. 
569. Motion for Leave To File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief for TechNet as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 10, Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (No. 13-869) (quoting Jessica Tyndall, The 
Delaware Arbitration Experiment: Not Just a “Secret Court,” 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 
395, 408 (2013)).  
570. Thomas J. Stipanowich, In Quest of the Arbitration Trifecta, or Closed Door Litigation?: The 
Delaware Arbitration Program, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 349, 350-52 (2013). 
571. Motion for Leave To File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief for TechNet as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 569, at 8 (citing to and extrapolating from Leo E. Strine, 
Jr., “Mediation-Only” Filings in the Delaware Court of Chancery: Can New Value Be Added by 
One of America’s Business Courts?, 53 DUKE L.J. 585, 592-93 (2003)). 
572. Outsourcing to arbitration is not the only method of limiting opportunities to pursue claims 
collectively. The Supreme Court has also imposed constraints on class actions, and more are 
contemplated. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); Resnik, supra note 
14; Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161 (2015). 
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rules could impose obligations of egalitarian access and public accountability 
on arbitration.  
To make plain that the current norms of the Alternative Civil Procedural 
Rules are not inevitable and that its deregulatory diffusion could be replaced 
with transparent systems, I provide a few examples of yet other “alternatives” 
that do create mechanisms for oversight of decision makers, that aim to protect 
disputants’ volition, and that authorize public access and court review. Each of 
the processes has its critics, yet each illustrates methods for organizing publicly 
endorsed arbitration. Thus, were the Supreme Court seeking ways to imple-
ment its tests of effective vindication and adequacy, it has models upon which 
to draw. Federalism is one font of innovation, and above I discussed state-
based innovations such as California’s fee waiver rules and reporting mandates 
and Illinois’s court-arbitration program. A second resource is Congress, which 
has created a different form of arbitration for cases filed in the federal courts. 
Agency oversight is a third model, and a fourth comes from regulatory efforts 
in Europe. 
In the 1980s, Congress encouraged federal courts to offer an array of court-
based ADR and created special procedures for “court-annexed arbitration.” 
Congress authorized federal judges to appoint lawyers to conduct trial-like 
hearings and to enjoy judge-like powers to issue subpoenas, convene hearings, 
and enter awards.573 But the provisions imposed constraints very different from 
those the Court has licensed through its reading of the FAA.  
Specifically, in the 1988 “Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice 
Act,”574 Congress selected ten district courts that could mandate court-annexed 
arbitration, but not in all cases. Instead, this option was available only when 
cases involved monetary damages under $100,000; for cases involving civil 
rights and constitutional claims, the statute permitted judges to refer cases to 
arbitration only if the parties consented and if the issues were not “novel.”575  
A decade later, Congress revisited the parameters in the “Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution Act of 1998,”576 which required all federal district courts to 
“authorize, by local rule . . . , the use of alternative dispute resolution processes 
 
573. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, sec. 901, § 653, 102 
Stat. 4642, 4660 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2012)).  
574. Id. 
575. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4659 (1988). Note that the 1998 revision, discussed infra 
notes 576-580, does not include the limitation precluding cases that include novel issues.  
576. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2012)). 
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in all civil actions,” including the “use of arbitration.”577 The criteria for eligible 
cases shifted a bit. Congress prohibited arbitrations when actions were “based 
on an alleged violation of a right secured” by the Federal Constitution and 
when the relief sought exceeded $150,000.578 Congress also directed district 
courts to establish standards for those appointed as arbitrators, who were sub-
ject to rules of disqualification applicable to federal judges and protected for 
their “quasi-judicial functions” with “the immunities and protections that the 
law accords to persons serving in such capacity.”579 
In addition, under the heading “Safeguards in Consent Cases,” Congress 
required federal courts to ensure that consent to arbitration was given “freely 
and knowingly” and that “no party or attorney” was to be “prejudiced for re-
fusing to participate in arbitration”; the ten districts originally authorized in 
1988 to provide arbitration continued, however, to have the option of mandat-
ing its use for eligible cases.580 Congress also provided for trial de novo in 
which the action was to be “treated . . . as if it had not been referred to arbitra-
tion.”581 Thus, unlike other forms of ADR for which federal judges have the 
power to require attendance,582 the general mandate from Congress was to 
make arbitration voluntary. Moreover, unlike the obligations enforced by the 
Supreme Court under the FAA,583 federal court-annexed arbitrations do not 
preclude parties who want to proceed to trial from doing so.  
 
577. 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2012). The statute explained that its provisions were not to affect exist-
ing programs under the 1988 statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 654(d) (2012). 
578. 28 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2012). In the 1998 Amendment, as well as the original 1988 statute, if 
the court’s jurisdiction rested on 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which is available for cases filed under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, arbitration is not permitted. Id. 
579. 28 U.S.C. § 655(c) (2012). Authority was also provided for courts, under regulations ap-
proved by the Judicial Conference, to establish rates of compensation. 28 U.S.C. § 658 
(2012).  
580. 28 U.S.C. §§ 654(b), 654 (d) (2012). As of 2014, three of those ten districts—the District of 
New Jersey, the Eastern District of New York, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania—
had active, mandatory programs. Telephone Interview with Donna Stienstra, Senior Re-
searcher, Fed. Judicial Ctr. (June 1, 2015). 
581. 28 U.S.C. § 657(c)(2) (2012). In the 1988 statute, Congress had provided that if a party did 
less well in the de novo trial, fee-shifting was permissible. See Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IX, § 
901(a), 102 Stat. 4661 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1988)). That provision is not 
replicated in the 1998 statute. 
582. See, for example, FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f), which authorizes judges to impose sanctions on par-
ties who refuse to participate in pretrial conferences. “Good-faith” participation is required, 
see FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(1)(B); agreement is not.  
583. Some arbitration clauses permit opt-outs; those studied by the CFPB required consumers to 
mail a “signed written document to the issuer” within a stated time. CFPB 2015 Arbitration 
Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 31. Given that the clauses were often hard to read and that most 
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Another distinction between FAA and court-annexed arbitration is the po-
tential for the public to attend proceedings. The 1988 provisions did not dis-
cuss confidentiality but did require that awards could not be “made known” to 
judges assigned to the cases.584 Further, neither information adduced during 
arbitration nor awards made, if any, were admissible evidence in any trials sub-
sequent to the arbitration.585 In the 1998 amendments, Congress required dis-
trict courts to protect the “confidentiality of the alternative dispute resolution 
processes” through prohibitions on “disclosure of confidential dispute resolu-
tion communications.”586  
The statute could be read to suggest that arbitration proceedings fell within 
the parameters of “confidential dispute resolution communications.” But the 
statute does not speak directly to this issue, and little reported case law  
addresses it.587 Through review of some local rules and discussions with court 
staff, we learned that, as of 2014, court-annexed arbitrations were open to the 
public in the two federal court districts reporting hundreds of court-annexed 
arbitrations yearly,588 that litigants were encouraged to use open courtrooms in 
 
consumers were not aware of them, the default under the FAA contrasts sharply with what 
the federal statute governing court-annexed arbitration provides. 
584. Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IX, § 901(a), 102 Stat. 4660 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 654(b) 
(1988)) (“Sealing of Arbitration Award”).  
585. Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IX, § 901(a), 102 Stat. 4660 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 655(c) 
(1988)) (“Limitation on Admission of Evidence”). This provision adds arbitration proceed-
ings to the limits imposed by federal evidentiary rules which have, since 1975, precluded the 
admission of information obtained in a mediation or settlement conference. See FED. R. 
EVID. 408. 
586. 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (2012). Congress called on districts to adopt local rules implementing 
confidentiality and provided this provision as an interim measure.  
587. One 2007 lower court decision invoked the statute as a congressional mandate that court-
annexed arbitrations be confidential. Stepp v. NCR Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 826, 836-37 (S.D. 
Ohio 2007) concerned an employee who had lost a job and alleged age discrimination; the 
employer sought confidential compulsory arbitration. The district court rejected many chal-
lenges to the arbitration, including the claim that closure failed to vindicate the employee’s 
statutory rights. In passing, the court commented: “Given that Congress provided for con-
fidentiality in court mandated arbitration, 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) . . . , the inclusion of a confi-
dentiality provision” in the proposed private arbitration was “not sufficient to overcome the 
‘current strong endorsement,’ of arbitration.” 494 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (citing Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991)). 
588. Local rules generally do not discuss public access to arbitration, or reference the location of 
arbitration hearings but do not clarify who can attend. Thus information on actual practices 
requires direct exchanges with courthouse judges and staff, who have been generous in 
providing help. Examples of rules noting that arbitration headings may be held in court-
houses include: N.D. CAL. ADR R. 4-4(b) (2012) (“The hearing may be held at any location 
within the Northern District of California selected by the arbitrator(s), including a room at a 
federal courthouse, if available.); and M.D. GA. R. 16.2.4(B) (2014) (stating that the arbitra-
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a third,589 and that arbitrations were private (if held) in six federal court dis-
tricts.590 An example of open arbitrations in the states comes from Illinois, 
 
tion hearing “shall be held in space to be provided in a United States Courthouse”). The 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania requires what it terms “arbitration trials” to be held in 
courtrooms. E.D. PA. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 53.2(5)(A) (2013) (“The trial shall take place in the 
United States Courthouse in a room assigned by the arbitration clerk.”). The District of 
Connecticut had a local rule, promulgated in 1978 and discontinued in 1982, providing that 
arbitration hearings were “normally [to] be held at the appropriate United States Court-
house” and persons “having a direct interest” were authorized to attend; the arbitrator had 
discretion about whether to permit attendance of “any other person.” D. CONN LOCAL R. 28 
§ 7 (e) (not in use) (on file with author). Similarly, while the local rule for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York states that arbitrations are held in courtrooms, the hearings are not open 
to the public. See E.D.N.Y. LOCAL R.87.3(f)(1)); Telephone Interview with Donna Stienstra, 
supra note 580. 
Staff from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted that requiring arbitration proceed-
ings to take place in a courtroom was meant in part to lend dignity to the proceedings. Tele-
phone Interview by Chris Milione with Michael E. Kunz, Clerk of the Court, E. Dist. of Pa. 
(Apr. 11, 2014). Information on the numbers of arbitrations comes from Stienstra, supra note 
224, at 15 tbl.7, who reported that 2,799 cases had been referred to arbitration in her review 
of forty-nine federal district courts in a year period ending June 30, 2011; the District of New 
Jersey recorded 1,668 court-annexed arbitrations and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
listed 826 court-annexed arbitrations, id. at app. 5. 
589.  Telephone Interview by Chris Milione with Jim Quinlan, Arbitration Clerk, Dist. of N.J. 
(Apr. 9, 2014). Quinlan reconfirmed this information for the author on May 11, 2015 (e-mail 
on file with author). 
590. Two districts’ local rules—those of the Western District of Missouri and the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania—had general privacy rules for ADR that appear to include arbitration. 
See General Order, Mediation and Assessment Program, W.D. Mo., VIII(A)(1) (“This Court 
shall treat as confidential all written and oral communications, not under oath, made in 
connection with or during any Program session except as otherwise noted in this Section.”); 
ADR Policies and Procedures, W.D. Pa. 6(A) (“Except as provided in subsection D of this 
Section 6, this Court, the ADR Coordinator, all neutrals, all counsel, all parties and any oth-
er person who participates (in person or by telephone) in (i) any ADR process described in 
Sections 1 through 5 of these Policies and Procedures, or (ii) any private ADR process pur-
suant to Court order, shall treat as ‘confidential information’ (i) the contents of all docu-
ments created for or by the neutral, (ii) all communications and conduct during the ADR 
process, and (iii) all ‘communications in connection with’ the ADR process.”).  
In four other districts—the Northern District of California, the Middle District of Geor-
gia, the District of Idaho, and the Eastern District of New York—clerks informed students 
working on this project that if arbitration hearings were held, they would be private. See 
Telephone Interview by Chris Milione with Tim Smagacz, ADR Program Administrator, N. 
Dist. of Cal. (Apr. 23, 2014); Telephone Interview by Mark Kelley with Holly McCarra, Ar-
bitration Clerk, Middle Dist. of Ga. (Apr. 2014); Telephone Interview by Devon Porter with 
Susie Headlee, ADR/Pro Bono Coordinator, Dist. of Idaho (Apr. 14, 2014); Telephone In-
terview by Devon Porter with Rita Credle, Arbitration Clerk, E. Dist. of N.Y. (Apr. 24, 
2014). Further, the District of Delaware’s experience with arbitration is limited; most of its 
ADR is mediation. Telephone Interview by Chris Milione with Mary Pat Thynge, Chief 
Magistrate Judge, Dist. of Del. (Apr. 17, 2014). 
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which is both a high-volume jurisdiction and one that provides public access to 
arbitration.591  
Two other parallels between court-annexed arbitration and FAA-based ar-
bitration merit discussion: costs and use. In 1999, the Judicial Conference of 
the United States concluded that federal courts’ local rules should address the 
compensation of “neutrals” and clarify whether they would serve “pro bono or 
for a fee.”592 The related commentary called for participants “unable to afford 
the cost of ADR . . . [to be] excused from paying.”593 Pursuant to this mandate, 
for example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania specified in 2014 that the 
hourly fees were to be paid by funds from the federal judiciary.594  
As for the frequency of use, four of the ten districts originally licensed in 
1988 to create court-annexed arbitration programs continued, as of 2014, to 
 
591. See Arbitrator’s Bench Book, DUPAGE CNTY., ILL., EIGHTEENTH JUD. CIR. 14 (2011), 
http://www.dupageco.org/Courts/Docs/34143 [http://perma.cc/Q4ZM-9KNU]. Arbitration 
hearings are public in all counties in Illinois. See Interview by Chris Milione with  
Loretta Glenny, Arbitration Administrator, Ill. 18th Judicial Dist. (Sept. 29, 2014). The  
proceedings take place either in courthouses, which sometimes have “arbitration centers,” or 
in other buildings. See Illinois Uniform Arbitrator Reference Manual, ADMIN. OFF. ILL. CTS.  
8 (SEPT. 2010), www.dupageco.org/courts/33051 [http://perma.cc/4BRF-UAAJ]; Locations  
and Contact Information, CIR. CT. COOK COUNTY. (2015), http://www.cookcountycourt.org 
/ABOUTTHECOURT/OfficeoftheChiefJudge/CourtRelatedServices/MandatoryArbitration
/LocationsandContactInformation.aspx [http://perma.cc/GL6M-2PXN]; see also ILL. SUP. 
CT. R. 88 cmt. (noting that the “use of courthouse facilities provides a desirable quasi-
judicial atmosphere,” and centralization advances efficiency while providing opportunities 
to monitor the progress of cases).  
592. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 53 
(1999). As noted, the statute authorized the conference to regulation compensation provi-
sions. See 28 U.S.C. § 658 (2012). The “non-mandatory principles” included making known 
rates and limits of compensation and requiring fee disclosures. Thanks to Donna Stienstra 
for pointing us to these sources. See also Jason Bertoldi, Compensating ADR Neutrals in the 
Federal Courts (Feb. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
593. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra 
note 592, at 53-54. 
594. E.D. PA. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 53.2(2) (2013) (calling for compensation of $150 per hour for single 
arbitrators). In the Eastern District of New York, local rules provide compensation, to “be 
paid by or pursuant to the order of the Court” subject to the limits set by the Judicial Con-
ference” of “$250 for services in each case,” unless protracted, and if three arbitrators are 
used, the compensation is “$100 for service” for each. E.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. 83.7(b) see also 
D.N.J. LOCAL CIV.R. 201.1(c) (2014) (calling for compensation of “$250 for service in each 
case” unless the proceeding is protracted); M.D. GA. R. 16.2.2(C) (2014) (providing that 
“arbitrators shall be compensated for their services in such amounts and in such manner as 
the Chief Judge shall specify from time to time by standing order”); N.D. CAL. ADR R. 4-
3(b) (2012) (calling for compensation of $250 per day for single arbitrators and $150 per day 
for each member of a panel of three). 
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provide court-annexed arbitration.595 After the 1998 amendments, six addi-
tional districts established programs, and the volume of cases varied widely, 
from districts in which hundreds of cases went through its program yearly to 
those in which no court-annexed arbitrations had been held in a year or 
more.596 These numbers indicate that some sets of disputants volunteer to ar-
bitrate when the option is provided; to understand which groups select to do 
so requires more than courts records can provide.597  
 
595. As the rules illustrate, these are the districts retaining authority to mandate use of court-
annexed arbitration. See D.N.J. LOCAL CIV. R. 201.1(d)(1) (2014) (“Subject to the exceptions 
set forth in [the local rules], the Clerk shall designate and process for compulsory arbitra-
tion any civil action pending before the Court where the relief sought consists only of mon-
ey damages not in excess of $150,000 exclusive of interest and costs and any claim for puni-
tive damages.”); E.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. 83.7(d)(1)(2013) (requiring that the Clerk of the Court 
“designate and process for compulsory arbitration all civil cases . . . wherein money damages 
only are being sought in an amount not in excess of $150,000.00 exclusive of interest and 
costs.”); E.D. PA. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 53.2(3)(a) (2013) (explaining that the Clerk must “desig-
nate and process for compulsory arbitration all civil cases (including adversary proceedings 
in bankruptcy, excluding, however, (1) social security cases, (2) cases in which a prisoner is a 
party, (3) cases alleging a violation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution, and (4) ac-
tions in which jurisdiction is based in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. §1343) wherein money 
damages only are being sought in an amount not in excess of $150,000.00 exclusive of inter-
est and costs.”); N.D. CAL. ADR R. 3-2 (2012) (“Litigants in certain cases designated when 
the complaint or notice of removal is filed are presumptively required to participate in one 
non-binding ADR process offered by the Court (Arbitration, Early Neutral Evaluation, or 
Mediation) or, with the assigned Judge’s permission, may substitute an ADR process of-
fered by a private provider.”). The Northern District of California, however, no longer had 
an active program. See infra note 596. 
596. Interviews conducted in the spring of 2014 provide some insight into the frequency of court-
annexed arbitrations. The three districts having programs and authorized to mandate use 
were the most active. The District of New Jersey, the Eastern District of New York, and the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania reported robust court-annexed arbitration programs: staff 
described such arbitrations as “very common” in the District of New Jersey, and said that 
they took place about 180 times a year in the Eastern District of New York, and 784 times in 
2013 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In contrast, staff in two districts—the Northern 
District of California and the Western District of Missouri—described such proceedings as 
“rare” or “very rare,” or that none had taken place in the past year. In the District of Dela-
ware, staff estimated similarly low frequency—seven or eight times in the past twenty years; 
staff in the District of Idaho reported about five court-annexed arbitrations in the past ten 
years. In the District of Connecticut, the program had operated from 1978 until about 1982, 
D. CONN LOCAL R. 28 (not in use) (on file with author), and no court-annexed arbitrations 
had taken place for more than twenty years. The Middle District of Georgia reported about 
twelve court-annexed arbitrations per year, and the Western District of Pennsylvania esti-
mated that about two percent of its civil caseload used court-annexed arbitration yearly. See 
Memorandum from Mark Kelley, Devon Porter & Chris Milione to author, Court-Annexed 
Arbitration in the Federal Courts (May 1, 2014) (on file with author). 
597. Commentators suggest that, rather than arbitrate, some disputants prefer mediation, seen as 
a less expensive and more confidential processes. See, e.g., Stienstra, supra note 224, at 15; 
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As noted above, administrative agencies can also be a source of rules—
illustrated here by the public-private system put into place for securities-
regulation arbitrations in the wake of the Court’s rulings enforcing arbitration 
mandates. In the late 1990s, the American Stock Exchange and the Municipal 
Securities Rulemaking Board closed their arbitration systems,598 leaving the 
National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange 
to administer arbitrations. In 2007, they formed FINRA,599 overseen by the 
SEC,600 which became “the sole U.S. private-sector provider of member firm 
regulation for securities firms that do business with the public.”601 FINRA’s 
work includes “rule writing, firm examination, enforcement, and arbitration 
and mediation functions.”602  
The Government Accountability Office has issued a series of reports critical 
of the industry’s arbitrations.603 FINRA’s rules respond to some of those con-
cerns, even as the rules continue to prompt critical commentary and litigation 
about FINRA’s procedures for controlling the selection of arbitrators and  
its failure to require open hearings.604 FINRA has methods for entities to  
 
Thomas J. Stipanowich & Zachary P. Ulrich, Commercial Arbitration and Settlement: Empiri-
cal Insights into the Roles Arbitrators Play, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MED. 1, 2 n.10, 6, 20 (2014).  
598. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 538, at 480. 
599. See News Release: NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine To Form the Financial  
Industry Regulatory Authority—FINRA, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (July 30,  
2007), http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/p036329 [http://perma.cc 
/LR4Y-3Z68] [hereinafter FINRA News Release]. 
600. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2012). The Court referred to the SEC’s oversight function when it held se-
curities claims arbitrable. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233 
(1987) (explaining that the SEC since 1975 “has had expansive power to ensure the adequacy 
of the arbitration procedures employed by the [self-regulatory organizations]”). 
601. Order Approving NASD Proposed Rule Change To Consolidate NASD and NYSE Regula-
tory Functions, SEC Release No. 56146, 2007 WL 5185331 (July 26, 2007); NASD Proposed 
Rule Change To Consolidate NASD and NYSE Regulatory Functions, 72 Fed. Reg. 14149 
(proposed Mar. 26, 2007).  
602. See FINRA News Release, supra note 599. 
603. See supra note 540. 
604. See Christine Hines, Groups Urge Transparency from FINRA on Forced  
Investor Arbitration, FAIR ARB. NOW (Jan. 22, 2015) http://www.fairarbitrationnow 
.org/groups-urge-transparency-from-finra-on-forced-investor-arbitration [http://perma.cc 
/JA76-KGMA] (discussing a letter from Americans for Financial Reform, Alliance for Jus-
tice, Center for Justice and Democracy, Consumers Union, National Association of Con-
sumer Advocates, National Consumers League, Public Investors Arbitration Bar Associa-
tion, Public Citizen, and U.S. PIRG to the FINRA Dispute Resolution Task Force). That 
letter argued that mandatory arbitration deprives individual investors of open and fair hear-
ings and “stunts development of critical legal policy.” Id. (quoting the letter). Moreover, it 
argued, “important information about arbitrator selection and other elements of FINRA’s 
arbitration system remain unavailable to the public.” Id. (quoting the letter). Whether 
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register605 and for individuals, required to have five years of professional expe-
rience and training, to do so as well.606 FINRA delineates between “public” 
and “non-public” arbitrators based on whether they have affiliations with the 
security industry.607 In light of complaints about the arbitral forum’s control 
over arbitrator panel selection,608 a computer generates randomized lists from 
which parties choose arbitrators.609  
FINRA rules leave open the possibility of collective action in courts by  
precluding enforcement of provisions requiring waivers of class actions, while  
requiring that arbitrations under its aegis are individual and not collective  
 
FINRA’s disclosure requirements for arbitrators suffice was the subject of a later court chal-
lenge, arguing that FINRA had failed to specify the nature of an arbitrator’s relationship to 
financial consultants. See Stone v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 538 F. App’x 169 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2292 (2014) (No. 13-959).  
605.  For firm registration under FINRA, see Firm Registration, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY 
(2015), http://www.finra.org/industry/firm-registration [http://perma.cc/X5FX-RQXP]. 
606. See FINRA’s Arbitrators, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://www.finra 
.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitrators/BecomeanArbitrator/FINRAArbitrators [http:// 
perma.cc/ZUJ6-GVNY]; see also Required Basic Arbitrator Training, FIN. INDUSTRY  
REG. AUTHORITY (2014), http://www.finra.org/arbitrationandmediation/arbitrators 
/training/requiredbasicarbitratortraining [http://perma.cc/V767-W8WF]. FINRA requires 
specialized training to chair an arbitral panel. FINRA RULES § 12400(c), http://finra 
.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4138 [http://perma 
.cc/PLW8-XTYJ]. Optional training is also available. Advanced Arbitrator Training, FIN.  
INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation 
/Arbitrators/Training/AdvancedTraining/index.htm [http://perma.cc/93AN-4ZRM].  
607. Code of Arbitration Procedures for Customer Disputes, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY 
§ 12100(u) (June 2013), http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403 
&element_id=4099 [http://perma.cc/8JFK-AH2T]; see Regulatory Notice 13-21, FIN.  
INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (June 2013) (effective July 1, 2013), http://www.finra.org 
/web/groups/industry/@ip@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p272613.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/R8TT-GQ78]. Under California’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) of 2004, CAL. 
LAB. CODE §§ 2698-99 (West 2015), private parties can become “public” to obtain damages 
akin to qui tam, as a way for the state to police labor law violations. See Iskanian v. CLS 
Transp. LA LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1155 (2015). In 2015, the U.S. 
Supreme Court declined to hear a challenge to a decision by the California Supreme Court 
relying on Iskanian. See Brown v. S.C. (Morgan Tire & Auto), 331 P.3d 1274 (2014), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Bridgestone Retail Operations, LLC v. Brown, 83 U.S.L.W. 3627 (U.S. June 1, 
2015) (No. 14-790). 
608. See GAO, 2000, PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS, supra note 540, at 6. 
609. FINRA RULES § 12400(a), FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://finra.complinet 
.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4138 [http://perma.cc/65XS 
-SKHF] (describing this procedure for customer-broker disputes); FINRA RULES § 
13400(a) FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://finra.complinet.com/en/display 
/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4235 [http://perma.cc/65XS-SKHF] (describ-
ing this procedure for industry disputes). 
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actions.610 FINRA’s Rules and its Codes of Arbitration Procedure for Consum-
er and Industry Disputes had, before the Court’s class action arbitration deci-
sions, barred enforcement of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in a putative 
class action unless class certification was denied, a class was decertified, or a 
court found that a consumer was not part of the class.611 Responding to a chal-
lenge to these provisions in light of AT&T v. Concepcion and Italian Colors, 
FINRA’s Board of Governors held in the spring of 2014 that these rules re-
mained “valid and enforceable”612 and accorded with the Exchange Act’s “core” 
purpose of the “protection of investors.”613 
 
610. FINRA RULES § 2268(f), FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://finra.complinet 
.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9955 [http://perma.cc/C3LY 
-MQQR] (requiring all arbitration agreements to include a statement that the clause may 
not be enforced against a member of a putative class action); FINRA RULES § 2268(d), FIN. 
INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main 
.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9955 [http://perma.cc/C3LY-MQQR] (barring any predis-
pute arbitration agreement from including a condition that “limits or contradicts” the 
FINRA rules); see also Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in a Box, or What Class Action 
Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 416-419 (2012) (discussing 
FINRA provisions that bar securities firms from enforcing class action waivers). The rule in 
Italian Colors may apply to FINRA inter-industry and employment arbitration. See Jill I. 
Gross & Olivia Darius, Arbitration Case Law Update 2014, at 5, in SEC. ARB. COURSEBOOK 
(Practising Law Inst.) (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2427401 [http://perma.cc/6MW2 
-KESP]. 
611. FINRA RULES § 2268(f), FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://finra.complinet 
.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9955 [http://perma.cc/C3LY 
-MQQR]. The rule predates FINRA; its predecessor, the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) adopted the precursor to these rules in 1992, in response to SEC pressure 
to “give investors access to the courts in . . . class actions.” Proposed Rule Change by Nat’l 
Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating to Improvements in the NASD Code of Arbitra-
tion Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30519, 30520 (proposed July 9, 1992). 
612. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 2014 WL 1665738, at *18 (FINRA Apr. 24, 2014). In October 
2011, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (Schwab) added a “Waiver of Class Action or Representa-
tive Action” to the arbitration section of its Account Agreement with customers, affecting 
“almost seven million.” Complaint and Request for Expedited Hearing at 1, Charles Schwab 
& Co., Inc., 2014 WL 1665738 (FINRA 2014), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/02022012finra 
_finra.pdf [http://perma.cc/26VR-9GT8]. FINRA brought an enforcement action against 
Schwab in February 2012. Id. at 1. FINRA’s enforcement complaint alleged that Schwab’s 
new provision violated FINRA Rules 2268(d)(1) and (3), which prohibit the enforcement of 
predispute arbitration agreements otherwise against FINRA rules; FINRA Code of Arbitra-
tion Procedure 12204(d), which bars the enforcement of class action waivers; and FINRA 
Rule 2010, which requires FINRA members to meet “high standards of commercial honor” 
and engage in “just and equitable principles of trade.” Id. at 5. The FINRA Board of Gover-
nors’ April 2014 decision overturned a Hearing Panel decision in favor of Schwab. Id. at 2; 
see Hearing Panel Decision Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Parties’ Cross-Motions for 
Summary Judgment, Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., (FINRA Feb. 21, 
2013), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/OHODecision/p258285_0.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/7C8H-RNW9]. Concomitant with the April 2014 decision, Schwab agreed to a settle-
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Aggregate data about FINRA arbitration filings are also made available: be-
tween 2007 and 2013, the numbers ranged from about 3,200 to 7,100 a year.614 
Prior to the issuance of an award, all information is private.615 Once an award is 
made, it can be found on FINRA’s website, which includes the names of the 
parties and their counsel, as well as the relief requested and awarded, if any.616 
The caveat is that, as in courts and other arbitration systems, many cases do 
not end in an award.617 Moreover, FINRA does not provide data on unpaid 
awards, although it can suspend members who fail to pay.618 
 A brief consideration of Europe—once serving as the arbitration model for 
the U.S.—is in order. Under the directive on consumer ADR (CADR) that  
I mentioned in Part I, European rules require providers to register619 and to  
create means to ensure “independence,” “transparency,” the “adversarial  
 
ment requiring it to pay a $500,000 fine and to notify all customers that the class action 
waiver was invalid. FINRA Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent, No. 2011029760202 
(Apr. 24, 2014), http://disciplinaryactions.finra.org/Search/ViewDocument/35735; see also 
Press Release, FINRA, Board Decision Finds Charles Schwab & Co. Violated FINRA Rules by 
Adding Waiver Provisions in Customer Agreements Prohibiting Customers from Participating in 
Class Actions; Reverses FINRA Hearing Panel Decision (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.finra.org 
/newsroom/newsreleases/2014/p493587 [http://perma.cc/N4J7-ESTT]. 
613. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 2014 WL 1665738, at *17-18 (FINRA Apr. 24, 2014).  
614. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://www.finra 
.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics 
[http://perma.cc/8R92-JZ6K]. 
615. Administrative Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalReso
urces/FAQ/P123919 [http://perma.cc/ZZY4-YH8P]. 
616. FINRA RULES § 12904(H), FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://finra.complinet 
.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4192 [http://perma.cc/XWP6 
-UUGV] (for customer disputes “[a]ll awards shall be made publicly available”); FINRA  
RULES § 13904(H), FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://finra.complinet.com 
/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4292 [http://perma.cc/JER2-D76B] 
(same for industry disputes); FINRA Arbitration Awards Online, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTHORI-
TY (2015), http://www.finraawardsonline.finra.org [http://perma.cc/PP2R-YMSV]; FINRA 
Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 446.  
617. For example, through August 2014, twenty-three percent of cases were decided by arbitra-
tors, either after a hearing or after review of documents. See FINRA Dispute Resolution Statis-
tics, supra note 446. “All [o]ther reasons . . . includes cases closed by: Stipulated Award, 
Bankruptcy of Critical Party; Uncured Deficient Claim; Forum Denied; Stayed by Court Ac-
tion, etc. Note cases counted as closed in this report do not include those cases that closed 
and were then reopened.” Id.  
618. FINRA RULES § 9554, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (2015), http://finra.complinet 
.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4005 [http://perma.cc/CT3Q 
-AXYE] (permitting FINRA staff to suspend members that fail to pay arbitration awards or 
related settlements).  
619. European ODR Regulation, supra note 212. 
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principle,” “effectiveness,” and “fairness.”620 The Consumer ADR Directive 
regulates fees, ADR providers’ independence and impartiality, the transparency 
of procedures and obligations to create web-based data about complaints, the 
time to disposition, and compliance with awards.621  
In addition to specifying that pre-dispute agreements against consumers 
are not enforceable,622 the regulations call for information about how CADR 
affects compliance with legal obligations and whether the procedures enhance 
consumer access to remedies.623 ADR entities are to comply “with the require-
ments” on “confidentiality and privacy,” and Member States are to “ensure that 
ADR entities make publicly available any systematic or significant prob-
lems.”624 Researchers on CADR have suggested that it could be “constitution-
ally dangerous for a CADR system to decide the rights and wrongs of a dispute 
other than on the basis of the law,” and that assessments (“key performance 
indicators”) had to rely on lawfulness as a metric.625 
An EU Regulation details how providers are to establish a platform for On-
line Dispute Resolution (ODR), how to submit complaints, and how to create 
a database of complaints so that the “Commission shall have access . . . for  
. . . monitoring the use and functioning” while protecting personal data and  
 
620. HODGES, BENÖHR, & CRUETZFELDT-BANDA, supra note 212, at 13-18; see CADR 2013 Directive, 
supra note 212, at Article 55, on the need to “closely monitor” ADR entities.  
621. See CADR 2013 Directive, supra note 212. Article 8 aims for ninety days to resolution, and 
article 9, on fairness, authorizes parties to withdraw. See id. 
622. See id. Article 10 (“Member States shall ensure that an agreement between a consumer and a 
trader to submit complaints to an ADR entity is not binding on the consumer if it was con-
cluded before the dispute materialized and if it has the effect of depriving the consumer of 
his right to bring an action before the courts for the settlement of the dispute.”). Further, 
under subsection 2, an ADR decision can be binding only if parties are “informed of its 
binding nature in advance and specifically accept that provision.” Id. In general, the law of 
the European Court of Justice regards as unfair “standard form” contracts that require con-
sumers to go to arbitration and remands the issue to national level courts to decide case by 
case whether terms are in fact standard (that is, not negotiable) and not to enforce unfair 
terms. Whether European countries do enough to protect consumers, and whether they 
ought to distinguish among consumers, is the subject of Lisa Waddington, Reflections on the 
Protection of ‘Vulnerable’ Consumers Under EU Law (Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Pa-
per No. 2013-2, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2532904 [http://perma.cc/W8DB-5YLY]. 
 Such sensitivity to context is lauded in Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, & Robert E. 
Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 
75-81 (2014). 
623. See European ODR Regulation, supra note 212 (concerning online dispute resolution for 
consumer disputes).  
624. CADR 2013 Directive, supra note 212, at para. 24, 29, 30. 
625. HODGES, BENÖHR, & CRUETZFELDT-BANDA, supra note 212, at 426-48. 
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confidentiality.626 In addition, EU countries permit monitoring through a pub-
lic “Union-wide data base of consumer complaints” and a “Consumer Markets 
Scoreboard” evaluating access to and use of ADR.627 A European Commission 
Recommendation to expand methods of collective redress describes ADR as an 
“efficient way of obtaining redress in mass harm situations,” and states that 
such procedures should “always be available alongside, or as a voluntary ele-
ment of, judicial collective redress.”628 
Policing can also come from courts, such as a 2010 ruling, Alassini v. Italian 
Telecom, in which the European Court of Justice concluded that the company’s 
online ADR program was not an impermissible and disproportionate burden 
on rights to a fair hearing, but with several caveats that created a framework for 
national courts to assess ADR programs. Thus, ADR efforts could not impose a 
“substantial delay” in bringing legal proceedings and, when needed, time-bars 
were to be tolled; forms of judicial “interim measures” were to remain availa-
ble, and for those unable to use electronic ADR procedures, accommodations 
had to be made.629  
conclusion:  “nightmarish” scenarios and the 
constitution of courts  
A return to the United States and to the federal courts—the font of con-
temporary arbitration law—provides my conclusion. Recall that in 1995, the 
U.S. Judicial Conference’s long-range planners projected that federal court fil-
ings would soar to 610,000 by 2010,630 producing the “nightmarish” scenario 
of overwhelming numbers.631 The Long Range Plan raised the specter that 
“civil litigants who can afford it will opt out of the court system entirely for 
private dispute resolution providers.”632 Further, “the future may make the jury 
 
626. See European ODR Regulation, supra note 212, art. 12, para. 2. Yearly reports were also re-
quired. Various efforts (“EEJ-Net,” “ECC-Net,” “Fin-Net,” “SOLVIT”) aimed to assist con-
sumers in filing cross-border complaints. HODGES, BENÖHR, & CRUETZFELDT-BANDA, supra 
note 212, at 13-18.  
627. Id. at 18-20. 
628. European Commission Recommendation on Collective Redress, supra note 214, at para. 16.  
629. Case C-317/08, Alassini v. Italian Telecom, 2010 E.C.R. I-02213, at para. 47-67. 
630. 1995 Long Range Plan, supra note 189, at 15. 
631.  Under the heading “A Possible Scenario for the Future,” the Long Range Plan stated: “If the 
federal courts’ civil and criminal jurisdiction continues to grow at the same rate it did over 
the past 53 years, the picture in 2020 can only be described as nightmarish.” Id. at 18. 
632. Id. at 19. 
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trial—and perhaps the civil bench trial as well—a creature of the past.”633 The 
projected denouement was that the “federal district courts, rather than being 
forums where the weak and the few have recognized rights that the strong and 
the many must regard, could become an arena for second-class justice.”634  
With these assumptions, the federal courts would largely “become criminal 
courts and forums for those who cannot afford private justice.”635 Therefore, as 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist explained in his foreword to the 1995 Long 
Range Plan, a “conservation” effort was needed to preserve the “core values of 
the rule of law,” “equal justice, judicial independence, national courts of limited 
jurisdiction, excellence, and accountability”—values that were challenged by 
the “limited financial resources of the federal government.”636 
With the advantage of hindsight, we can know that rather than the 
610,000 filings anticipated in 1995 for 2010, some 360,000 cases were begun 
that year.637 As of 2014, filing data were reported as holding “steady”; in 2014, 
total “filings for civil cases and criminal defendants” numbered about 
376,000.638 Moreover, a review of filings during the past 110 years—graphed in 
Figure 8—suggests that if the current trend line remains stable, both the rate of 




633. Id. at 19-20. 
634. Id. at 20  
635. Id. at 20  
636. Id. at vii.  
637. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics: March 31, 2010, supra note 131, at T. C-1 and D-1. 
Recorded were 77,287 filings for criminal cases and 282,307 civil filings. Id. 
638. Chief Justice Roberts noted that the “total filings for civil cases and criminal defendants in 
the district courts grew less than one percent to 376,536.” See Roberts, supra note 113, at 13.  
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Figure 8.  




But the aspirations of the federal judiciary’s Long Range Plan—that civil tri-
als not be “a creature of the past” and that the federal courts be preserved as 
“forums where the weak and the few have recognized rights that the strong and 
the many must regard”640—are dimming. The moniker of the “vanishing trial” 
makes that point.641 In the 1960s, trials took place in about ten percent of the 
 
639.  Information for 1905-1998 comes from William F. Shughart II & Gökhan R. Karahan, De-
terminants of Case Growth in Federal District Courts in the United States, 1904–2002  
(ICPSR 03987-v1), INTER-U. CONSORTIUM FOR POL. & SOC. RES. (2003), http://www 
.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3987 [http://perma.cc/AN8H-GJ53]. For data  
for years 1999-2012, see History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CENTER,  
http://www.fjc.gov/history/caseload.nsf/page/caseloads_main_page [http://perma.cc/4X7G 
-KXJG]. Data for 2013 are taken from Caseload Statistics 2013, U.S. CTS., tbls. C &  
D, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/caseload-statistics 
-2013.aspx [http://perma.cc/D5G9-GBFK]. The effective annual growth rate described in 
Figure 8 reflects the annual rate of growth that would have occurred if filings had increased 
at a constant rate during the prior five years. This growth rate, based on actual growth in 
each of the five years, has been smoothed out to avoid the distraction of the volatility in 
year-to-year growth rates. Five-year growth rates for 1905-1908 are based in part upon es-
timated filings during 1900-1903, projected backwards using years with reported numbers 
of filings and cases pending. This graph does not include bankruptcy filings. 
640. 1995 Long Range Plan, supra note 189, at 20. 
641. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Fed-
eral and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). 
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civil cases brought to federal courts.642 By 2010, trials began in about one case 
out of 100 civil cases filed.643  
Of course, judges do adjudicatory work other than trials, and hence another 
metric is relevant: “bench presence.” After reviewing statistics gathered by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, researchers reported a “steady year-
over-year decline in total courtroom hours” from 2008 to 2012 that continued 
into 2013.644 Federal judges spent less than two hours a day on average in the 
courtroom, or about “423 hours of open court proceedings per active district 
judge.”645 
In contrast, the market for alternative judges is booming. The AAA’s signifi-
cant expansion during the last decades can be tracked through its Supreme Court 
amici filings that, when pieced together, detail the growth. The AAA’s docket 
grew from 1,750 arbitrations in 1950646 to 13,000 in 1966, of which sixty-four 
percent were proceedings against uninsured motorists.647 Within fifteen years, 
the number of annual proceedings had increased to more than 40,000, of 
which, the AAA noted, “a number of them were international.”648 By 2000, the 
 
642. Id. at 465 (noting that between 1962 and 1969, no more than twelve percent of annual civil 
terminations occurring during or after trial); see also Marc Galanter & Angela M. Frozena, A 
Grin Without a Cat: The Continuing Decline & Displacement of Trials in American Courts, 
DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 115; Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedures in De-
cline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 558 (1986) (reporting that trials were completed in 10.5% to 
12% of federal civil cases annually from 1960 to 1969). 
643. Table C-4: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken, 
During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2010, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. (2010), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2010 
/dec10/C04Dec10.pdf [http://perma.cc/6632-GGDA] (indicating that one percent of the 
314,233 civil cases terminated “reach[ed] trial”). The 2013 numbers were about the same. Ta-
ble C-4: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken, Dur-
ing the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2013, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. (2013), http://www 
.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2013/December 
/C04Dec13.pdf [http://perma.cc/DKE8-2MJ5] (indicating that 1.2% of the 259,284 civil cases 
terminated “reach[ed] trial”).  
The logic of the decline is argued by John Langbein in The Disappearance of Civil Trial in 
the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522 (2012). See also Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Con-
sequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631.  
644. See Jordan M. Singer & Hon. William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An Updated Look at 
Federal District Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 565 (2014).  
645. Id. at 566-67. 
646. See Brief of the Am. Arbitration Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Shear-
son/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44), 1986 WL 727884, at 
*16 [hereinafter AAA Shearson/American Express Brief]. 
647. See AAA Prima Paint Brief, supra note 179, at *15 n.9. 
648. Motion for Leave To File Brief of Amicus Curiae at 1, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), 1985 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1614. Two years 
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AAA was offering long-term tallies. Between 1926 (when it began) and 1999, 
the AAA had dealt with about 1.7 million cases, “most of [which were] arbitra-
tions.”649 In 2007, the total was over two million cases,650 and in 2012, the fig-
ure was close to 3.7 million.651 By then, the AAA had entered into cooperative 
agreements with sixty-six organizations in forty-six countries.652 In terms of its 
annual docket, filings are up from 150,000 a year in 2007 to about 200,000 per 
year.653  
As public judges move to the periphery of dispute resolution and shift their 
own procedures to privatize much of their interaction with disputants, another 
effect of Dispute Diffusion and its Alternative Civil Procedure Rules emerges: 
the impact on the public’s right to observe court processes. Above I argued 
that, insofar as can be known in light of a host of closed proceedings and lim-
ited quantitative data, this diffusion of disputes has resulted in a good deal of 
erasure of private enforcement of federal and state litigation rights. Thus, the 
cumulative effect of the Court’s FAA expansion works an unconstitutional dep-
rivation of litigants’ property and court access rights. I close by expanding the 
analysis of how this outsourcing, coupled with the privatization of judicial pro-
cesses in courts, puts at risk the other kind of access-to-court right, that of the 
public’s authority to observe and, with it, the rationales for robust public sup-
port of court services.  
To do so, I return to the constitutional challenge to Delaware’s “arbitra-
tion” program, which I used as an example of resourced parties seeking to rely 
on publicly appointed judges to resolve their disputes, albeit in private. When 
ruling that Delaware could not constitutionally hold closed arbitrations in its 
courthouses, the Third Circuit drew on Supreme Court decisions in criminal 
cases, described as applying a test of “experience” and “logic.”654 The Court has 
held that the First Amendment protects public access to criminal proceedings, 
if they were traditionally accessible (the “experience” prong), as long as access 
“plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in 
 
later, in 1985, the AAA arbitrated approximately 45,000 cases. See AAA Shearson/American 
Express Brief, supra note 646, at *2. 
649. AAA Green Tree Brief, supra note 179, at *2. 
650. AAA Hall Street Brief, supra note 247, at *1. 
651. See AAA BG Group Brief, supra note 180, at * 2.  
652. The American Arbitration Association: A Long History of Working with Government, AM. ARB. 
ASS’N 1 (2011), http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_017603 [https://perma 
.cc/P6PZ-DL7B]. 
653. The AAA website continues to cite the study finding 150,000 arbitrations annually, but the 
growth rate of arbitrations reported in the amici filings suggests higher numbers, now 
above 200,000 yearly. See Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25. 
654. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514-515 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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question” (the “logic” in the test).655 The Third Circuit’s majority explained 
that “Delaware proceedings are conducted by Chancery Court judges in Chan-
cery Court during ordinary court hours, and yield judgments that are enforcea-
ble in the same way as judgments resulting from ordinary Chancery Court pro-
ceedings. Delaware’s proceedings derive a great deal of legitimacy and 
authority from the state.”656 As the concurring opinion by Judge Fuentes put it, 
“the air of [an] official State-run proceeding” made the limit on public access 
unconstitutional.657  
But as I have detailed, experiences in courts are changing and, with them, 
the logic supporting open processes. Dispute Diffusion values speed, finality, 
deregulated variability, and confidentiality. As these values come to dominate 
in and out of courts, the “positive significance” of openness diminishes, reflex-
ively (again in Bourdieu’s sociological terms). As judges turn themselves into 
just another set of actors in the dispute resolution market providing concilia-
tion services, rationales for constitutionally obligatory openness erode, as do 
arguments for substantial public support and structural independence.  
The debate between the majority and dissent in the Delaware litigation il-
lustrates this conflict of values. The majority underscored the benefits to the 
public of knowing how “Delaware resolves major business disputes”658 and 
discounted arguments about the harms that public access would cause.659 In 
the end, public “faith in the Delaware judicial system” was the more weighty 
consideration when finding a “First Amendment right of access to Delaware’s 
government-sponsored arbitrations.”660  
In contrast, the dissent in Strine focused on the centrality of privacy, the 
importance of insulating both the process and the outcomes of arbitrations 
from public scrutiny, the needs of the state to stay competitive, and the role  
of parties’ consent.661 In this account, offering confidentiality (“one of the  
 
655. Id. at 518 (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 
(1986)). 
656. Id. at 520. 
657. Id. at 522 (Fuentes, J., concurring).  
658. Id. at 519 (majority opinion). 
659. Id. at 519-21.  
660. Id. at 521. 
661. Id. at 523-26 (Roth, J., dissenting). Judge Roth’s views were reiterated forcefully in a peti-
tion for certiorari that, despite the support from a host of amici law firms and institutions, 
was denied in the winter of 2014. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Strine v. Del. Coal. for 
Open Gov’t, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014) (No. 13-869), 2012 WL 262086, cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 1551.  
Amici included the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable, TechNet, a 
large group of law firms, and NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. and NYSE Euronext. See Brief of 
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primary reasons why litigants choose arbitration”662) facilitated resolution by 
assuring parties that sensitive information would not be made public.663 Fur-
ther, Delaware sponsored this form of arbitration “as a part of its efforts to pre-
serve its position as the leading state for incorporations in the U.S.”664 Given 
that parties volunteered for the program, the dissent argued that the exercise of 
judicial power derived from their authority, rather than that of the state.665 
Thus, a mix of empirical claims about what prospective users would do (“go 
elsewhere” if Delaware’s proceedings were not closed) and normative views 
about the importance of state-based procedures successfully competing in the 
marketplace of dispute resolution rendered openness the lesser value.666 
This disagreement among the appellate judges illuminates the doctrinal 
weakness of the current First Amendment test of access rights. The logic prong 
lacks a normative compass, putting it at risk of collapsing into the “judgment 
of experience” as new procedures come to the fore. Alternatively, the experi-
ence prong is irrelevant because openness may have value regardless of past 
practices. Indeed, in searching for footings, judges engage with what Jeremy 
Bentham termed “publicity,” and they proffer, albeit often without citation, 
variations on his themes667—that openness forwards informed discussions of 
government, fosters perceptions of fairness, checks corruption, enhances per-
formance, discourages fraud, and permits communities to vent emotions in 
cases involving crimes.668  
 As the Delaware litigation also illustrates, the case law on public access fo-
cuses on whether proceedings in court are trial-like or predicates to trials. 
What the doctrine has yet to take into account is that being “trial-like”—in the 
absence of trials and “bench presence”—ought not to be the only measure of 
 
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and Business Roundtable as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Strine, 134 S. Ct. 1551, 2014 WL 709719; Brief for 
TechNet as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Strine, 134 S. Ct. 1551, 2014 WL 709721; 
Motion of Law Firms for Leave To File Brief as Amici Curiae for [24] Law Firms from 
throughout the Nation and Brief for Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Strine, 134 S. Ct. 
1551, 2014 WL 768323; Brief of NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. and NYSE Euronext as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Granting the Petition, Strine, 134 S. Ct. 1551, 2014 WL 787212.  
662. Strine, 733 F.3d at 525 (Roth, J., dissenting). 
663. Id. 
664. Id. at 524. 
665. Id. at 526. 
666. Id. 
667. JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence (1827), in 6 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 356 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, Tait 1843). 
668. See United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Smith, 
787 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
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constitutional obligations of openness for dispute resolution. When judges take 
on the role of “neutrals” or authorize others to do so with “quasi-judicial” sta-
tus, and when judges outsource their authority to the private sector, these 
“quasi-judicial” acts need to be subjected to public scrutiny. Information is 
needed because the difficulties of producing fair and binding outcomes for the 
millions of individuals who are now rights-holders are enormous. Public de-
bates need to explore what kinds of injuries ought to be redressable and, if so, 
how.  
In a 1976 article analyzing an earlier wave of Supreme Court constitutional 
analyses of the parameters of legitimate adjudication, Jerry Mashaw insisted 
that the “search” for “value” in due process law did not necessarily end in trial-
like proceedings akin to those then associated with courts.669 What was re-
quired were public mechanisms to evaluate the quality of decision making to 
ensure accuracy, to respect the dignity of disputants, and to accord them equal 
treatment.670 The measures he proposed—administrative oversight, transpar-
ency, accounting, and judicial review671—could all come into play to implement 
what the Supreme Court has come to call the “effective vindication” of rights. 
The complement to all of his methods is the concept of publicity, making ex-
changes between disputants and the state accessible in various ways so as to 
enable outsiders to evaluate the shape of the procedures developed and their 
outcomes  
In sum, the Supreme Court was right to invoke the idea of “effective vindi-
cation of rights,” but wrong not to require oversight to accomplish that aim. 
The constitutional predicates of legitimate coercion are at stake, as are the 
property and political rights of citizens. Whether conducted by state-paid or by 
privately financed entities, dispute resolution charged by the state with vindi-
cating legal obligations has to be regulated to ensure equality of access through 
mandating fee waivers for indigence and overseeing the quality of decision 
makers. The alternatives must be publicly available and accountable so as to 
permit analyses of whether their processes and results constitute law, justice, or 
both. In courts and their alternatives, constitutional democracies require public 
engagement with the substantive and procedural rules that are the predicates 
for the power to render enforceable judgments. 
 
669. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in 
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 
(1976). 
670. Id. at 30-54.  
671. Id. at 54-59.  
